Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 12:44:14 +0000
To: Chris Belcher <belcher@riseup.net>,
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP proposal: Timelocked address fidelity bond
	for BIP39 seeds
Precedence: list

Good morning Chris,

> Hello waxwing,
>
> > A user sacrifices X amount of time-value-of-money (henceforth TVOM)
>
> by committing in Joinmarket with FB1. He then uses the same FB1 in
> Teleport, let's say. If he gets benefit Y from using FB1 in Joinmarket,
> and benefit Z in Teleport, then presumably he'll only do it if
> (probabilistically) he thinks Y+Z > X.
>
> > But as an assessor of FB1 in Joinmarket, I don't know if it's also
>
> being used for Teleport, and more importantly, if it's being used
> somewhere else I'm not even aware of. Now I'm not an economist I admit,
> so I might not be intuit-ing this situation right, but it fees to me
> like the right answer is "It's fine for a closed system, but not an open
> one." (i.e. if the set of possible usages is not something that all
> participants have fixed in advance, then there is an effective Sybilling
> problem, like I'm, as an assessor, thinking that sacrificed value 100 is
> there, whereas actually it's only 15, or whatever.)
>
>
> I don't entirely agree with this. The value of the sacrifice doesn't
> change if the fidelity bond owner starts using it for Teleport as well
> as Joinmarket. The sacrifice is still 100. Even if the owner doesn't run
> any maker at all the sacrifice would still be 100, because it only
> depends on the bitcoin value and locktime. In your equation Y+Z > X,
>
> using a fidelity bond for more applications increases the
> left-hand-side, while the right-hand-side X remains the same. As
> protection from a sybil attack is calculated using only X, it makes no
> difference what Y and Z are, the takers can still always calculate that
> "to sybil attack the coinjoin I'm about to make, it costs A btc locked
> up for B time".

I think another perspective here is that a maker with a single fidelity bon=
d between both Teleport and Joinmarket has a single identity in both system=
s.

Recall that not only makers can be secretly surveillors, but takers can als=
o be secretly surveillors.

Ideally, the maker should not tie its identity in one system to its identit=
y in another system, as that degrades the privacy of the maker as well.

And the privacy of the maker is the basis of the privacy of its takers.
It is the privacy of the coins the maker offers, that is being purchased by=
 the takers.


A taker can be a surveillor as well, and because the identity between JoinM=
arket and Teleport is tied via the single shared fidelity bond, a taker can=
 perform partial-protocol attacks (i.e. aborting at the last step) to ident=
ify UTXOs of particular makers.
And it can perform attacks on both systems to identify the ownership of mak=
er coins in both systems.

Since the coins in one system are tied to that system, this increases the i=
nformation available to the surveillor: it is now able to associate coins i=
n JoinMarket with coins in Teleport, via the shared fidelity bond identity.
It would be acceptable for both systems to share an identity if coins were =
shared between the JoinMarket and Teleport maker clients, but at that point=
 they would arguably be a single system, not two separate systems, and that=
 is what you should work towards.


Regards,
ZmnSCPxj