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[85.237.234.5]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id fo15sm909141wic.19.2015.02.05.16.52.16 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Thu, 05 Feb 2015 16:52:17 -0800 (PST) User-Agent: K-9 Mail for Android In-Reply-To: References: <54D3D636.1030308@voskuil.org> <279489A5-1E46-48A2-8F58-1A25821D4D96@gmail.com> <6AEDF3C4-DEE0-4E31-83D0-4FD92B125452@voskuil.org> <54D3FB4A.9010105@voskuil.org> <54D400F0.9090406@voskuil.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 From: =?UTF-8?Q?Martin_Habov=C5=A1tiak?= Date: Fri, 06 Feb 2015 01:50:57 +0100 To: Paul Puey , Eric Voskuil , William Swanson Message-ID: X-Spam-Score: -1.6 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (martin.habovstiak[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YJX9r-0002FD-7S Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal for P2P Wireless (Bluetooth LE) transfer of Payment URI X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 06 Feb 2015 00:52:33 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Commit protocol provides both better user experience and better security. Dňa 6. februára 2015 1:49:12 CET používateľ Paul Puey napísal: >The trust can be considered bootstrapped by visual verification of the >address prefix. If we are really concerned about someone jamming a >Bluetooth signal in a coffeeshop then the UI can encourage verification >of the prefix. Much like how regular Bluetooth requires 'pairing' via >entering a 4-6 digit code. > > > >Paul Puey CEO / Co-Founder, Airbitz Inc >619.850.8624 | http://airbitz.co | San Diego > > > > >On Feb 5, 2015, at 3:46 PM, Eric Voskuil wrote: > >On 02/05/2015 03:36 PM, MⒶrtin HⒶboⓋštiak wrote: >>> A BIP-70 signed payment request in the initial broadcast can resolve >the >>> integrity issues, but because of the public nature of the broadcast >>> coupled with strong public identity, the privacy compromise is much >>> worse. Now transactions are cryptographically tainted. >>> >>> This is also the problem with BIP-70 over the web. TLS and other >>> security precautions aside, an interloper on the communication, >desktop, >>> datacenter, etc., can capture payment requests and strongly >correlate >>> transactions to identities in an automated manner. The payment >request >>> must be kept private between the parties, and that's hard to do. >> >> What about using encryption with forward secrecy? Merchant would >> generate signed request containing public ECDH part, buyer would send >> back transaction encrypted with ECDH and his public ECDH part. If >> receiving address/amount is meant to be private, use commit protocol >> (see ZRTP/RedPhone) and short authentication phrase (which is hard to >> spoof thanks to commit protocol - see RedPhone)? > >Hi Martin, > >The problem is that you need to verify the ownership of the public key. >A MITM can substitute the key. If you don't have verifiable identity >associated with the public key (PKI/WoT), you need a shared secret >(such >as a secret phrase). But the problem is then establishing that secret >over a public channel. > >You can bootstrap a private session over the untrusted network using a >trusted public key (PKI/WoT). But the presumption is that you are >already doing this over the web (using TLS). That process is subject to >attack at the CA. WoT is not subject to a CA attack, because it's >decentralized. But it's also not sufficiently deployed for some >scenarios. > >e - -- Odoslané z môjho Android zariadenia pomocou K-9 Mail. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: APG v1.1.1 iI8EAREKADcFAlTUD/AwHE1hcnRpbiBIYWJvdmF0aWFrIDxtYXJ0aW4uaGFib3Zz dGlha0BnbWFpbC5jb20+AAoJED6C3NvqapyUPwgA/0eVlJYeA3fYmVb1zVA8j1l/ kjOhc9CIDYL9ifk8N0t/AP4mC4CwmZoNXqr24le5WdYeBeyHMiDMtJrRfwQkN1LG dQ== =pY76 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----