Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3BE79514 for ; Thu, 4 May 2017 14:31:09 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wr0-f172.google.com (mail-wr0-f172.google.com [209.85.128.172]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BDEC7141 for ; Thu, 4 May 2017 14:31:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-wr0-f172.google.com with SMTP id w50so8984148wrc.0 for ; Thu, 04 May 2017 07:31:07 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=subject:to:references:from:message-id:date:user-agent:mime-version :in-reply-to; bh=4vJN6HBsj3qHv3pZECfjBF+Ctfyl3Udf1eiXfN1QdW8=; b=hMBvnWaCSysJ8xoFmcwsfvkyWeZKPeyWIvYHOcjJYcPNWY/Dk3jfSjzVRJQwxPt1mK awR5k20eFxRg+9BZTFFxvfLBuJTo4pO2jSX+eUtzNKStt2MwCVZf9ByKbA9Zro6gFNj9 79FERmKKme+00zX7XPNyKv9gpur/iG6W2OxwfYG8awVQpd5aB2lPTLTwPjyMcOJiU6FO RsIvjUy2pV3y/6/qdTc5BQQKogHfwLr/N2f2lDCZ8yLe7YZNDHE7pzrYGrAb+urt9zod l/sPsbuxrvqI/16c/YNs2DnagGiCefnKagyEYUCmJiO1BQ+t2hS6yMz4O9Iy8QCwMxms 78Gg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:to:references:from:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to; bh=4vJN6HBsj3qHv3pZECfjBF+Ctfyl3Udf1eiXfN1QdW8=; b=sYWO2l591QRmXqbZcRMWZxIh2Y1Frjzs3GSNaHbfpuCnM0W+U5YYRquuJdB+EnxsDS KYJGF7zaCSg+g3s5+8cwCN13MryyNx9xD5O6DJXfDScvsfiCfNViGgj5uauCMJHvFJ31 sAWq+NeFPkioSAKzK9TyqP+5EGtkiYqpaX26KBhHmxjATgf2X7anxQ7l/QphJVWr6R8i g7uFB1H1TUJ4+nok3yqqpk22y/hqS56VBQZv7XWT9GTwuIv7zdoSFTH8z5eUZ5Q0bxhl RKB/WrwxS8jfBmI5Y4iBL36gR9ZxheE1kqc16X+0hicmW++SYuhudWmL9CujLxgkk+UL blGg== X-Gm-Message-State: AN3rC/7TYl/gZgpXp4iv4Bk6SrA8F3AYVZDO+HP/CQwkqzWi4Lf363kE qVfmOaUhgk5ChQGI X-Received: by 10.223.148.165 with SMTP id 34mr18195168wrr.75.1493908266028; Thu, 04 May 2017 07:31:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.1.10] (ANice-654-1-42-58.w83-201.abo.wanadoo.fr. [83.201.101.58]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id l7sm3780200wrc.52.2017.05.04.07.31.04 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 04 May 2017 07:31:05 -0700 (PDT) To: Erik Aronesty , Bitcoin Dev References: <1493894309.1179269.965498864.6244705A@webmail.messagingengine.com> <02b56878-c4e5-d1b9-07f4-317663f543b5@gmail.com> From: Aymeric Vitte Message-ID: Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 16:31:11 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------16B159E3BD1454891ACC1E8C" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Full node "tip" function X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 04 May 2017 14:31:09 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------16B159E3BD1454891ACC1E8C Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Yes, as a whole, but I am sorry, your "tip" proposal is very very very bad as it is, think a little bit more about your latest answer and you will understand why I am a bit perplexed sometimes about what is proposed on this list Adding services paid by the miners is not a bad idea, like some proposals that were posted here proposing some system to validate/format the blocks for the miners But, first, the highest priority is to scale the full nodes and this cannot depend on miners, then once this is done we can imagine other services on top of it paid by the miners or others (+lightning & co) I have already explained many times my thoughts on the subject, I don't pretend that they represent the perfect solution but at least it's different from what we can read , so I think that the core dev team should setup a task force/group to solve this quickly now, the accumulation of strange proposals/workarounds here does not help Because it's a real question for everybody in the current context whether we can trust bitcoin or not, unfortunately the answer currently tends toward the later, or please explain me why this statement could be wrong Le 04/05/2017 à 15:47, Erik Aronesty a écrit : > - Full nodes already perform many valuable services, and simply > allowing people to pay for better service is something operators can > do now - even without it being baked into bitcoind. Paying for > access to a higher-speed relay network, for example, is something that > many operators would do. > > - Baking in the ability to add service fees could make more people > *want* to run more high quality, highly available full nodes... which > is really one of the most important things developers can be doing. > > > On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Aymeric Vitte via bitcoin-dev > > wrote: > > Strange idea, incentiving people to run full nodes should > certainly not depend on miners, should certainly not involve > another wasteful pow and should certainly not encourage any > collusion between participants like miners are doing (ie full > nodes pools for example or miners creating full nodes pools) > > > Le 04/05/2017 à 12:38, Tomas via bitcoin-dev a écrit : >> The ones that *could* pay non-mining full nodes are miners/pools, >> by outsourcing transaction selection using a different PoW. By >> doing so they could buy proof-of-uncensored-selection and >> proof-of-goodwill for a small fee. >> >> We would allow full nodes to generate and broadcast a template >> block which: >> >> * Does not contain a valid header yet >> * Contains the transaction selection >> * Contains a coinbase output with a predetermined part of the >> block reward (say 0.5%) to themselves >> * Contains a nonce for PoW of a predetermined currently ASIC >> resistant hash function behind a OP_RETURN. >> >> The template with the highest PoW since the last block would be >> leading. A miner/pool can then choose to use this instead of >> their own, adding the rest of the reward and the SHA nonce >> themselves. That way they would set up a competition among full >> nodes. >> >> This would of course be voluntary but provable, so maybe in a >> pool's interest to do this via naming and shaming. >> >> Tomas >> bitcrust >> >> On Wed, May 3, 2017, at 23:43, Ben Thompson via bitcoin-dev wrote: >>> I feel like this would be pointless as the vast majority of >>> users would likely download the blockchain from a node that was >>> not enforcing a tip requirement as it would seem like >>> unnecessary cost as in protocols such as BitTorrent there is no >>> such tips in sharing files and the blockchain distribution is in >>> eccense the same thing. However perhaps I am underestimating the >>> generosity of node operators but I feel that adding a cost to >>> the blockchain (assuming that all users add a tip requirement) >>> would lead to centralisation. >>> >>> On Wed, 3 May 2017, 22:21 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev, >>> >> > wrote: >>> >>> IDEA: >>> - Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address. Users that need >>> to download the block chain from that node can be encouraged >>> to send a tip to the peers that served them (by % served). >>> Recommended tip of 10mbit should be fine. >>> >>> - A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the >>> blockchain. If they do, users that don't specify a tip >>> cannot use them. >>> >>> CONS: >>> >>> For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting >>> their own full node. After all, if you have to pay $15 >>> just to get a copy of the blockchain, that just adds to the >>> already expensive prospect of hosting a full node. >>> PROS: >>> >>> As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your >>> money back and more. This is the an incentive for quality, >>> long term hosting. >>> In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick >>> around longer. It also discourages "installation spam" >>> attacks on the network. >>> Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is >>> successful. >>> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > > -- > Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets > > Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets > > Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist > Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass > Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org > Peersm : http://www.peersm.com > torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live > > node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor > > GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms > > _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev > mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > -- Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org Peersm : http://www.peersm.com torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms --------------16B159E3BD1454891ACC1E8C Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Yes, as a whole, but I am sorry, your "tip" proposal is very very very bad as it is, think a little bit more about your latest answer and you will understand why

I am a bit perplexed sometimes about what is proposed on this list

Adding services paid by the miners is not a bad idea, like some proposals that were posted here proposing some system to validate/format the blocks for the miners

But, first, the highest priority is to scale the full nodes and this cannot depend on miners, then once this is done we can imagine other services on top of it paid by the miners or others (+lightning & co)

I have already explained many times my thoughts on the subject, I don't pretend that they represent the perfect solution but at least it's different from what we can read , so I think that the core dev team should setup a task force/group to solve this quickly now, the accumulation of strange proposals/workarounds here does not help

Because it's a real question for everybody in the current context whether we can trust bitcoin or not, unfortunately the answer currently tends toward the later, or please explain me why this statement could be wrong


Le 04/05/2017 à 15:47, Erik Aronesty a écrit :
 - Full nodes already perform many valuable services, and simply allowing people to pay for better service is something operators can do now - even without it being baked into bitcoind.   Paying for access to a higher-speed relay network, for example, is something that many operators would do.

- Baking in the ability to add service fees could make more people *want* to run more high quality, highly available full nodes... which is really one of the most important things developers can be doing.


On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Aymeric Vitte via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

Strange idea, incentiving people to run full nodes should certainly not depend on miners, should certainly not involve another wasteful pow and should certainly not encourage any collusion between participants like miners are doing (ie full nodes pools for example or miners creating full nodes pools)


Le 04/05/2017 à 12:38, Tomas via bitcoin-dev a écrit :
The ones that *could* pay non-mining full nodes are miners/pools, by outsourcing transaction selection using a different PoW.  By doing so they could buy proof-of-uncensored-selection and proof-of-goodwill for a small fee.

We would allow full nodes to generate and broadcast a template block which:

* Does not contain a valid header yet
* Contains the transaction selection
* Contains a coinbase output with a predetermined part of the block reward (say 0.5%) to themselves
* Contains a nonce for PoW of a predetermined currently ASIC resistant hash function behind a OP_RETURN.

The template with the highest PoW since the last block would be leading. A miner/pool can then choose to use this instead of their own, adding the rest of the reward and the SHA nonce themselves. That way they would set up a competition among full nodes.

This would of course be voluntary but provable, so maybe in a pool's interest to do this via naming and shaming.

Tomas
bitcrust

On Wed, May 3, 2017, at 23:43, Ben Thompson via bitcoin-dev wrote:
I feel like this would be pointless as the vast majority of users would likely download the blockchain from a node that was not enforcing a tip requirement as it would seem like unnecessary cost as in protocols such as BitTorrent there is no such tips in sharing files and the blockchain distribution is in eccense the same thing. However perhaps I am underestimating the generosity of node operators but I feel that adding a cost to the blockchain (assuming that all users add a tip requirement) would lead to centralisation.

On Wed, 3 May 2017, 22:21 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev, <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
IDEA:
- Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address.   Users that need to download the block chain from that node can be encouraged to send a tip to the peers that served them (by % served).   Recommended tip of 10mbit should be fine.

- A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the blockchain.  If they do, users that don't specify a tip cannot use them.

CONS:

For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting their own full node.   After all, if you have to pay $15 just to get a copy of the blockchain, that just adds to the already expensive prospect of hosting a full node.  
PROS:

As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your money back and more.   This is the an incentive for quality, long term hosting.
In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick around longer.   It also discourages "installation spam" attacks on the network.
Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is successful.




_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

-- 
Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets
Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets
Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist
Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass
Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org
Peersm : http://www.peersm.com
torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live
node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms
_______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev 
-- 
Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets
Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets
Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist
Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass
Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org
Peersm : http://www.peersm.com
torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live
node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms
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