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([2a01:cb1d:44:6500:9d6d:71b2:cb71:cb17]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id v10sm9760407wmg.48.2019.11.08.11.40.17 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 08 Nov 2019 11:40:18 -0800 (PST) To: LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion , Luke Dashjr References: <201911081507.40441.luke@dashjr.org> From: Aymeric Vitte Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=vitteaymeric@gmail.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQINBFdW8uABEAC7HJScbB2d/lmYoY5Cn9loEjJwfLs1LC3om030bWFGiH3Ceo5XeHUT94rw Pi+HaHU8ea94425SXIFsnqp/ouoT/8Ffn6vED0OoRmK0jE4fqDApXSpoL2mHX9PAGdUItMtD YrxBiBZNfMkctEsm4NrQ4TCvB3Yrm6Fc69inXJjUoYgPw5tHafEeI8Qwh0j99JZZDKcAqIra JF3MPc59rATz0qOJtRP9EpsPVFwjJe13zN6CHILwiVgrL8EtT5WKCVO6ATxh60LHi8+MwPxV V31zp/NNI5Hck+XocEMO98ZvUu9X8ZxmnOk/+9pBxXEwUqSGUNWdmPJLncpI23Usce3u/MOo M2C4T4rD4J0XrXiyBvbeTvwq4qVNlyggeWzlBH+YpEYgDctPq4gNh4eoTtAkf8URtBeke5bQ CGdaZt/jxv8nvmxs9V/iSyg5ldJLQktHStXOo0OZ7FEB2C6Ggtymm4hm2MHYg07Q1MGJrFLa oJZkJ3JeXnVsZMam7ypQtld6rRa96CvH+llXwux6aQ5hKdzmBBMQ10LlkZhkExgTawbeqdiG RMP2DjD5go6TPdAHS4NN34SBkrTWLqgWOjN/lnG77bbLnpMl0P+xBTuqw1oSXaDbcdHE2nGY lRno/ZZIfr+1Bq56DZLBX/WpnAT4f5WtofL4CxQM9SbG6byyewARAQABtCJBeW1lcmljIFZp dHRlIDxheW1lcmljQHBlZXJzbS5jb20+iQI/BBMBCAApBQJXVvLgAhsjBQkJZgGABwsJCAcD AgEGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQKh17NCYnrDm3WhAAlYmgtSmtfqjBvQMqkmtqiQJA aZkzFZWt6+zroduHH5/Tp8jh73gFqCUyRrl/kcKvs2+XQhfrOwk1R6OScF25bpnrZSeuyJnZ MZu4T0P2tGS8YdddQvWUHMtI9ZnQRuYmuZT23/hgj1JnukuGvGLeY0yDUa1xFffPN39shp5X FPMcpIVOV3bs+xjAdsyfRyO3qJAD1FGiR7ggJeoaxUbKZ6NtcVUPPRMjVTKfopkuDwKY318m BE0epfxSZ/iRhsJ0/sREUWgbgq4/QvCFwBKzgz7fTikGmf8OELWSdofmXs7gOtmMc3el8fJu W8PVa/OsIQHDmwSzvxmE8ba5M8bdwOYEraTWFArIymAAtRXKxmuYpkqKfeSlbCwae3W+pgNT 8nKYRVAFlMtIxYkmPYyMTk9kCscmSqugGWbWdnqe/dhVaa31xa1qO1tDH24D2/tjCJRQt4Jk AEWNSmjCmjfeArMEFTGlZwMTAjVXErLSPbLOsZiZhD9sjvSbfzrtJiMli2h9+Dvds+AJk1PM O8LW7cCNyFoCk4OdAxzJHobZ25G+uy4NSQEHgxLC2iuh/tugz1tOHnQczPc/3AkVVI9A5DF1 gbVRBJh6rI7sAcwuR76uoOs0Rpp7r6I66xqU/5eq8g1OsJp89tw0ppSIa0YmaxNqQZ0l3rVX o/ZwpBjtNQS5Ag0EV1by4AEQANhlz3Ywff4dY1HTdn05v0wVUxZzW2PUih+96m6EhpUrD9BT vxriKtbgxm/zl+5YAlThbrk9f0QyVTHJ95Z1/M5qjuksP9Zn3qZ/8ylANDkN2s3z8Bq/LJA+ u7+APhMqyFWK0FqNCOogClvijiKPEzkU6tmDGO6wZ5pR/u8Fdq7DGQgwgyGZZc7qstte0M7l yx7bVRlPBqvd6kyX3YubQHzkctf46nFjiYZgKawdWFsA3PCdSBupbhixL5d/t1UK9ZTiQJcf 0uhHzT06qwolFrm/ugkLDHtE4Zo3BuKch47Sms8P2hJ08gABxeJHg0ZgkIUy/Xf4nHbDCBJw T8tE8pWYWA2ECiPNo0TOCMVOueEzISUNKINfCuFHSbMQU39hgt3ofxODbAjOiO3e/iu1ptck AkuVBdtjOBP4tHRGxVrbf5EuAV5U5xtiSxMwMgojg0GIXZjnT/8uvWqcLqtJILRMmmu+WNvD oxuiJzcTJhDai9oujmxQwcpMvgrBB89KSTDyitO5XVjZqaR7Zxvvn3rM4bAms/lotv9+pTyh spazTIxb80u0ifJ6y1RxAkxQCfWwps1i3VbsM6OKX78aUyOf5V4ihXF57M37tOqPRwFvz6a+ AIIhUNMTLo2H+o6Vw9qbX8SUxPHPs6YpJ8lWQJ9OMWHE+SbaDFAi/D5hYRubABEBAAGJAiUE GAEIAA8FAldW8uACGwwFCQlmAYAACgkQKh17NCYnrDmk4Q/9Fuu0h5HvIiO3ieYA2StdE7hO vv2THuesjJDsj6aQUTgknaxKptJogNe3dDyIT+FHxXmCw0Nrbm9Q3ryl80z/G9utfFNO3Gwc q31QW3n3LJHnpqdrV3WsRzT5NwJMVtiIAGRrX8ZomtarWHT0PeEHC2xBdFzRrJtmkrwer0Wc 0nBzD7vk1XEXC9nODbmlgsesoHFgRwQBst3wClCbX1gv8aSfxQNpaf9UBC8DmyrQ621UXpBo PvcFEtWxV44vJfP0WOLCCN0Pzv2F2I66iKo7VMqbr5jlNAXJN9I1hXb7qwYJmBC9j5oeEoqv A9d44WWpxrdAr8qih4Nv89k9+9F6NoqORY3FGuVDKiW8CVhCmGT7bIvNeyicVBZFipXqPcKL VFduO2c5Ubc2npMWLUF1k9JJc9tH75l3+F/0RbYVTzGAZ+zSaudwR6h8YiCN2DBZGZkJEZbh 3X/l6jtijMN/W9sPHyyKvm/TmeEC27S3TqZPZ8PUQLxZC70V6gMbenh01JdSQsn5t8Ru0RNh Blt0g7IyZyIKCE9b+TyzbYpX6qgqEBUHia5b0vyPtQacWQlZ8uqnghAqNkLluEsy7Q/7xG6M wXUYEDsFOmB9dKOzcAOIhpxlVjSKu5mzXJ11sEtE8nyF5NJ/riCA7FGcjlki3zIpzQUNo9v7 vXl2h6Tivlk= Message-ID: Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 20:40:17 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.9.