Return-Path: Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org (smtp4.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::137]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE0FFC002D for ; Thu, 14 Jul 2022 16:01:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C749741A01 for ; Thu, 14 Jul 2022 16:01:56 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp4.osuosl.org C749741A01 Authentication-Results: smtp4.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=q32-com.20210112.gappssmtp.com header.i=@q32-com.20210112.gappssmtp.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20210112 header.b=BviOH0zw X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.399 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.399 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.249, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp4.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ct_KUQ7lfnAz for ; Thu, 14 Jul 2022 16:01:55 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp4.osuosl.org BB228419F6 Received: from mail-lf1-x131.google.com (mail-lf1-x131.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::131]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BB228419F6 for ; Thu, 14 Jul 2022 16:01:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-lf1-x131.google.com with SMTP id z25so3581156lfr.2 for ; Thu, 14 Jul 2022 09:01:54 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=q32-com.20210112.gappssmtp.com; s=20210112; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=edsbawlD1vcacefcO+/9IR6TzmP4H8vXajSW9Lwkvug=; b=BviOH0zwciylkp4JUHLD9LWGcxtps9sVM3e7AZlprinuCkDr5ZRr7sw3pfw9hpqi1Q J9bt4EP54IGbj80thwbU+l+dxG+DvKnh2JtpImbBtYx+yOxHx+n4EFin5+K4RQZ4nL/U C+MvK8i9p4AqY+HufetxmjssCQ3w67rR1k51Ks9TIlZ9WNvxrTY18OTqODty0qKx49V8 RHuFgiCLnMdhJbKIFLER/glxV0sVvZDPkMmMCFTClxBPaTE+1s3rDAjjBZmUOvpDyxlc 8gW2gNHjPiMH8zgZv2ZWBaf+fXuvQepQmtxN1N90pYqkgi5qrhuQm+r5j0GgsDcsF9Vi HAvQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=edsbawlD1vcacefcO+/9IR6TzmP4H8vXajSW9Lwkvug=; b=2YfzTQ7AYgRU8d1JB6RWZLmcpRfatXCNaia/2isBNpCqKEI/7Vioqpz3DYE7EfgSe8 3sv7jw6LS/vd6Kz+4z+0dCVjMhjvSB/Z08XlGA31tDh1keV24Xd56iQKycSslqtA5K76 n86h4nCJ/vz+ULSz/D5ybDjykEYD5nrKpdIvGex4y5gJdqEY2kyOPsL3x6KQ9MfujpDT tCBOqkH7aroe5lnwjzl6b6XIBRpPFuFmoVOF+Q/Hhbdgj8af2bHx6T0pdB9unoD0VEUS 9uo2kLlyzPwzC6NKmA9jmJojjzQJzO4CJgaO6TWdClCgmeIffCEEz9+7GlC7hyJkSjiG Y0nA== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora+shQ+UqtoXqX2FltuurkoYeGmRO9tXGJVh75S7A0+ow9LZ8QJg 1ZhgevxFWzZZbou2/Qh664EUKbovMfXhKNWUU5spuMw= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1v6TGtPqSRXmZFcng0EXJ8gAhnH1oBESxqNWU3+0NYnPln9Qg6SZJNg81JngC4YgBVrzUQJSuOJrP3YQnjVcNM= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6512:3ca2:b0:48a:7f7:3a20 with SMTP id h34-20020a0565123ca200b0048a07f73a20mr5616055lfv.153.1657814511636; Thu, 14 Jul 2022 09:01:51 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <164548764-bff50cb79078c9964aa8ac1e51c13070@pmq5v.m5r2.onet> In-Reply-To: From: Erik Aronesty Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2022 12:01:39 -0400 Message-ID: To: Gino Pinuto Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000011d51305e3c605c3" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 14 Jul 2022 16:34:03 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Security problems with relying on transaction fees for security X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2022 16:01:57 -0000 --00000000000011d51305e3c605c3 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable it's in line with the values of - immutable supply - enforced by the game theory of hard money and no, it's not only "rich holders"... i mine, and lots of people i know d= o it's certainly more decentralized than the alternatives On Thu, Jul 14, 2022 at 7:43 AM Gino Pinuto wrote: > This is not an argument in line with bitcoin values, on that scenario onl= y > rich people will be able to mine and participate to the consensus process= . > Like George Soros today, he use its financial reserves to monopolize ONG > in order to manipulate nation states. I would not define this a "tax", > moreover a cost to maintain control over the network. > > Those rich holders could crate a cartel and without market dynamics all > game theory stop to work and the bitcoin network value drop. > > We should think about how to maximise the network value instead of trying > to preserve it with corruptible practices outside of market dynamics > principles. > > On Thu, 14 Jul 2022, 12:53 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev, < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> Fees and miner rewards are not needed at all for security at all since >> long term holders can simply invest in mining to secure the value of the= ir >> stake. >> >> Isn't it enough that the protocol has a mechanism to secure value? >> >> Sure fees *might* be enough. >> >> But in the event that they are not, large holders can burn a bit to make >> sure the hashrate stays high. >> >> I know, I know it's a tax on the rich and it's not fair because smaller >> holders are less likely to do it, but it's a miniscule tax even in the >> worst case >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jul 14, 2022, 5:35 AM vjudeu via bitcoin-dev < >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >>> > This specific