Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ECFFED1E for ; Fri, 23 Sep 2016 22:21:43 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from zinan.dashjr.org (unknown [192.3.11.21]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4AAF81D1 for ; Fri, 23 Sep 2016 22:21:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ishibashi.localnet (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:5:265:61b6:56a6:b03d:28d6]) (Authenticated sender: luke-jr) by zinan.dashjr.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BD49A38AB854; Fri, 23 Sep 2016 22:20:42 +0000 (UTC) X-Hashcash: 1:25:160923:roconnor@blockstream.io::diNqwTzoRK6Q4uzF:bYWwg X-Hashcash: 1:25:160923:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org::3baULeyCJAzdlHFu:dhWMr From: Luke Dashjr To: "Russell O'Connor" Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 22:20:39 +0000 User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/4.4.21-gentoo; KDE/4.14.24; x86_64; ; ) References: <201609230957.03138.luke@dashjr.org> In-Reply-To: X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: E463 A93F 5F31 17EE DE6C 7316 BD02 9424 21F4 889F X-PGP-Key-ID: BD02942421F4889F X-PGP-Keyserver: hkp://pgp.mit.edu MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="iso-8859-15" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <201609232220.41783.luke@dashjr.org> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RDNS_DYNAMIC autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP draft: OP_CHECKBLOCKATHEIGHT X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 22:21:44 -0000 In the innocent use case of this opcode, a double-spend has already occurred, and this should be a strict improvement. In the non-innocent abuse of this opcode, I don't see that it's any worse than simply double-spending. Would this proposal be better or otherwise more acceptable, if a specified height more recent than 100 blocks deep causes the script to fail? This would increase delays in recovering the double-spend situation of course... but less than 24h. Luke On Friday, September 23, 2016 1:43:15 PM Russell O'Connor wrote: > I believe Bitcoin currently enjoys the property that during an "innocent" > re-org, i.e. a reorg in which no affected transactions are being double > spent, all affected transactions can always eventually get replayed, so > long as the re-org depth is less than 100. > > My concern with this proposed operation is that it would destroy this > property. > > On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 5:57 AM, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev < > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > This BIP describes a new opcode (OP_CHECKBLOCKATHEIGHT) for the Bitcoin > > scripting system to address reissuing bitcoin transactions when the coins > > they > > spend have been conflicted/double-spent. > > > > https://github.com/luke-jr/bips/blob/bip-cbah/bip-cbah.mediawiki > > > > Does this seem like a good idea/approach? > > > > Luke > > _______________________________________________ > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev