Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 455D38ED for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2015 21:15:01 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from resqmta-ch2-03v.sys.comcast.net (resqmta-ch2-03v.sys.comcast.net [69.252.207.35]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BEAD610D for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2015 21:15:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from resomta-ch2-03v.sys.comcast.net ([69.252.207.99]) by resqmta-ch2-03v.sys.comcast.net with comcast id 99Ez1r00529Cfhx019Ez6F; Tue, 25 Aug 2015 21:14:59 +0000 Received: from crushinator.localnet ([IPv6:2601:186:c000:825e:e9f4:8901:87c7:24a0]) by resomta-ch2-03v.sys.comcast.net with comcast id 99Ey1r00P4eLRLv019Ezwu; Tue, 25 Aug 2015 21:14:59 +0000 From: Matt Whitlock To: Peter Todd , bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 17:14:58 -0400 Message-ID: <1555170.JCnkl2i9KN@crushinator> User-Agent: KMail/4.14.10 (Linux/4.0.5-gentoo; KDE/4.14.11; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: <20150825203744.GB3464@muck> References: <1489961.GhSFCGzPRJ@crushinator> <20150825203744.GB3464@muck> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=comcast.net; s=q20140121; t=1440537299; bh=vZMTcym6nRuzkJL6UZJfxXawODFzGmFdXE1kWtbvQZI=; h=Received:Received:From:To:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version: Content-Type; b=lrhv8LS9ZYVCJSErA3tnGic6TuGmPjo3yTN666YPGyxvHIQM+FAuro75p+n/L8WME JMZlisn67Pv5eBEt1WSm4mlbbV88KGIhooGvfcPgow318eaSZL3uN0A81INVVyUkMS z1rdZTNc0oroAp5FXQGP8c/gGKQMbv7UbWJsTP2eepmStpa9DnyePimzJA5C02/sfN RrYWcsenhBjn1PfGjtv+wtTQwEsbD+0qEcRBwFYVNtFlaoO3+ygLlC7D0nqrIZnBn7 XJtzgpQrxHxEYD838iXC6feFjB4uoQ0LubdCOhPNdEy9X2FeZ9DiQNAmvtZQ2Il5dI kXySrtxYDYojA== X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: greg@xiph.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap [BIP 1xx - Draft] X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 21:15:01 -0000 On Tuesday, 25 August 2015, at 1:37 pm, Peter Todd wrote: > On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 04:26:23PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote: > > On Tuesday, 25 August 2015, at 1:16 pm, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev = wrote: > > > What would you think of an approach like John Dillon's proposal t= o > > > explicitly give the economic majority of coin holders a vote for = the max > > > blocksize? Miners could still vote BIP100 style for what max they= were > > > willing to use, limited in turn by the vote of the economic major= ity. > >=20 > > What fraction of coin holders do you suppose will vote? And, of tho= se, what fraction have the technical knowledge to make an informed vote= ? It would be like polling Toyota truck owners to see whether the 2017 = Tacoma should increase its engine's cylinder displacement by 10%. Ordin= ary users just aren't going to be able to vote meaningfully, and most w= on't respond to the poll at all. >=20 > Note that you can make the % of voters required adapt dyanmically to = voter > interest. Also, your example is rather misleading, as car buyers *do*= > make those kinds of decisions though various market mechanisms. Yes, car buyers do make those kinds of decisions through market mechani= sms. An equivalent process for Bitcoin would be that the max block-size= limit (and other fundamental economic parameters) would be determined = via a process of forking off altcoins (such as Bitcoin XT will do) and = allowing the market to decide which coin is most valuable. This is the = "default" mechanism for change (because it's what naturally happens whe= n there is a lack of internal consensus), but it's not the least painfu= l mechanism. My point still stands that =E2=80=94 just as in democracy in general =E2= =80=94 the voters are really in no position to cast informed votes, nor= should they be (cf. "rational ignorance" [1]). I do not oppose opening= up the determination of the max block-size limit to a popular "check" = via stakeholder vote =E2=80=94 actually, I think this is an important c= heck on miners' power =E2=80=94 but I do argue that the vote is likely = to have drastically little participation and very low-quality results. [1] Rational Ignorance: =C2=ABIgnorance about an issue is said to be "r= ational" when the cost of educating oneself about the issue sufficientl= y to make an informed decision can outweigh any potential benefit one c= ould reasonably expect to gain from that decision, and so it would be i= rrational to waste time doing so.=C2=BB