approach would obviously not work as most of those >>> outputs would be dust and the miner would need to waste an absurd amoun= t of >>> block space just to grab them, but maybe there's a smarter way to do it= . >>> >>> There is a smarter way. Just send 0.01 BTC per block to the timelocked >>> outputs. Now, we have 6.25 BTC, so it means less than 0.2%. But that >>> percentage will grow over time, as basic block reward will shrink, and = we >>> will have mandatory 0.01 BTC endlessly moved, until it will wrap. And g= uess >>> what: if it will be 0.01 BTC per block, wrapped every 210,000 blocks, i= t >>> simply means you can lock 2,100 BTC in an endless circulation loop, and >>> avoid this "tail supply attack". >>> >>> So, fortunately, even if "tail supply attackers" will win, we will stil= l >>> have a chance to counter-attack by burning those coins, or (even better= ) by >>> locking them in an endless circulation loop, just to satisfy their >>> malicious soft-fork, whatever amount it will require. Because even if i= t >>> will be mandatory to timelock 0.01 BTC to the current block number plus >>> 210,000, then it is still perfectly valid to move that amount endlessly= , >>> without taking it, just to resist this "tail supply attack". >>> >>> >>> On 2022-07-13 20:01:39 user Manuel Costa via bitcoin-dev < >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>> > What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth >>> out while keeping the ~21M coins limit ? >>> >>> This would be a hard fork afaict as it would go against the rules of th= e >>> coinbase transaction following the usual halving schedule. >>> >>> However, if instead we added a rule that fees have to be sent to an >>> anyone can spend output with a timelock we might be able to achieve a >>> similar thing. >>> >>> Highly inefficient example: >>> >>> - Split blocks into 144 (about a day) >>> - A mined block takes all the fees and distributes them equally into 14= 4 >>> new outputs (anyone can spend) time locked to each of the 144 blocks of= the >>> next day. >>> - Next day, for each block, we'd have available an amount equivalent to >>> the previous day total fees / 144. So we deliver previous day's fees >>> smoothed out. >>> >>> Notes: >>> 144 is arbitrary in the example. >>> This specific approach would obviously not work as most of those output= s >>> would be dust and the miner would need to waste an absurd amount of blo= ck >>> space just to grab them, but maybe there's a smarter way to do it. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Gino Pinuto via bitcoin-dev >>> escreveu no dia quarta, 13/07/2022 =C3=A0(s) 13:19: >>> What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth ou= t >>> while keeping the ~21M coins limit ? >>> >>> >>> Benefits : >>> - Miners would still be incentivized to collect higher fees transaction >>> with the indirect perspective to generate more reward in future. >>> - Revenues are equally distributed over time to all participants and we >>> solve the overnight discrepancy. >>> - Increased velocity of money will reduce the immediate supply of >>> bitcoin cooling down the economy. >>> - Reduction of velocity will have an impact on miners only if it >>> persevere in the long term but short term they will still perceive the >>> buffered reward. >>> >>> >>> I don't have ideas yet on how to elegantly implement this. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, 13 Jul 2022, 12:08 John Tromp via bitcoin-dev, < >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>> > The emission curve lasts over 100 years because Bitcoin success state >>> requires it to be entrenched globally. >>> >>> It effectively doesn't. The last 100 years from 2040-2140 only emits a >>> pittance of about 0.4 of all bitcoin. >>> >>> What matters for proper distribution is the shape of the emission >>> curve. If you emit 99% in the first year and 1% in the next 100 years, >>> your emission "lasts" over 100 years, and you achieve a super low >>> supply inflation rate immediately after 1 year, but it's obviously a >>> terrible form of distribution. >>> >>> This is easy to quantify as the expected time of emission which would >>> be 0.99 * 0.5yr + 0.01* 51yr =3D 2 years. >>> Bitcoin is not much better in that the expected time of emission of an >>> bitcoin satisfies x =3D 0.5*2yr + 0.5*(4+x) and thus equals 6 years. >>> >>> Monero appears much better since its tail emission yields an infinite >>> expected time of emission, but if we avoid infinities by looking at >>> just the soft total emission [1], which is all that is emitted before >>> a 1% yearly inflation, then Monero is seen to actually be a lot worse >>> than Bitcoin, due to emitting over 40% in its first year and halving >>> the reward much faster. Ethereum is much worse still with its huge >>> premine and PoS coins like Algorand are scraping the bottom with their >>> expected emission time of 0. >>> >>> There's only one coin whose expected (soft) emission time is larger >>> than bitcoin's, and it's about an order of magnitude larger, at 50 >>> years. >>> >>> [1] >>> https://john-tromp.medium.com/a-case-for-using-soft-total-supply-1169a1= 88d153 >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > --00000000000011d51305e3c605c3 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
it's in line with the values of

