Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6A5BE4A8 for ; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 18:00:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f181.google.com (mail-wi0-f181.google.com [209.85.212.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 32AF8161 for ; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 18:00:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wibxm9 with SMTP id xm9so212231922wib.0 for ; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 11:00:10 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=GbP4cU3t5/BxgKobcN0e/ix8atVCCcCHLuwIufZX3ME=; b=bogTjFtQ7vXFxyNaM+PjLFabqvFGOFFX/PLFIirSU1nk1+GSkEeMP9QPAOkAn1LL0P emld+Cc7iukQMdF33H0j1A6dc77pubgWUzRpxq+n29O6Z0woWAJmZumSP8YyrIjsFPPz DXWopgqSaW+ShvcCA/skhQHeBc2C/v46tC5gd8Ik5nL5h5Chu+65I8Gs9um3sXCng7Eg AEa2K7vdqJI1OkA1D9Dfw4flNvvZ4+wu+R/Nw45AVKhuX735Rf4AeE7NLdls+5Rl6TVt Bx6CBcvt1OolJGEJmKCxpIgT3jwO1wN4eIKwVldHTCB306yNTLabbHETD/IgcfZTpUaQ MxDQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnEqXMd1LpBHsHRZ+xX7OoWJMqelHZBAHu5xy7wzrf2/WuuJf/Edh+OzCbKWVgOxJJ8OM+D MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.37.74 with SMTP id w10mr5355502wij.92.1438192810777; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 11:00:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.194.95.168 with HTTP; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 11:00:10 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <1B7F00D3-41AE-44BF-818D-EC4EF279DC11@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 20:00:10 +0200 Message-ID: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= To: Eric Lombrozo Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Why Satoshi's temporary anti-spam measure isn't temporary X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 18:00:13 -0000 On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 12:43 PM, Eric Lombrozo via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Erm=E2=80=A6most miners just trust mining pool operators to validate bloc= ks for > them=E2=80=A6and some of the biggest pools have been blatantly cutting co= rners. Yes, > a few pools might have temporarily bled a little=E2=80=A6but properly val= idating is > probably not the equilibrium strategy=E2=80=A6and as time goes on, they a= re likely > to start cutting corners again. Whether they ultimately bleed money isn= =E2=80=99t > really the point - many believe that cutting corners is actually a ration= al > strategy. If you want to discuss the game theory behind this, fine=E2=80= =A6but the > fact some of the biggest mining pool operators are on record saying they = are > likely to continue doing this is enough to seriously put to question one = of > the most fundamental assumptions behind the network security model. Actually validating blocks IS the equilibrium strategy. When the subsidy is completely gone (or at least when the block reward is not almost exclusively composed of subsidy [a future where fees are not a completely negligible part of the total reward]), miners will re-calculate their estimations and they will find out that mining empty blocks won't be so profitable in a future with less subsidy. In fact, with the incentives they currently have (negligible fees) actually bothering about including transactions at all it's not really worth it for them. They may just do it because they're nice people, meta-incentives...whatever the reason is, they users are enjoying a service they're not paying for. Only subsidy and no fees creates other incentive problems, not just SPV mining. But apparently some people think that scaring some users with unreasonable expectations away because they have to pay fees (still, non-proportional [to the amount you're moving] fees due to the irreversibility of the payments: something the reversible payments based on the banking industry can't simply compete with) it's much worse than perpetuating big incentive problems that could break the system. And, of course, short term convenience for users is much more important than figuring out the long term viability of the system once the seigniorage (spent on the miner's subsidy) goes away. The pattern seems clear to be: decentralization and long term viability don't matter too much to some people. For some people, short term market cap seems to be the most important priority and everything else is secondary.