Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C588340C for ; Fri, 3 Feb 2017 00:24:35 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from zinan.dashjr.org (zinan.dashjr.org [192.3.11.21]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2632C1CE for ; Fri, 3 Feb 2017 00:24:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ishibashi.localnet (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:5:265:a45d:823b:2d27:961c]) (Authenticated sender: luke-jr) by zinan.dashjr.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4270F38A179B; Fri, 3 Feb 2017 00:24:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Hashcash: 1:25:170203:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org::kUhwb9BJ5GYs7Z1l:y9Zj X-Hashcash: 1:25:170203:teekhan42@gmail.com::U4gzlnCtnfaIL6an:cxCZU From: Luke Dashjr To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org, "t. khan" Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2017 00:24:09 +0000 User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/4.4.45-gentoo; KDE/4.14.24; x86_64; ; ) References: In-Reply-To: X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: E463 A93F 5F31 17EE DE6C 7316 BD02 9424 21F4 889F X-PGP-Key-ID: BD02942421F4889F X-PGP-Keyserver: hkp://pgp.mit.edu MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <201702030024.10232.luke@dashjr.org> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RP_MATCHES_RCVD autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Pre-BIP] Community Consensus Voting System X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 03 Feb 2017 00:24:35 -0000 Strongly disagree with buying "votes", or portraying open standards as a=20 voting process. Also, this depends on address reuse, so it's fundamentally= =20 flawed in design. Some way for people to express their support weighed by coins (without=20 losing/spending them), and possibly weighed by running a full node, might=20 still be desirable. The most straightforward way to do this is to support=20 message signatures somehow (ideally without using the same pubkey as=20 spending), and some [inherently unreliable, but perhaps useful if the=20 community "colludes" to not-cheat] way to sign with ones' full node. Note also that the BIP process already has BIP Comments for leaving textual= =20 opinions on the BIP unrelated to stake. See BIP 2 for details on that. Luke On Thursday, February 02, 2017 7:39:51 PM t. khan via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Please comment on this work-in-progress BIP. >=20 > Thanks, >=20 > - t.k. >=20 > ---------------------- > BIP: ? > Layer: Process > Title: Community Consensus Voting System > Author: t.khan > Comments-Summary: No comments yet. > Comments-URI: TBD > Status: Draft > Type: Standards Track > Created: 2017-02-02 > License: BSD-2 > Voting Address: 3CoFA3JiK5wxe9ze2HoDGDTmZvkE5Uuwh8 (just an example, don= =E2=80=99t > send to this!) >=20 > Abstract > Community Consensus Voting System (CCVS) will allow developers to measure > support for BIPs prior to implementation. >=20 > Motivation > We currently have no way of measuring consensus for potential changes to > the Bitcoin protocol. This is especially problematic for controversial > changes such as the max block size limit. As a result, we have many > proposed solutions but no clear direction. >=20 > Also, due to our lack of ability to measure consensus, there is a general > feeling among many in the community that developers aren=E2=80=99t listen= ing to > their concerns. This is a valid complaint, as it=E2=80=99s not possible t= o listen > to thousands of voices all shouting different things in a crowded > room=E2=80=94basically the situation in the Bitcoin community today. >=20 > The CCVS will allow the general public, miners, companies using Bitcoin, > and developers to vote for their preferred BIP in a way that=E2=80=99s pu= blic and > relatively difficult (expensive) to manipulate. >=20 > Specification > Each competing BIP will be assigned a unique bitcoin address which is add= ed > to each header. Anyone who wanted to vote would cast their ballot by > sending a small amount (0.0001 btc) to their preferred BIP's address. Each > transaction counts as 1 vote. >=20 > Confirmed Vote Multiplier: > Mining Pools, companies using Bitcoin, and Core maintainers/contributors > are allowed one confirmed vote each. A confirmed vote is worth 10,000x a > regular vote. >=20 > For example: >=20 > Slush Pool casts a vote for their preferred BIP and then states publicly > (on their blog) their vote and the transaction ID and emails the URL to t= he > admin of this system. In the final tally, this vote will count as 10,000 > votes. >=20 > Coinbase, Antpool, BitPay, BitFury, etc., all do the same. >=20 > Confirmed votes would be added to a new section in each respective BIP as= a > public record. >=20 > Voting would run for a pre-defined period, ending when a particular block > number is mined. >=20 >=20 > Rationale > Confirmed Vote Multiplier - The purpose of this is twofold; it gives a > larger voice to organizations and the people who will have to do the work > to implement whatever BIP the community prefers, and it will negate the > effect of anyone trying to skew the results by voting repeatedly. >=20 > Definitions > Miner: any individual or organization that has mined at least one valid > block in the last 2016 blocks. >=20 > Company using Bitcoin: any organization using Bitcoin for financial, asset > or other purposes, with either under development and released solutions. >=20 > Developer: any individual who has or had commit access, and any individual > who has authored a BIP >=20 > Unresolved Issues > Node voting: It would be desirable for any full node running an up-to-date > blockchain to also be able to vote with a multiplier (e.g. 100x). But as > this would require code changes, it is outside the scope of this BIP. >=20 > Copyright > This BIP is licensed under the BSD 2-clause license.