Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::138]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BA067C002D for ; Wed, 29 Jun 2022 10:44:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8FDC88270B for ; Wed, 29 Jun 2022 10:44:26 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp1.osuosl.org 8FDC88270B Authentication-Results: smtp1.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20210112 header.b=K9wgea0q X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.098 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp1.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Fhosl_cI44Fn for ; Wed, 29 Jun 2022 10:44:25 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp1.osuosl.org 243FE826B4 Received: from mail-yw1-x1136.google.com (mail-yw1-x1136.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1136]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 243FE826B4 for ; Wed, 29 Jun 2022 10:44:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-yw1-x1136.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-3177f4ce3e2so143880747b3.5 for ; Wed, 29 Jun 2022 03:44:25 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=fV+j0zohtAwCtHXE9uphQWbAfC/UYQQwfYsR+r/9Vfk=; b=K9wgea0qJTCS3ENmuqJwhpOJqI4boFKu6PbWVI78JKT1he9ifCDQQZ1/oA/qUI7VQ6 WD+Rr+ws8lt8rc80rNZcFUrQULlCcUiKOYN64X8JuVdbr3QkzCnTeBGnDGMXp6t8QKVa Y5GVd1dSJ1ucAAjxB/uOgnEWBPLzUNIu3I7vTLCbA4Z0j7ZXlsG9f6uudLGWrcBQUCy5 E9YK6FFDu+lIea2pSeCNoLHMK3EZgzCQ8IWB9TUmwFbfvLVeBe+RTqsDlWXth2ZSyRER FvClmh2qW2l0eNO5A49jXk9W2C3q8CZmb+7l+Dz9FdXN2Uei1AVPFQftOsnXpDLr+pHI 8AkQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=fV+j0zohtAwCtHXE9uphQWbAfC/UYQQwfYsR+r/9Vfk=; b=D7NR3udYkgaqf3KaWigN/92pXnOnxEpjAXUWUi1f0BYQnOhZhZrIp1k4rUn6915+7s TC39n0rT39YFrySlzmRQziapHlCS6sqnxD+zL5avn0QskBa9r0c/RwQ3lLDHFIcahSpn z7R6D5YWZNoAa4D0PlHKkVQNZ57FJXpOpv9CzoS/CNlXvMvAqsf2hDT1tqbr4vvFzmDt nWMEzkYZI6wYTg5AhgmBBKvcelX/0iwsbFJVgS/pNNm82abDDO/f80mboNCGohXYv8A5 Ae6SHBCTOyaxN8WRdIurjL0yeS4+OZxj63GiVE9tC+MwLVana9NxK4F/3uUCGrL2tyYo HhZQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora9Lqo6JyzksZ3ltNbwKmig2INBo6T12IgC472J9vlrRtYp+Gn75 L1pwXVS+CV3NcDe98n+AHw2RNNtfOjTOk5jqYApgDryuiIfeBw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1u33xBwOVkZSPL//osU2ZFbyKZZXjYZBrm/skbZB0LgamLTJ5bcLnO62lry3ObyBU9QrXRs+ep4zOkbTu0YmuY= X-Received: by 2002:a0d:dd10:0:b0:317:abd3:a97e with SMTP id g16-20020a0ddd10000000b00317abd3a97emr3210126ywe.56.1656499463946; Wed, 29 Jun 2022 03:44:23 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Kate Salazar Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 12:44:11 +0200 Message-ID: To: Billy Tetrud , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000001e8b9c05e293d683" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 10:51:25 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin covenants are inevitable X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 10:44:26 -0000 --0000000000001e8b9c05e293d683 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hey On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 10:43 AM Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > @Eric > > People who transact are realizing the benefit of money - the avoidance > of barter costs. > > I'm very confident you're incorrect that holders don't receive any benefit > and you're certainly not correct that every spend is receiving the same > benefit. As I'm sure you're aware, one of the primary components of a > currency's value and purpose is as a store of value. Storing value happens > while you're holding it, not while you're spending it. Consider the > following two scenarios: one person holds onto 10 bitcoin for 10 years and > then spends those 10 bitcoins in some way in 2 transactions. Another person > spends 4 bitcoins to buy something, then sells it for 6 bitcoins, and then > buys something else for that 6 bitcoins and then never acquires any bitcoin > for 10 years. > > Both people spent 10 bitcoins over 2 transactions. Over that 10 year > period, only one of those people utilized bitcoin's utility as a store of > value. Who benefited more from their use of bitcoin? > > > Those who never transact, never realize any benefit. > > While that's true, its not relevant and basically a red herring. You need > to compare those who transact often and rarely hold, to those who