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From: Bastien TEINTURIER <bastien@acinq.fr>
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2020 10:25:09 +0200
Message-ID: <CACdvm3O3UmZcYYGaY2x23MYY=3saPFkgQtaDELd=kY93SRLLaA@mail.gmail.com>
To: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000bf61e705a8a7fb58"
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
 lightning-dev <lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] RBF Pinning with Counterparties
 and Competing Interest
Precedence: list

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Hey ZmnSCPxj,

I agree that in theory this looks possible, but doing it in practice with
accurate control
of what parts of the network get what tx feels impractical to me (but maybe
I'm wrong!).

It feels to me that an attacker who would be able to do this would break
*any* off-chain
construction that relies on absolute timeouts, so I'm hoping this is
insanely hard to
achieve without cooperation from a miners subset. Let me know if I'm too
optimistic on
this!

Cheers,
Bastien

Le lun. 22 juin 2020 =C3=A0 10:15, ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com> a =C3=
=A9crit :

> Good morning Bastien,
>
> > Thanks for the detailed write-up on how it affects incentives and
> centralization,
> > these are good points. I need to spend more time thinking about them.
> >
> > > This is one reason I suggested using independent pay-to-preimage
> > > transactions[1]
> >
> > While this works as a technical solution, I think it has some incentive=
s
> issues too.
> > In this attack, I believe the miners that hide the preimage tx in their
> mempool have
> > to be accomplice with the attacker, otherwise they would share that tx
> with some of
> > their peers, and some non-miner nodes would get that preimage tx and be
> able to
> > gossip them off-chain (and even relay them to other mempools).
>
> I believe this is technically possible with current mempool rules, withou=
t
> miners cooperating with the attacker.
>
> Basically, the attacker releases two transactions with near-equal fees, s=
o
> that neither can RBF the other.
> It releases the preimage tx near miners, and the timelock tx near
> non-miners.
>
> Nodes at the boundaries between those that receive the preimage tx and th=
e
> timelock tx will receive both.
> However, they will receive one or the other first.
> Which one they receive first will be what they keep, and they will reject
> the other (and *not* propagate the other), because the difference in fees
> is not enough to get past the RBF rules (which requires not just a feerat=
e
> increase, but also an increase in absolute fee, of at least the minimum
> relay feerate times transaction size).
>
> Because they reject the other tx, they do not propagate the other tx, so
> the boundary between the two txes is inviolate, neither can get past that
> boundary, this occurs even if everyone is running 100% unmodified Bitcoin
> Core code.
>
> I am not a mempool expert and my understanding may be incorrect.
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hey ZmnSCPxj,<div><br></div><div>I agree that in theory th=
is looks possible, but doing it in practice with accurate control</div><div=
>of what parts of the network get what tx feels impractical to me (but mayb=
e I&#39;m wrong!).</div><div><br></div><div>It feels to me that an attacker=
 who would be able to do this would break *any* off-chain</div><div>constru=
ction that relies on absolute timeouts, so I&#39;m hoping this is insanely =
hard to</div><div>achieve without cooperation from a miners=C2=A0subset. Le=
t me know if I&#39;m too optimistic on</div><div>this!</div><div><br></div>=
<div>Cheers,</div><div>Bastien</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">Le=C2=A0lun. 22 juin 2020 =C3=A0=C2=A01=
0:15, ZmnSCPxj &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com">ZmnSCPxj@prot=
onmail.com</a>&gt; a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,=
204);padding-left:1ex">Good morning Bastien,<br>
<br>
&gt; Thanks for the detailed write-up on how it affects incentives and cent=
ralization,<br>
&gt; these are good points. I need to spend more time thinking about them.<=
br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; This is one reason I suggested using independent pay-to-preimage<=
br>
&gt; &gt; transactions[1]<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; While this works as a technical solution, I think it has some incentiv=
es issues too.<br>
&gt; In this attack, I believe the miners that hide the preimage tx in thei=
r mempool have<br>
&gt; to be accomplice with the attacker, otherwise they would share that tx=
 with some of<br>
&gt; their peers, and some non-miner nodes would get that preimage tx and b=
e able to<br>
&gt; gossip them off-chain (and even relay them to other mempools).<br>
<br>
I believe this is technically possible with current mempool rules, without =
miners cooperating with the attacker.<br>
<br>
Basically, the attacker releases two transactions with near-equal fees, so =
that neither can RBF the other.<br>
It releases the preimage tx near miners, and the timelock tx near non-miner=
s.<br>
<br>
Nodes at the boundaries between those that receive the preimage tx and the =
timelock tx will receive both.<br>
However, they will receive one or the other first.<br>
Which one they receive first will be what they keep, and they will reject t=
he other (and *not* propagate the other), because the difference in fees is=
 not enough to get past the RBF rules (which requires not just a feerate in=
crease, but also an increase in absolute fee, of at least the minimum relay=
 feerate times transaction size).<br>
<br>
Because they reject the other tx, they do not propagate the other tx, so th=
e boundary between the two txes is inviolate, neither can get past that bou=
ndary, this occurs even if everyone is running 100% unmodified Bitcoin Core=
 code.<br>
<br>
I am not a mempool expert and my understanding may be incorrect.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
ZmnSCPxj<br>
</blockquote></div>

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