Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YsrHy-0001tS-7Q for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 14 May 2015 11:26:54 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.215.54 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.215.54; envelope-from=decker.christian@gmail.com; helo=mail-la0-f54.google.com; Received: from mail-la0-f54.google.com ([209.85.215.54]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YsrHv-0001h9-Tk for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 14 May 2015 11:26:54 +0000 Received: by labbd9 with SMTP id bd9so62877909lab.2 for ; Thu, 14 May 2015 04:26:45 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 10.112.189.102 with SMTP id gh6mr2722577lbc.115.1431602805482; Thu, 14 May 2015 04:26:45 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Christian Decker Date: Thu, 14 May 2015 11:26:44 +0000 Message-ID: To: Pieter Wuille , Tier Nolan Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c36dc4ae2b9805160900b0 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (decker.christian[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YsrHv-0001h9-Tk Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] [BIP] Normalized Transaction IDs X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 14 May 2015 11:26:54 -0000 --001a11c36dc4ae2b9805160900b0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sorry about that, sometimes I hate keyboard shortcuts :-) Ok, I think I got the OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG proposal, transactions keep referencing using hashes of complete transactions (including signatures), while the OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG looks up the previous transaction (which we already need to do anyway in order to insert the prevOut pubkeyScript), normalizes the prevout and calculates its normalized transaction ID. It then inserts the normalized transaction IDs in the OutPoint before calculating its own hash which is then signed. Is that correct so far? Let me try to summarize the discussion so far: I think we have consensus that transaction malleability needs to be addressed, and normalized transaction IDs seem to be the way to go forward. The discussion now is how to use normalized transaction IDs and we have two approaches to implement them: - OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG which continues to use the current hashes to reference a specific signed instance of a class of semantically identical transactions. Internally only the semantic class is enforced. Transactions can be fixed to reference the correct signed instance if the transaction has been changed along the way. - The second proposal advocates using the normalized transaction IDs directly in the transactions, requiring no further intervention to fix an eventually malleated transaction. Both approaches have their own advantages and problems: OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG is a soft-fork which makes it somewhat less problematic to roll-out and does not break existing software. The normalized transaction ID can be computed on the fly (possibly increasing lookup times) or stored alongside the UTXO (increasing storage needs). If the normalized transaction IDs really need to be recomputed down to the coinbase then the increased storage is the only option, and would add 32 byte to every transaction metadata in the UTXO. My proposal is harder to migrate to, as it requires a hardfork, and will require more storage (64 byte raw data for a normalized to legacy transaction ID) for every transaction in the UTXO set. At 6 million distinct transactions which unspent outputs this boils down to 384 MB (though this may change in future by introducing an aggregation strategy or fragment further). Some of that space may be reclaimed. There is absolutely no interaction required to fix up transactions if a dependency has been malleated, since we address a semantic class, not the specific instance. We limit the use of normalized transaction IDs to the OutPoint in transactions, since there we want to reference the semantic class not the actual signed instance. At protocol message level (inv, getdata) and blocks we continue to use the legacy ID. This is not as nice as having one ID for every transaction that is used everywhere. Both solutions solve malleability, just with different tradeoffs. I don't see them as mutually exclusive, if we adopt the OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG as short term fix, that can be rolled out and applied, then my proposal can be seen as long-term goal that is semantically cleaner and easier to implement. Personally I think hard-forks shouldn't be the dreaded boogeyman everybody makes them out to be, we have never really tested rolling out a hardfork and they might just turn out to be possible. I don't thing we loose anything by attempting this, except maybe reduce the urgency to apply some perfect future thing. Regards, Christian On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Christian Decker < decker.christian@gmail.com> wrote: > Ok, I think I got the OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG proposal, transactions keep > referencing using hashes of complete transactions (including signatures), > while the OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG looks up the previous transaction (which we > already need to do anyway in order to insert the prevOut pubkeyScript), > normalizes the prevout and calculates its normalized transaction ID. It > then inserts the normalized transaction IDs in the OutPoint before > calculating its own hash which is then signed. Is that correct so far? > > Let me try to summarize the discussion so far: > > I think we have consensus that transaction malleability needs to be > addressed, and normalized transaction IDs seem to be the way to go forward. > > The discussion now is how to use normalized transaction IDs and we have > two approaches to implement them: > > - OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG which continues to use the current hashes to > reference a specific signed instance of a class of semantically identical > transactions. Internally only the semantic class is enforced. Transactions > can be fixed to reference the correct signed instance if the transaction > has been changed along the way.is a softfork using the "if I don't > know this opcode the TX is automatically valid" trick > > > On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 2:40 AM Pieter Wuille > wrote: > >> On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 1:32 PM, Tier Nolan wrote: >> >>> >>> On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Pieter Wuille >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> This was what I was suggesting all along, sorry if I wasn't clear. >>>> >>>> That's great. So, basically the multi-level refund problem is solved >>> by this? >>> >> >> Yes. So to be clear, I think there are 2 desirable end-goal proposals >> (ignoring difficulty of changing things for a minute): >> >> * Transactions and blocks keep referring to other transactions by full >> txid, but signature hashes are computed off normalized txids (which are >> recursively defined to use normalized txids all the way back to coinbases). >> Is this what you are suggesting now as well? >> >> * Blocks commit to full transaction data, but transactions and signature >> hashes use normalized txids. >> >> The benefit of the latter solution is that it doesn't need "fixing up" >> transactions whose inputs have been malleated, but comes at the cost of >> doing a very invasive hard fork. >> >> -- >> Pieter >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud >> Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications >> Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights >> Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. >> http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >> > --001a11c36dc4ae2b9805160900b0 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Sorry about that, sometimes I hate keyboard shortcuts :-)<= div dir=3D"ltr">