hold a > lot but rarely transact. Its not helpful to consider those who throw their > bitcoin into a bottomless pit and never retrieve them. > > On an idealistic level, I agree with Keagan that it would make sense to > have "a balance of fees to that effect". I think doing that would be > technically/economically optimal. However, I think there is an enormous > benefit to having a cultural aversion to monetary inflation and the > consequences of convincing the bitcoin community that inflation is ok could > have unintended negative consequences (not to mention how difficult > convincing the community would be in the first place). There's also the > economic distortion that inflation causes that has a negative effect which > should also be considered. The idea of decaying utxo value is interesting > to consider, but it would not solve the economic distortion that > monetary inflation causes, because that distortion is a result of monetary > devaluation (which decaying utxos would be a form of). Then again, maybe in > this case the distortion of inflation would actually be a correction - > correcting for the externality of benefit received by holders. I'm > stream-of-consciousnessing a bit, but anyways, I suspect its not worth the > trouble to perfect the distribution of bitcoin blockchain security costs to > include holders. Tho, if I were to go back in time and influence how > bitcoin was designed, I might advocate for it. > Pool operators are free to request larger fees from older utxos, or from all utxos, or from newer utxos, at their judgement, looking at the blockspace demand census and at what the other pool operators are doing. This is not consensus, it's policy. It's not a technology problem, it's solved above in the social layer. If this kind of problem torments anyone, maybe miner decentralization hard forks are worth looking at, some already exist. > > @Peter > > demurrage and inflation have identical economic properties. > > The distortion of incentives is identical, however there is also the > effect it has on a currency's property as a useful unit of account. > Decaying utxos would mean that it would contribute substantially less to > market prices needing to change. I suspect this effect would be bordering > on negligible tho. > > On Thu, Jun 23, 2022 at 2:17 PM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> On Tue, Jun 21, 2022 at 01:00:07PM -0600, Keagan McClelland via >> bitcoin-dev wrote: >> > > The PoW security of Bitcoin benefits all Bitcoin users, proportional >> to >> > the >> > value of BTC they hold; if Bitcoin blocks aren't reliably created the >> value >> > of >> > *all* BTC goes down. It doesn't make sense for the entire cost of that >> > security >> > to be paid for on a per-tx basis. And there's a high chance paying for >> it >> > on a >> > per-tx basis won't work anyway due to lack of consistent demand. >> > >> > FWIW I prefer the demurrage route. Having something with finite supply >> as a >> > means of measuring economic activity is unprecedented and I believe >> deeply >> > important. I'm sympathetic to the argument that the security of the >> chain >> > should not be solely the responsibility of transactors. We realize the >> > value of money on receipt, hold *and* spend and it would be appropriate >> for >> > there to be a balance of fees to that effect. While inflation may be >> > simpler to implement (just chop off the last few halvings), I think it >> > would be superior (on the assumption that such a hodl tax was >> necessary) to >> > keep the supply fixed and have people's utxo balances decay, at least at >> > the level of the UX. >> >> Demurrage makes protocols like Lightning much more complex, and isn't >> compatible with existing implementations. While demurrage could in theory >> be >> implemented in a soft-fork by forcing txs to contain an output with the >> demurrage-taxed amount, spending to a pool of future mining fees, I really >> don't think it's practical to actually do that. >> >> Anyway, demurrage and inflation have identical economic properties. >> They're >> both a tax on savings. The only difference is the way that tax is >> implemented. >> >> -- >> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --0000000000001e8b9c05e293d683 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hey

