Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1RcgBp-0002Pk-0W for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 19 Dec 2011 16:35:49 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from zinan.dashjr.org ([173.242.112.54]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1RcgBj-0006Ow-Ix for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 19 Dec 2011 16:35:48 +0000 Received: from ishibashi.localnet (fl-184-4-160-40.dhcp.embarqhsd.net [184.4.160.40]) (Authenticated sender: luke-jr) by zinan.dashjr.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 15E57560005; Mon, 19 Dec 2011 16:35:38 +0000 (UTC) From: "Luke-Jr" To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 11:35:32 -0500 User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/3.1.4-gentoo; KDE/4.7.3; x86_64; ; ) References: <1323728469.78044.YahooMailNeo@web121012.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <201112191145.02427.andyparkins@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <201112191145.02427.andyparkins@gmail.com> X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: CE5A D56A 36CC 69FA E7D2 3558 665F C11D D53E 9583 X-PGP-Key-ID: 665FC11DD53E9583 X-PGP-Keyserver: x-hkp://subkeys.pgp.net MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="iso-8859-15" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <201112191135.34080.luke@dashjr.org> X-Spam-Score: -2.4 (--) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -2.6 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain 0.2 AWL AWL: From: address is in the auto white-list X-Headers-End: 1RcgBj-0006Ow-Ix Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] [BIP 15] Aliases X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 16:35:49 -0000 On Monday, December 19, 2011 6:44:59 AM Andy Parkins wrote: > Perhaps we should be more strict about which CA certificates are trusted by > the bitcoin client: say restrict it to those who have demonstrably good > practices for verifying identity; rather than the ridiculous amount of > trust that comes pre-installed for me in my browser. Accepted CAs is/should be a property of your *operating system*, not any particular software. Anyhow, restricting this further just makes it even more unusable. Already there is only 1 or 2 CAs that will provide a gratis certificate for personal/small users. If you only allow high-class CAs, I imagine that will restrict "no key in the URI" aliases to those who will fork over a lot of money.