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Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2015 17:44:43 -0400
From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
To: "Raystonn ." <raystonn@hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <20150608214443.GC19826@muck>
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In-Reply-To: <COL131-DS61BB9B5776DE65077ED0ACDBF0@phx.gbl>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	"Patrick Mccorry \(PGR\)" <patrick.mccorry@newcastle.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential
 solution	described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the block	size
 limit
Precedence: list


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On Mon, Jun 08, 2015 at 02:33:54PM -0700, Raystonn . wrote:
> > the attack would be expensive.
>=20
> For attacks being waged to destroy Bitcoin by filling all blocks with spa=
m transactions, the attack succeeds when the attacker is well funded.  This=
 gives well-funded private and/or public entities the means to destroy Bitc=
oin if they desire.  This is only true after the block size limit was imple=
mented.  Without the block size limit, the spam doesn=E2=80=99t harm Bitcoi=
n.  It simply enriches miners at the cost of the spammers, which is a nicel=
y antifragile quality.

There will always be a blocksize limit based on technological
considerations - the network has a finite bandwidth limit.

Without a blocksize limit the attacker would just flood the network
until the bandwidth usage became so great that consensus would fail,
rendering Bitcoin both worthless, and insecure.

The worst an attacker flooding the network with transactions with a
blocksize limit can do is raise costs, without harming security. Keep in
mind, that at some point it'd be cheaper to just 51% attack the network.
Based on the current block subsidy of 25BTC/MB that's at the point where
transaction fees are 25mBTC/KB, which corresponds to <$2/tx fees - not
that cheap, but still quite affordable for a large percentage of
Bitcoin's users right now. And that's the *absolute worst-case* attack
possible.

--=20
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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