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From: Omer Shlomovits <omer.shlomovits@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 10:13:08 +0200
Message-ID: <CALhDas1F6guAvPtTcSR+NJ+cybH-wcJu14ZmiQaSNX98OcWYBw@mail.gmail.com>
To: c1.bitcoin@niftybox.net
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Cc: Morten Dahl <mortendahlcs@gmail.com>, bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org,
	Elichai Turkel <elichai.turkel@gmail.com>, Roman Zeyde <mail@romanzey.de>,
	Gary Benattar <g.benattar@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Multi party Schnorr Rust implementation
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Hi,

AFAIK, There is no way to do threshold signatures non-interactively for the
general case of t out of n. Even if you are willing to maintain additional
data structure on top of the standard and change verification algorithm
(see for example appendix B in [1] where they use bitmaps).

The best way that I came up with so far (which I plan to implement in the
library) is to take SS01 paper [2], this also the paper cited in
bip-schnorr [3], and to replace Pedersen VSS with Feldman VSS (Feldman VSS
implementation can be found in [4] ). Basically taking the DKG from GG18
without paillier and the dlog pok (threshold ecdsa paper [5]) and use it
for the threshold schnorr DKG and for the ephemeral key distributed
generation. This will cause the lost of Robustness but will be more
efficient.

Generally speaking - the purpose of using threshold security is to replace
hw security. The assumption is that you would rather trust that no more
than t out of n different machines will get corrupted at same time than to
trust one secure hardware. Maybe that relax a bit the demand for using air
gapped devices?


[1] https://docs.zilliqa.com/whitepaper.pdf
[2]
https://github.com/KZen-networks/multi-party-schnorr/blob/master/papers/provably_secure_distributed_schnorr_signatures_and_a_threshold_scheme.pdf
[3]
https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/bip-schnorr.mediawiki#multisignatures-and-threshold-signatures
[4]
https://github.com/KZen-networks/curv/tree/master/src/cryptographic_primitives/secret_sharing
[5] http://stevengoldfeder.com/papers/GG18.pdf

On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 8:33 AM Devrandom <c1.bitcoin@niftybox.net> wrote:

> Hi Omer,
>
> Are there any candidates for non-interactive threshold signatures?
> Interactive signatures are not very suitable for air-gapped use cases.
>
> On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 11:18 AM Omer Shlomovits via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Hello all,
>>
>> I am working for the past few months with collaborators (in cc) on
>> providing Rust reference implementations to existing multi party schemes
>> for Schnorr signatures [1]. This includes aggregated signatures,
>> accountable signatures (which for n out of n are multi-signatures) and
>> threshold signatures (wip).
>> The project can be found here:
>> https://github.com/KZen-networks/multi-party-schnorr .
>> We aim that if the protocol is run in a configuration of a single party
>> it will be bip-schnorr [2] compliant.
>>
>> Hope you'll find it useful :)
>> Questions, suggestions and pull requests are welcome!
>>
>>
>> [1]
>> https://github.com/KZen-networks/multi-party-schnorr/tree/master/papers
>> [2] https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/bip-schnorr.mediawiki
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,=C2=A0<div><br></div><div>AFAIK, There is no =
way to do threshold signatures non-interactively for the general case of t =
out of n. Even if you are willing to maintain additional data structure on =
top of the standard and change verification algorithm (see for example appe=
ndix B in [1] where they use bitmaps).</div><div>=C2=A0</div><div>The best =
way that I came up with so far (which I plan to implement in the library) i=
s to take SS01 paper [2], this also the paper cited in bip-schnorr [3], and=
 to replace Pedersen VSS with Feldman VSS (Feldman VSS implementation can b=
e found in [4] ). Basically taking the DKG from GG18 without paillier and t=
he dlog pok (threshold ecdsa paper [5]) and use it for the threshold schnor=
r DKG and for the ephemeral key distributed generation. This will cause the=
 lost of Robustness but will be more efficient.</div><div><br></div><div>Ge=
nerally speaking - the purpose of using threshold security is to replace hw=
 security. The assumption is that you would rather trust that no more than =
t out of n different machines will get corrupted at same time than to trust=
 one secure hardware. Maybe that relax a bit the demand for using air gappe=
d devices?=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>[1]=C2=A0<a href=
=3D"https://docs.zilliqa.com/whitepaper.pdf">https://docs.zilliqa.com/white=
paper.pdf</a></div><div>[2]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/KZen-network=
s/multi-party-schnorr/blob/master/papers/provably_secure_distributed_schnor=
r_signatures_and_a_threshold_scheme.pdf">https://github.com/KZen-networks/m=
ulti-party-schnorr/blob/master/papers/provably_secure_distributed_schnorr_s=
ignatures_and_a_threshold_scheme.pdf</a></div><div>[3]=C2=A0<a href=3D"http=
s://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/bip-schnorr.mediawiki#multisignat=
ures-and-threshold-signatures">https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnor=
r/bip-schnorr.mediawiki#multisignatures-and-threshold-signatures</a><br></d=
iv><div>[4] <a href=3D"https://github.com/KZen-networks/curv/tree/master/sr=
c/cryptographic_primitives/secret_sharing">https://github.com/KZen-networks=
/curv/tree/master/src/cryptographic_primitives/secret_sharing</a></div><div=
>[5]=C2=A0<a href=3D"http://stevengoldfeder.com/papers/GG18.pdf">http://ste=
vengoldfeder.com/papers/GG18.pdf</a></div></div></div></div></div></div></d=
iv><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at =
8:33 AM Devrandom &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:c1.bitcoin@niftybox.net">c1.bitcoin=
@niftybox.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div d=
ir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Omer,</div><div><br></div>Are there any candidates for n=
on-interactive threshold signatures?=C2=A0 Interactive signatures are not v=
ery suitable for air-gapped use cases.<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 11:18 AM Omer Shlomovits via bitcoin=
-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D=
"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hello all,<div><br></div><div>I am working for the past=
 few months with collaborators (in cc) on providing Rust reference implemen=
tations to existing multi party schemes for Schnorr signatures [1]. This in=
cludes aggregated signatures, accountable signatures (which for n out of n =
are multi-signatures) and threshold signatures (wip).=C2=A0</div><div>The p=
roject can be found here:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/KZen-networks/=
multi-party-schnorr" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/KZen-networks/mul=
ti-party-schnorr</a> .=C2=A0</div><div>We aim that if the protocol is run i=
n a configuration of a single party it will be bip-schnorr [2] compliant.=
=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div><font face=3D"arial, helvetica, sans-serif"=
><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">Hope you&#39;ll find it useful :)</span><=
br style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0)">Questions, s=
uggestions and pull requests are welcome!</span></font><br></div><div><br><=
/div><div><br></div><div>[1]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/KZen-networ=
ks/multi-party-schnorr/tree/master/papers" target=3D"_blank">https://github=
.com/KZen-networks/multi-party-schnorr/tree/master/papers</a></div><div>[2]=
=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/bip-schnorr.=
mediawiki" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/=
bip-schnorr.mediawiki</a></div></div></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail=
man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>
</blockquote></div>

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