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------6BF0EE4CC9D5B8885EE8FEF4" Content-Language: fr X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: "security@bitcoincore.org" Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] CVE-2017-18350 disclosure X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 08 Nov 2019 19:40:22 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------6BF0EE4CC9D5B8885EE8FEF4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sure, but what is questionable here is the use of SOCKS proxy, for Tor I think as the main purpose, making it dangerous for the "whole bitcoin world" while it's something like of zero interest/use (or please let me know what it is beside Tor) The Tor network is very centralized and not designed at all to handle p2p networks (which bitcoin is still not), it is designed to be used via the Tor Browser to browse the web and to hide web servers, not bitcoin nodes, and there are a lot of misbehaving/dangerous nodes there, there is no encryption in bitcoin protocol, an exit node can fake whatever it likes, this seems to be a use case as far as I can see, but even if the initiator is configured to connect to a hidden bitcoin node, I don't see the point I have advertised recentlty the open sourcing of node-Tor (https://github.com/Ayms/node-Tor) here This one is designed for p2p, not over the Tor network but using the Tor protocol, as simple as bitcoin.pipe(node-Tor), or .pipe(node-Tor), which is the finality of the project as far as I see it since years (maybe see http://www.peersm.com/Convergence.pdf even if I would modify some parts now) Inside servers or browsers acting as servers also (WebRTC or WebSockets), bitcoin peers (servers/browsers) relaying the bitcoin anonymized protocol using the Tor protocol (and not the Tor network) between each others, there is no story of exit nodes here and rdv points would not apply for bitcoin use, this "just" adds the internal missing encryption and anonymity layer to the bitcoin protocol Personally I would remove the socks proxy interface from bitcoin core, independently of Tor this can be misused too and offers absolutely zero security Le 08/11/2019 à 18:03, LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH via bitcoin-dev a écrit : > It goes without saying in that all privately known CVE should be > handled so professionally but, that is, well done team. > > Regards, > LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org > on behalf of Luke > Dashjr via bitcoin-dev > *Sent:* Saturday, 9 November 2019 2:07 AM > *To:* bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > *Cc:* security@bitcoincore.org > *Subject:* [bitcoin-dev] CVE-2017-18350 disclosure >   > CVE-2017-18350 is a buffer overflow vulnerability