=C2= =A0- immutable=C2=A0supply
=C2=A0- enforced by the game theory of= hard money

and no, it's not only "rich h= olders"... i mine, and lots of people i know do

it's certainly more decentralized than the alternatives



=
On Thu, Jul 14, 2022 at 7:43 AM Gino = Pinuto <gino.pinuto@gmail.com> wrote:
This is not an argument in line with bitcoin values, on tha= t scenario only rich people will be able to mine and participate to the con= sensus process.
Like George Soros today, he use its financ= ial reserves to monopolize ONG in order to manipulate nation states. I woul= d not define this a "tax", moreover a cost to maintain control ov= er the network.

Those ri= ch holders could crate a cartel and without market dynamics all game theory= stop to work and the bitcoin network value drop.
We should think about how to maximise the network= value instead of trying to preserve it with corruptible practices outside = of market dynamics principles.

On Thu, 14 Jul 2022, 12:53 Erik Aronest= y via bitcoin-dev, <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:=
Fees and miner rewards are not needed at all for security at all since l= ong term holders can simply invest in mining to secure the value of their s= take.

Isn't it enough that= the protocol has a mechanism to secure value?

<= /div>
Sure fees *might* be enough.=C2=A0=C2=A0

But in the event that they are not,= large holders can burn a bit to make sure the hashrate stays high.

I know, I know it's a tax o= n the rich and it's not fair because smaller holders are less likely to= do it, but it's a miniscule tax even in the worst case





=


On Thu, J= ul 14, 2022, 5:35 AM vjudeu via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-= dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> This specific approach would obviously no= t work as most of those outputs would be dust and the miner would need to w= aste an absurd amount of block space just to grab them, but maybe there'= ;s a smarter way to do it.

