Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1F38917DF for ; Tue, 29 Sep 2015 17:24:23 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f170.google.com (mail-ig0-f170.google.com [209.85.213.170]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0ED5EFD for ; Tue, 29 Sep 2015 17:24:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igcrk20 with SMTP id rk20so82732220igc.1 for ; Tue, 29 Sep 2015 10:24:21 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=QH2g8buE2AxfVIoCl2prETxpK7wZSyhaEDYUcxNXWB4=; b=PNHhV/s8iOnJVEVv1ItjRzM0nqy3f+MN1wwZa/QQgyYjELGOAEdZ5LQhoNapukS+Ex q8xv3M/vtQk8uRkh1I6FKtX2xNUUwlGw/yDaYq4pPE2u8FiF0hou+NwLWtx3+dfScua7 6Yru2fA1wH29ammh3amVaumh2L0dkCJD5GyPYMGqx7Z71hIhcufJJrkmZ/3NwGaj0nP6 RvGGmA9ilLz4tueMUBK9DR8hhRR2kwx3Af2zDhCnlIDv/MX9YOVtmVR/GqZJozjsxWmX k5QMD8welDCzRmrEAIxSkCf11DnAq5ppk1yg+5wA0Zfnm1eCnW38LjS4ntYrRBDeNUa3 vt3g== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.79.167 with SMTP id k7mr24193752igx.28.1443547461483; Tue, 29 Sep 2015 10:24:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.79.69.135 with HTTP; Tue, 29 Sep 2015 10:24:21 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2015 12:24:21 -0500 Message-ID: From: Allen Piscitello To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e013a1a38a884320520e61503 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Is it possible for there to be two chains after a hard fork? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2015 17:24:23 -0000 --089e013a1a38a884320520e61503 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 You're entire argument seems to be based on this assumption. >I support the 95% chain (because I'm not insane) I fail to see how always following a majority of miners no matter what their actions somehow equates to insanity. On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > I keep seeing statements like this: > > On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 9:30 AM, Jonathan Toomim (Toomim Bros) via > bitcoin-dev wrote: > >> As a further benefit to hard forks, anybody who is ideologically opposed >> to the change can continue to use the old version successfully, as long as >> there are enough miners to keep the fork alive. > > > ... but I can't see how that would work. > > Lets say there is a hard fork, and 5% of miners stubbornly refuse to go > along with the 95% majority (for this thought experiment, it doesn't matter > if the old rules or new rules 'win'). > > Lets further imagine that some exchange decides to support that 5% and > lets people trade coins from that fork (one of the small altcoin exchanges > would definitely do this if they think they can make a profit). > > Now, lets say I've got a lot of pre-fork bitcoin; they're valid on both > sides of the fork. I support the 95% chain (because I'm not insane), but > I'm happy to take people's money if they're stupid enough to give it to me. > > So, I do the following: > > 1) Create a send-to-self transaction on the 95% fork that is ONLY valid on > the 95% fork (maybe I CoinJoin with a post-fork coinbase transaction, or > just move my coins into then out of an exchange's very active hot wallet so > I get coins with a long transaction history on the 95% side of the fork). > > 2) Transfer those same coins to the 5% exchange and sell them for > whatever price I can get (I don't care how low, it is free money to me-- I > will still own the coins on the 95% fork). > > I have to do step (1) to prevent the exchange from taking the > transfer-to-exchange transaction and replaying it on the 95% chain. > > I don't see any way of preventing EVERYBODY who has coins on the 95% side > of the fork from doing that. The result would be a huge free-fall in price > as I, and everybody else, rushes to get some free money from anybody > willing to pay us to remain idealogically pure. > > Does anybody think something else would happen, and do you think that > ANYBODY would stick to the 5% fork in the face of enormously long > transaction confirmation times (~3 hours), a huge transaction backlog as > lots of the 95%'ers try to sell their coins before the price drops, and a > massive price drop for coins on the 5% fork. > > -- > -- > Gavin Andresen > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --089e013a1a38a884320520e61503 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
You're entire argument seems to be based on this = assumption.

>I = support the 95% chain (because I'm not insane)

I fail to see how always foll= owing a majority of miners no matter what their actions somehow equates to = insanity.


On Tue,= Sep 29, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev = <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
I keep seeing statements like this:
On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 9:30 AM, Jonatha= n Toomim (Toomim Bros) via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@li= sts.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
As a furt= her benefit to hard forks, anybody who is ideologically opposed to the chan= ge can continue to use the old version successfully, as long as there are e= nough miners to keep the fork alive.

... but I can= 9;t see how that would work.

Lets say there is a hard fork, and 5% of miners stub= bornly refuse to go along with the 95% majority (for this thought experimen= t, it doesn't matter if the old rules or new rules 'win').

Lets furth= er imagine that some exchange decides to support that 5% and lets people tr= ade coins from that fork (one of the small altcoin exchanges would definite= ly do this if they think they can make a profit).

Now, lets say I've got a lo= t of pre-fork bitcoin; they're valid on both sides of the fork. I suppo= rt the 95% chain (because I'm not insane), but I'm happy to take pe= ople's money if they're stupid enough to give it to me.

So, I do the foll= owing:

1) Create a send-to-self transaction on the 95% fork that is ONLY valid on= the 95% fork (maybe I CoinJoin with a post-fork coinbase transaction, or j= ust move my coins into then out of an exchange's very active hot wallet= so I get coins with a long transaction history on the 95% side of the fork= ).

2) = Transfer =C2=A0those same coins to the 5% exchange and sell them for whatev= er price I can get (I don't care how low, it is free money to me-- I wi= ll still own the coins on the 95% fork).
I have to do step (1) to prevent the exc= hange from taking the transfer-to-exchange transaction and replaying it on = the 95% chain.

I don't see any way of preventing EVERYBODY who h= as coins on the 95% side of the fork from doing that. The result would be a= huge free-fall in price as I, and everybody else, rushes to get some free = money from anybody willing to pay us to remain idealogically pure.

Does anybody t= hink something else would happen, and do you think that ANYBODY would stick= to the 5% fork in the face of enormously long transaction confirmation tim= es (~3 hours), a huge transaction backlog as lots of the 95%'ers try to= sell their coins before the price drops, and a massive price drop for coin= s on the 5% fork.

--
--
Gavin Andresen


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