<= div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 10:43 AM Billy= Tetrud via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
@Eric<= br>
>=C2=A0 People who transact are realizing the benefit of money - the avoidance of b= arter costs.=C2=A0

I'm very confident you're inc= orrect that=C2=A0holders=C2=A0don't receive any benefit and you're = certainly not correct that=C2=A0every=C2=A0spend is receiving the same bene= fit. As I'm sure you're aware, one of the primary components of a c= urrency's value and purpose is as a store of=C2=A0value. Storing value = happens while you're holding it, not while you're spending it. Cons= ider the following two scenarios: one person holds onto 10 bitcoin for 10 y= ears and then spends those 10 bitcoins in=C2=A0some way in 2 transactions. = Another person spends 4 bitcoins to buy something, then sells it for 6 bitc= oins, and then buys something else for that 6 bitcoins and then never acqui= res any bitcoin for 10 years.=C2=A0

Both people sp= ent 10 bitcoins over 2 transactions. Over that 10 year period, only one of = those people utilized bitcoin's utility as a store of value. Who benefi= ted more from their use of bitcoin?=C2=A0

> Tho= se who never transact, never realize any benefit.

= While that's true, its not relevant and basically a red herring. You ne= ed to compare those who transact often and rarely hold, to those who hold a= lot but rarely transact. Its=C2=A0not helpful to consider those who throw = their bitcoin into a bottomless pit and never retrieve them.

=
On an idealistic level, I agree with Keagan that it would make s= ense to have "a balance of fees to that effect". I think doing th= at would be technically/economically optimal. However, I think there is an = enormous benefit to having a cultural aversion to monetary inflation and th= e consequences of convincing the bitcoin community that inflation is ok cou= ld have unintended negative consequences (not to mention how difficult conv= incing the community would be in the first place). There's also the eco= nomic distortion that inflation causes that has a negative effect which sho= uld also be considered. The idea of decaying utxo value is interesting to c= onsider, but it would not solve the economic distortion that monetary=C2=A0= inflation causes,=C2=A0because that=C2=A0distortion is a result of monetary= devaluation (which decaying=C2=A0utxos would be a form of). Then again, ma= ybe in this case the distortion of inflation would actually be a correction= - correcting for the externality of benefit received by holders. I'm s= tream-of-consciousnessing=C2=A0a bit, but anyways, I suspect its not worth = the trouble to perfect the distribution of bitcoin blockchain security cost= s to include holders. Tho, if I were to go back in time and influence how b= itcoin was designed, I might advocate for it.
=
Pool operators are free to request larger fees from older ut= xos, or from all utxos, or from newer utxos, at their judgement, looking at= the blockspace demand census and at what the other pool operators are doin= g. This is not consensus, it's policy. It's not a technology proble= m, it's solved above in the social layer.

If t= his kind of problem torments anyone, maybe miner decentralization hard fork= s are worth looking at, some already=C2=A0exist.
=C2=A0

@Peter
> demurrage and inflation have identical ec= onomic properties.=C2=A0

The distortion of incenti= ves is identical, however there is also the effect it has on a currency'= ;s property as a useful unit of account. Decaying utxos would mean that it = would contribute substantially less to market prices needing to change. I s= uspect this effect would be bordering on negligible tho.=C2=A0
<= br>
On Thu,= Jun 23, 2022 at 2:17 PM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.l= inuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On Tue, Jun 21, 2022 at 01:00:07PM -0600, Keagan McClella= nd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > The PoW security of Bitcoin benefits all Bitcoin users, proportio= nal to
> the
> value of BTC they hold; if Bitcoin blocks aren't reliably created = the value
> of
> *all* BTC goes down. It doesn't make sense for the entire cost of = that
> security
> to be paid for on a per-tx basis. And there's a high chance paying= for it
> on a
> per-tx basis won't work anyway due to lack of consistent demand. >
> FWIW I prefer the demurrage route. Having something with finite supply= as a
> means of measuring economic activity is unprecedented and I believe de= eply
> important. I'm sympathetic to the argument that the security of th= e chain
> should not be solely the responsibility of transactors. We realize the=
> value of money on receipt, hold *and* spend and it would be appropriat= e for
> there to be a balance of fees to that effect. While inflation may be > simpler to implement (just chop off the last few halvings), I think it=
> would be superior (on the assumption that such a hodl tax was necessar= y) to
> keep the supply fixed and have people's utxo balances decay, at le= ast at
> the level of the UX.

Demurrage makes protocols like Lightning much more complex, and isn't compatible with existing implementations. While demurrage could in theory b= e
implemented in a soft-fork by forcing txs to contain an output with the
demurrage-taxed amount, spending to a pool of future mining fees, I really<= br> don't think it's practical to actually do that.

Anyway, demurrage and inflation have identical economic properties. They= 9;re
both a tax on savings. The only difference is the way that tax is implement= ed.

--
http= s://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
--0000000000001e8b9c05e293d683--