There is a smarter way. Just send 0.01 BTC per block to the timelocked outp= uts. Now, we have 6.25 BTC, so it means less than 0.2%. But that percentage= will grow over time, as basic block reward will shrink, and we will have m= andatory 0.01 BTC endlessly moved, until it will wrap. And guess what: if i= t will be 0.01 BTC per block, wrapped every 210,000 blocks, it simply means= you can lock 2,100 BTC in an endless circulation loop, and avoid this &quo= t;tail supply attack".

So, fortunately, even if "tail supply attackers" will win, we wil= l still have a chance to counter-attack by burning those coins, or (even be= tter) by locking them in an endless circulation loop, just to satisfy their= malicious soft-fork, whatever amount it will require. Because even if it w= ill be mandatory to timelock 0.01 BTC to the current block number plus 210,= 000, then it is still perfectly valid to move that amount endlessly, withou= t taking it, just to resist this "tail supply attack".


On 2022-07-13 20:01:39 user Manuel Costa via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth o= ut while keeping the ~21M coins limit ?

This would be a hard fork afaict as it would go against the rules of the co= inbase transaction following the usual halving schedule.

However, if instead we added a rule that fees have to be sent to an anyone = can spend output with a timelock we might be able to achieve a similar thin= g.

Highly inefficient example:

- Split blocks into 144 (about a day)
- A mined block takes all the fees and distributes them equally into 144 ne= w outputs (anyone can spend) time locked=C2=A0to each of the 144 blocks of = the next day.
- Next day, for each block, we'd have available an amount equivalent to= the previous day total fees / 144. So we deliver previous day's fees s= moothed out.

Notes:
144 is arbitrary in the example.
This specific approach would obviously not work as=C2=A0most of those outpu= ts would be dust and the miner would need to waste an absurd=C2=A0amount of= block space just to grab them, but maybe there's a smarter way to do i= t.




Gino Pinuto via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@l= ists.linuxfoundation.org> escreveu no dia quarta, 13/07/2022 =C3=A0(= s) 13:19:
What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth out wh= ile keeping the ~21M coins limit ?


Benefits :
- Miners would still be incentivized to collect higher fees transaction wit= h the indirect perspective to generate more reward in future.
- Revenues are equally distributed over time to all participants and we sol= ve the overnight discrepancy.
- Increased velocity of money will reduce the immediate supply of bitcoin c= ooling down the economy.
- Reduction of velocity will have an impact on miners only if it persevere = in the long term but short term they will still perceive the buffered rewar= d.


I don't have ideas yet on how to elegantly implement this.



On Wed, 13 Jul 2022, 12:08 John Tromp via bitcoin-dev, <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> The emission curve lasts over 100 years because Bitcoin success state = requires it to be entrenched globally.

It effectively doesn't. The last 100 years from 2040-2140 only emits a<= br> pittance of about 0.4 of all bitcoin.

What matters for proper distribution is the shape of the emission
curve. If you emit 99% in the first year and 1% in the next 100 years,
your emission "lasts" over 100 years, and you achieve a super low=
supply inflation rate immediately after 1 year, but it's obviously a terrible form of distribution.

This is easy to quantify as the expected time of emission which would
be 0.99 * 0.5yr + 0.01* 51yr =3D 2 years.
Bitcoin is not much better in that the expected time of emission of an
bitcoin satisfies x =3D 0.5*2yr + 0.5*(4+x) and thus equals 6 years.

Monero appears much better since its tail emission yields an infinite
expected time of emission, but if we avoid infinities by looking at
just the soft total emission [1], which is all that is emitted before
a 1% yearly inflation, then Monero is seen to actually be a lot worse
than Bitcoin, due to emitting over 40% in its first year and halving
the reward much faster. Ethereum is much worse still with its huge
premine and PoS coins like Algorand are scraping the bottom with their
expected emission time of 0.

There's only one coin whose expected (soft) emission time is larger
than bitcoin's, and it's about an order of magnitude larger, at 50<= br> years.

[1] https://john-tromp.medium.com/a-case-for-using-soft-total-supply-1169a18= 8d153
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.li= nuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.li= nuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.li= nuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundati= on.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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