Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1QW3YB-0004sI-Ft for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 13 Jun 2011 09:35:15 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from mail-iw0-f175.google.com ([209.85.214.175]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1QW3Y7-0001Nk-0v for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 13 Jun 2011 09:35:15 +0000 Received: by iwn19 with SMTP id 19so2568181iwn.34 for ; Mon, 13 Jun 2011 02:35:05 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.231.82.139 with SMTP id b11mr5179190ibl.134.1307956193048; Mon, 13 Jun 2011 02:09:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.231.19.203 with HTTP; Mon, 13 Jun 2011 02:09:53 -0700 (PDT) X-Originating-IP: [99.173.148.118] In-Reply-To: References: Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2011 05:09:53 -0400 Message-ID: From: Jeff Garzik To: Christian Decker Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 X-Spam-Score: 0.1 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 0.1 AWL AWL: From: address is in the auto white-list X-Headers-End: 1QW3Y7-0001Nk-0v Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bootstrapping via BitTorrent trackers X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2011 09:35:15 -0000 On Mon, Jun 13, 2011 at 4:55 AM, Christian Decker wrote: > We have quite a few bootstrapping mechanisms, starting with the overly > complex (IMHO) IRC bootstrapping, which is often suspected as bot-activity. > Then we have a few hardcoded nodes and some fallback nodes. I was wondering > why we didn't adopt BitTorrent tracker bootstrapping until now? It's > basically all it does. Given a hash (SHA1 hash of the genesis bloc would be > nice ^^) it gives you a list of other nodes with the same hash. It seems to offer few benefits over DNS seeding, while potentially potentially creating a vulnerable hot spot in the DHT. Sybil attacks on DHTs are well documented. -- Jeff Garzik exMULTI, Inc. jgarzik@exmulti.com