which allows a > malicious > SOCKS proxy server to overwrite the program stack on systems with a > signed > `char` type (including common 32-bit and 64-bit x86 PCs). > > The vulnerability was introduced in > 60a87bce873ce1f76a80b7b8546e83a0cd4e07a5 > (SOCKS5 support) and first released in Bitcoin Core v0.7.0rc1 in 2012 > Aug 27. > A fix was hidden in d90a00eabed0f3f1acea4834ad489484d0012372 ("Improve > and > document SOCKS code") released in v0.15.1, 2017 Nov 6. > > To be vulnerable, the node must be configured to use such a malicious > proxy in > the first place. Note that using *any* proxy over an insecure network > (such > as the Internet) is potentially a vulnerability since the connection > could be > intercepted for such a purpose. > > Upon a connection request from the node, the malicious proxy would > respond > with an acknowledgement of a different target domain name than the one > requested. Normally this acknowledgement is entirely ignored, but if the > length uses the high bit (ie, a length 128-255 inclusive), it will be > interpreted by vulnerable versions as a negative number instead. When the > negative number is passed to the recv() system call to read the domain > name, > it is converted back to an unsigned/positive number, but at a much > wider size > (typically 32-bit), resulting in an effectively infinite read into and > beyond > the 256-byte dummy stack buffer. > > To fix this vulnerability, the dummy buffer was changed to an explicitly > unsigned data type, avoiding the conversion to/from a negative number. > > Credit goes to practicalswift (https://twitter.com/practicalswift) for > discovering and providing the initial fix for the vulnerability, and > Wladimir > J. van der Laan for a disguised version of the fix as well as general > cleanup > to the at-risk code. > > Timeline: > - 2012-04-01: Vulnerability introduced in PR #1141. > - 2012-05-08: Vulnerability merged to master git repository. > - 2012-08-27: Vulnerability published in v0.7.0rc1. > - 2012-09-17: Vulnerability released in v0.7.0. > ... > - 2017-09-21: practicalswift discloses vulnerability to security team. > - 2017-09-23: Wladimir opens PR #11397 to quietly fix vulernability. > - 2017-09-27: Fix merged to master git repository. > - 2017-10-18: Fix merged to 0.15 git repository. > - 2017-11-04: Fix published in v0.15.1rc1. > - 2017-11-09: Fix released in v0.15.1. > ... > - 2019-06-22: Vulnerability existence disclosed to bitcoin-dev ML. > - 2019-11-08: Vulnerability details disclosure to bitcoin-dev ML. > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev -- Move your coins by yourself (browser version): https://peersm.com/wallet Bitcoin transactions made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-transactions Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org Peersm : http://www.peersm.com torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms --------------6BF0EE4CC9D5B8885EE8FEF4 Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Sure, but what is questionable here is the use of SOCKS proxy, for Tor I think as the main purpose, making it dangerous for the "whole bitcoin world" while it's something like of zero interest/use (or please let me know what it is beside Tor)

