Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 02:44:53 -0500
From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
To: Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Message-ID: <20180124074453.GC12767@savin.petertodd.org>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Transaction Merging (bip125 relaxation)
Precedence: list


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On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 10:49:34PM +0000, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev w=
rote:
> On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 10:19 PM, Rhavar via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > Interesting. I didn't think about this before, but it seems like bip125=
 is
> > rather incentive incompatible right now? If we're assuming a competitive
> > mempool, it really doesn't seem generally rational to accept a replacem=
ent
> > transaction of a lower fee rate.
>=20
> BIP125 replacement requires that the fee rate increases.  The text of
> the BIP document is written in a confusing way that doesn't make this
> clear.

In fact I considered only requiring an increase in fee rate, based on the
theory that if absolute fee went down, the transaction must be smaller and =
thus
miners could overall earn more from the additional transactions they could =
fit
into their block. But to do that properly requires considering whether or n=
ot
that's actually true in the particular state the mempool as a whole happens=
 to
be in, so I ditched that idea early on for the much simpler criteria of bot=
h a
feerate and absolute fee increase.

--=20
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org

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