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From: Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2016 23:38:30 +0000
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To: Chris Priest <cp368202@ohiou.edu>, 
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Capital Efficient Honeypots w/ "Scorched Earth"
 Doublespending Protection
Precedence: list

On Wed, Aug 24, 2016 at 11:03 PM, Chris Priest via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> How does your system prevent against insider attacks? How do you know
> the money is stolen by someone who compromised server #4, and not
> stolen by the person who set up server #4? It is my understanding
> these days most attacks are inside jobs.

Working as designed in that case:  You know #4 is compromised, it
doesn't tell you if it was an insider or an outsider, but in both
cases someone unauthorized or without integrity got access to the
key(s).