Ok, I think I got the OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG proposal, = transactions keep referencing using hashes of complete transactions (includ= ing signatures), while the OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG looks up the previous transac= tion (which we already need to do anyway in order to insert the prevOut pub= keyScript), normalizes the prevout and calculates its normalized transactio= n ID. It then inserts the normalized transaction IDs in the OutPoint before= calculating its own hash which is then signed. Is that correct so far?
=
Let me try to summarize the discussion so far:

I think we have c= onsensus that transaction malleability needs to be addressed, and normalize= d transaction IDs seem to be the way to go forward.

The discussion n= ow is how to use normalized transaction IDs and we have two approaches to i= mplement them:

  • OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG which continues to use the= current hashes to reference a specific signed instance of a class of seman= tically identical transactions. Internally only the semantic class is enfor= ced. Transactions can be fixed to reference the correct signed instance if = the transaction has been changed along the way.
  • The second proposal= advocates using the normalized transaction IDs directly in the transaction= s, requiring no further intervention to fix an eventually malleated transac= tion.
Both approaches have their own advantages and problems:= =C2=A0

OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG is a soft-fork which mak= es it somewhat less problematic to roll-out and does not break existing sof= tware. The normalized transaction ID can be computed on the fly (possibly i= ncreasing lookup times) or stored alongside the UTXO (increasing storage ne= eds). If the normalized transaction IDs really need to be recomputed down t= o the coinbase then the increased storage is the only option, and would add= 32 byte to every transaction metadata in the UTXO.

My proposal is harder to migrate to, as it requires a hardfork, and will = require more storage (64 byte raw data for a normalized to legacy transacti= on ID) for every transaction in the UTXO set. At 6 million distinct transac= tions which unspent outputs this boils down to 384 MB (though this may chan= ge in future by introducing an aggregation strategy or fragment further). S= ome of that space may be reclaimed. There is absolutely no interaction requ= ired to fix up transactions if a dependency has been malleated, since we ad= dress a semantic class, not the specific instance. We limit the use of norm= alized transaction IDs to the OutPoint in transactions, since there we want= to reference the semantic class not the actual signed instance. At protoco= l message level (inv, getdata) and blocks we continue to use the legacy ID.= This is not as nice as having one ID for every transaction that is used ev= erywhere.

Both solutions solve malleability, just = with different tradeoffs.

I don't see them as = mutually exclusive, if we adopt the OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG as short term fix, t= hat can be rolled out and applied, then my proposal can be seen as long-ter= m goal that is semantically cleaner and easier to implement.

=
Personally I think hard-forks shouldn't be the dreaded booge= yman everybody makes them out to be, we have never really tested rolling ou= t a hardfork and they might just turn out to be possible. I don't thing= we loose anything by attempting this, except maybe reduce the urgency to a= pply some perfect future thing.

Regards,
Christian

On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Christian D= ecker <decker.christian@gmail.com> wrote:
Ok, I think I got the OP_CHECKAWE= SOMESIG proposal, transactions keep referencing using hashes of complete tr= ansactions (including signatures), while the OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG looks up th= e previous transaction (which we already need to do anyway in order to inse= rt the prevOut pubkeyScript), normalizes the prevout and calculates its nor= malized transaction ID. It then inserts the normalized transaction IDs in t= he OutPoint before calculating its own hash which is then signed. Is that c= orrect so far?

Let me try to summarize the discussion so= far:

I think we have consensus that transaction m= alleability needs to be addressed, and normalized transaction IDs seem to b= e the way to go forward.

The discussion now is how= to use normalized transaction IDs and we have two approaches to implement = them:
  • OP_CHECKAWESOMESIG which continues to use the curre= nt hashes to reference a specific signed instance of a class of semanticall= y identical transactions. Internally only the semantic class is enforced. T= ransactions can be fixed to reference the correct signed instance if the tr= ansaction has been changed along the way.is a softfork using the "if I don't know this opcode= the TX is automatically valid" trick

On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 2:40 AM Pieter Wuille = <pieter.wui= lle@gmail.com> wrote:
=
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 1:32 PM, Tier Nolan <tier.nolan@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wu= ille@gmail.com> wrote:

This was what I was suggesting all along, sorry = if I wasn't clear.

<= /div>
That's great.=C2=A0 So,= basically the multi-level refund problem is solved by this?

Yes. So to be c= lear, I think there are 2 desirable end-goal proposals (ignoring difficulty= of changing things for a minute):

* Transactions and blo= cks keep referring to other transactions by full txid, but signature hashes= are computed off normalized txids (which are recursively defined to use no= rmalized txids all the way back to coinbases). Is this what you are suggest= ing now as well?

* Blocks commit to full transaction data= , but transactions and signature hashes use normalized txids.

=
The benefit of the latter solution is that it doesn't need "f= ixing up" transactions whose inputs have been malleated, but comes at = the cost of doing a very invasive hard fork.

--
Pieter

---------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---
One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications
Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight.
http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm= /clk/290420510;117567292;y_____________________________________________= __
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Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
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