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From: Peter Vessenes <peter@coinlab.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2013 11:44:02 -0800
Message-ID: <CAMGNxUusTxVBbp7L0v5fC9d2ERQaMMBzX5-T70risVF3jd1tVg@mail.gmail.com>
To: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Jorge_Tim=F3n?= <jtimonmv@gmail.com>
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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Key retirement and key compromise
Precedence: list

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We've been toying with the idea of a 'dead' button, one that issues a bunch
of pre-generated txs sending stuff out to a previously secured 'backup' set
of addresses (we don't think in terms of wallets, just keypairs).

In this scenario, you have a long-term storage address (or set of them),
and if you need to hit the panic button, previously signed transactions
send value over to your emergency storage.

If you've mucked around sending / receiving with your long-term storage,
you'd only catch some BTC, not necessarily all, but what's nice is the
panic transaction leaking has lower security requirements than your private
keys -- worst case it's out, and you've got to deal with stuff in emergency
storage, as opposed to losing all your coins.

You could pair this with a server that checks if 'safe' addresses have
'unauthorized' transactions showing up on the blockchain, and you'd have a
reasonable automated security layer. Maybe. :)

I'm interested in thoughts on this approach as well.

Jorge -- I respectfully disagree with you, there are a number of enterprise
scenarios where your method is not appropriate.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra" style>We&#39;ve been toying wit=
h the idea of a &#39;dead&#39; button, one that issues a bunch of pre-gener=
ated txs sending stuff out to a previously secured &#39;backup&#39; set of =
addresses (we don&#39;t think in terms of wallets, just keypairs).
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra" style><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
 style>In this scenario, you have a long-term storage address (or set of th=
em), and if you need to hit the panic button, previously signed transaction=
s send value over to your emergency storage.</div>

<div class=3D"gmail_extra" style><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra" style=
>If you&#39;ve mucked around sending / receiving with your long-term storag=
e, you&#39;d only catch some BTC, not necessarily all, but what&#39;s nice =
is the panic transaction leaking has lower security requirements than your =
private keys -- worst case it&#39;s out, and you&#39;ve got to deal with st=
uff in emergency storage, as opposed to losing all your coins.</div>

<div class=3D"gmail_extra" style><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra" style=
>You could pair this with a server that checks if &#39;safe&#39; addresses =
have &#39;unauthorized&#39; transactions showing up on the blockchain, and =
you&#39;d have a reasonable automated security layer. Maybe. :)</div>

<div class=3D"gmail_extra" style><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra" style=
>I&#39;m interested in thoughts on this approach as well.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra" style><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra" style>Jorge -- =
I respectfully disagree with you, there are a number of enterprise scenario=
s where your method is not appropriate.=A0</div>

</div>

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