Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1SZIAq-0001FH-CS for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 29 May 2012 08:53:04 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of mac.com designates 17.172.81.0 as permitted sender) client-ip=17.172.81.0; envelope-from=gronager@mac.com; helo=st11p00mm-asmtpout001.mac.com; Received: from st11p00mm-asmtpout001.mac.com ([17.172.81.0]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1SZIAk-0007sZ-Iy for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 29 May 2012 08:53:04 +0000 MIME-version: 1.0 Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Content-type: text/plain; CHARSET=US-ASCII Received: from [109.105.106.230] (unknown [109.105.106.230]) by st11p00mm-asmtp001.mac.com (Oracle Communications Messaging Exchange Server 7u4-22.01 64bit (built Apr 21 2011)) with ESMTPSA id <0M4S00D980O28200@st11p00mm-asmtp001.mac.com> for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 29 May 2012 08:52:52 +0000 (GMT) X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:5.6.7580,1.0.260,0.0.0000 definitions=2012-05-29_03:2012-05-21, 2012-05-29, 1970-01-01 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 spamscore=0 ipscore=0 suspectscore=3 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=6.0.2-1012030000 definitions=main-1205290035 From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Michael_Gr=F8nager?= In-reply-to: Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 10:52:49 +0200 Message-id: <5C824F0D-6025-4630-965B-E6C685588250@mac.com> References: <4FC0C401.1040600@justmoon.de> To: Peter Vessenes X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1278) X-Spam-Score: -1.5 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (gronager[at]mac.com) -0.0 T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record X-Headers-End: 1SZIAk-0007sZ-Iy Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Punishing empty blocks? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 08:53:04 -0000 Peter, I like the idea of being able to know what fees to expect from different miners (it is like a service description / SLA for their service), but I would prefer a more distributed discovery mechanism for the information on the fees (Spent 10 years on Grid Computing...). Miners could e.g. include a pointer to a webpage (or even their min fee) in the coinbase (encoded properly, like the "/P2SH/" string for BIP0016). That way clients could look it up them selves or you could create sites accumulating this information from the chain it self. So something like : const char* service_sla = "|https://my_ubercool_asic_mining_pool/sla.php|"; COINBASE_FLAGS << std::vector(service_sla, service_sla+strlen(service_sla)); The format of the sla.php page should then be specified too - but it could be a json-rpc call returning a json object like (as result): { sla_version: "0.1", accept_no_fee_tx: false, min_fee: 50000, big_tx_fee: 10000, // extra fee pr kb } I guess miners could work out a more suitable set of fees... Seems like this calls for a BIP ? /M On 28/05/2012, at 16:54, Peter Vessenes wrote: > One of the issues here though is that it would be nice if miners published their own tx rules -- it might be hard to impute them from data. > > I had started a thread about this on bitcoin.org some time ago, and I don't recall what the general outcome was. > > I had imagined an open service whereby a miner could publish a short string in their conbase tying to the service and the service would have different metadata, including the miner's transaction guarantees. > > We offered to host this before, and would still be willing to host such a service. > > Peter > > On Sat, May 26, 2012 at 7:52 AM, Stefan Thomas wrote: > Zooko is spot on - slower confirmations will give people a reason to set > higher fees. As soon as fees reach a level where they matter, even > botnet operators will be looking into ways of including transactions for > some extra profit. > > In the meantime slightly slower confirmations aren't a problem. Consider > that even if it takes four blocks to get your transaction included > instead of one, once it is included, you still benefit from every new > block in terms of security. So if you're looking for six confirmations > for example, even a three block delay will only be a 50% delay for you. > And of course there are techniques for instant transactions which > continue to be refined and improved. > > As for the proposed solutions: Punishing 1-tx blocks is complete and > utter nonsense. It's trivial to include a bogus second transaction. > > Any additional challenges towards miners like hashes of the previous > block are at best useless. If I was running a botnet, I'd just grab that > hash from a website (pretty good chance Blockchain.info will have it :P) > or mining pool or wherever and keep going undeterred. At worst they may > affect scalability one day. You might imagine a peer-to-peer network of > miners who for cost reasons don't download all blocks anymore, but > verify only a percentage of them at random. They might then exchange > messages about invalid blocks including a proof (invalid tx, merkle > branch) why the block is invalid. This is just one idea, the point is > that assumptions about what a legitimate miner looks like may not always > hold in the future. > > Finally, there is an ethical aspect as well. If a miner wishes not to > include my transaction that is his choice. He has no more an obligation > to sell his service to me than I have to buy it from him. If I really, > really want him to include my transaction I will have to offer to pay more. > > If we as developers think that confirmations are too slow or that more > blocks should include transactions, then the right measures would be: > > - Educating users about the relationship between confirmation speed and fees > - Raising the default transaction fee > > Every market has a supply curve, so it is economically to be expected > that there will be some miners who don't include transactions, simply > because they are at that end of the supply curve where it is not worth > it for them to sell their service. All markets must have a certain > tension - there must be miners who don't include transactions for there > to be users who want their transactions included more quickly. In other > words there must be somebody not confirming if confirmations are to have > value. If you interfere with that all you'll accomplish is keep > transaction fees below market level, which will make the transition from > inflation-financed hashing to transaction-financed hashing more painful > and disruptive. > > Cheers, > > Stefan > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Live Security Virtual Conference > Exclusive live event will cover all the ways today's security and > threat landscape has changed and how IT managers can respond. Discussions > will include endpoint security, mobile security and the latest in malware > threats. http://www.accelacomm.com/jaw/sfrnl04242012/114/50122263/ > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > > > -- > > Peter J. Vessenes > CEO, CoinLab > M: 206.595.9839 > Skype: vessenes > Google+ > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Live Security Virtual Conference > Exclusive live event will cover all the ways today's security and > threat landscape has changed and how IT managers can respond. Discussions > will include endpoint security, mobile security and the latest in malware > threats. http://www.accelacomm.com/jaw/sfrnl04242012/114/50122263/_______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development Michael Gronager, PhD Director, Ceptacle Jens Juels Gade 33 2100 Copenhagen E Mobile: +45 31 45 14 01 E-mail: gronager@ceptacle.com Web: http://www.ceptacle.com/