The Tor network is very centralized and not designed at all to handle p2p networks (which bitcoin is still not), it is designed to be used via the Tor Browser to browse the web and to hide web servers, not bitcoin nodes, and there are a lot of misbehaving/dangerous nodes there, there is no encryption in bitcoin protocol, an exit node can fake whatever it likes, this seems to be a use case as far as I can see, but even if the initiator is configured to connect to a hidden bitcoin node, I don't see the point

I have advertised recentlty the open sourcing of node-Tor (https://github.com/Ayms/node-Tor) here

This one is designed for p2p, not over the Tor network but using the Tor protocol, as simple as bitcoin.pipe(node-Tor), or <any protocol>.pipe(node-Tor), which is the finality of the project as far as I see it since years (maybe see http://www.peersm.com/Convergence.pdf even if I would modify some parts now)

Inside servers or browsers acting as servers also (WebRTC or WebSockets), bitcoin peers (servers/browsers) relaying the bitcoin anonymized protocol using the Tor protocol (and not the Tor network) between each others, there is no story of exit nodes here and rdv points would not apply for bitcoin use, this "just" adds the internal missing encryption and anonymity layer to the bitcoin protocol

Personally I would remove the socks proxy interface from bitcoin core, independently of Tor this can be misused too and offers absolutely zero security


Le 08/11/2019 à 18:03, LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
It goes without saying in that all privately known CVE should be handled so professionally but, that is, well done team.

Regards,
LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH


CVE-2017-18350 is a buffer overflow vulnerability which allows a malicious
SOCKS proxy server to overwrite the program stack on systems with a signed
`char` type (including common 32-bit and 64-bit x86 PCs).

The vulnerability was introduced in 60a87bce873ce1f76a80b7b8546e83a0cd4e07a5
(SOCKS5 support) and first released in Bitcoin Core v0.7.0rc1 in 2012 Aug 27.
A fix was hidden in d90a00eabed0f3f1acea4834ad489484d0012372 ("Improve and
document SOCKS code") released in v0.15.1, 2017 Nov 6.

To be vulnerable, the node must be configured to use such a malicious proxy in
the first place. Note that using *any* proxy over an insecure network (such
as the Internet) is potentially a vulnerability since the connection could be
intercepted for such a purpose.

Upon a connection request from the node, the malicious proxy would respond
with an acknowledgement of a different target domain name than the one
requested. Normally this acknowledgement is entirely ignored, but if the
length uses the high bit (ie, a length 128-255 inclusive), it will be
interpreted by vulnerable versions as a negative number instead. When the
negative number is passed to the recv() system call to read the domain name,
it is converted back to an unsigned/positive number, but at a much wider size
(typically 32-bit), resulting in an effectively infinite read into and beyond
the 256-byte dummy stack buffer.

To fix this vulnerability, the dummy buffer was changed to an explicitly
unsigned data type, avoiding the conversion to/from a negative number.

Credit goes to practicalswift (https://twitter.com/practicalswift) for
discovering and providing the initial fix for the vulnerability, and Wladimir
J. van der Laan for a disguised version of the fix as well as general cleanup
to the at-risk code.

Timeline:
- 2012-04-01: Vulnerability introduced in PR #1141.
- 2012-05-08: Vulnerability merged to master git repository.
- 2012-08-27: Vulnerability published in v0.7.0rc1.
- 2012-09-17: Vulnerability released in v0.7.0.
...
- 2017-09-21: practicalswift discloses vulnerability to security team.
- 2017-09-23: Wladimir opens PR #11397 to quietly fix vulernability.
- 2017-09-27: Fix merged to master git repository.
- 2017-10-18: Fix merged to 0.15 git repository.
- 2017-11-04: Fix published in v0.15.1rc1.
- 2017-11-09: Fix released in v0.15.1.
...
- 2019-06-22: Vulnerability existence disclosed to bitcoin-dev ML.
- 2019-11-08: Vulnerability details disclosure to bitcoin-dev ML.
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

-- 
Move your coins by yourself (browser version): https://peersm.com/wallet
Bitcoin transactions made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-transactions
Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets
Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets
Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist
Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass
Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org
Peersm : http://www.peersm.com
torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live
node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms
--------------6BF0EE4CC9D5B8885EE8FEF4--