In-Reply-To: <5a779c13-8ebf-5052-5bf7-846f970c21ef@spiller.com>
References: <5a779c13-8ebf-5052-5bf7-846f970c21ef@spiller.com>
Thread-Topic: [bitcoin-dev] Yet another Taproot activation logic
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From: Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces <arielluaces@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 07 Mar 2021 13:13:47 -0800
To: Carlo Spiller <carlo@spiller.com>,
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Message-ID: <baad4898-6605-4edc-ad13-0f74289484ae@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Yet another Taproot activation logic
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Hi Carlo

This your proposal is similar to the Simple Majority Activation p=
roposal (SMA)=2E The difference is that your proposal has the final activat=
ion threshold set to 80% and SMA has it set to 51% https://lists=2Elinuxfou=
ndation=2Eorg/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-March/018587=2Ehtml

The problem w=
ith what you're proposing is what do users do if signaling is somewhere bet=
ween 51% to 79%? Users that want to promote a UASF know that their miner ma=
jority can activate Taproot and activate without the 21% to 49% of miners n=
eeding to signal (or purposefully stalling)=2E A UASF knows they have major=
ity mining power so there is little risk to them and a big reward (activati=
ng Taproot) so they are incentivized to do a UASF=2E

A UASF with a miner m=
ajority can scare everyone else about them being at risk of big reorgs to g=
ain traction and followers=2E

With the same proposal but the final thresho=
ld set to 51% instead of 80% there can't be risk of a UASF because if 51% i=
s not reached they know they don't have enough miner support to keep the ch=
ain together=2E

If support is less than 50% a UASF movement needs to hard =
fork anyway to change the PoW (for protection) and change addresses to prev=
ent double spends=2E

I really like the SMA proposal with 51% because it re=
moves the incentive to do a UASF=2E

Cheers
Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces


On Mar 7=
, 2021, 6:37 AM, at 6:37 AM, Carlo Spiller via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lis=
ts=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg> wrote:
>Hi everybody
>
>I'm new to this list, b=
ut not new to Bitcoin, having skin in the game 
>since 2014=2E I was there =
for the scaling war and the drama around
>SegWit, 
>as a simple user=2E Thi=
s time, I run my own full node and follow 
>development=2E I hope to bring =
something new to the table=2E
>
>Having witnessed the miner's unwillingness=
 to activate SegWit truly 
>makes me concerened for a simple LOT=3Dfalse=2E=
 After reading the
>discussion 
>now for some time and thinking about it my=
self, I have come to the 
>following proposal=2E
>
>Initially deploy with L=
OT=3Dfalse and an activation threshold of 95% of 
>miner signaling=2E
>
>*I=
FF* after 6 months Taproot is not activated by MASF, BUT at least 80%
>
>of=
 hashpower signaled for the upgrade, LOT gets a lock-in date another
>6 
>m=
onths later and the threshold for MASF is lowered to 90%=2E
>
>If after the=
 initial 6 months of signaling with LOT=3Dfalse, 80% is not 
>reached, the =
proposal expires=2E
>
>This way, a small percent of hashpower does not get =
to stall
>activation, 
>rather, 80% of hashpower can activate LOT=3Dtrue, a=
nd later, 90% can 
>activate Taproot=2E If a flaw is found in Taproot in th=
e first six months
>
>(unlikely anyway), miners simply don't signal and the=
 proposal expires=2E
>
>If miners don't signal at all, only six months are =
lost, before a new 
>activation logic can be deployed=2E
>
>Don't mind this=
 if something similar was already proposed somewhere
>else=2E
>
>Best
>
>Ca=
rlo
>
>_______________________________________________
>bitcoin-dev mailing=
 list
>bitcoin-dev@lists=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg
>https://lists=2Elinuxfoun=
dation=2Eorg/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

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<html><head></head><body><div dir=3D"auto">Hi Carlo<br><br></div>
<div dir=
=3D"auto">This your proposal is similar to the Simple Majority Activation p=
roposal (SMA)=2E The difference is that your proposal has the final activat=
ion threshold set to 80% and SMA has it set to 51% <a href=3D"https://lists=
=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-March/018587=2Ehtml">ht=
tps://lists=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-March/018587=
=2Ehtml</a><br><br></div>
<div dir=3D"auto">The problem with what you're pr=
oposing is what do users do if signaling is somewhere between 51% to 79%? U=
sers that want to promote a UASF know that their miner majority can activat=
e Taproot and activate without the 21% to 49% of miners needing to signal (=
or purposefully stalling)=2E A UASF knows they have majority mining power s=
o there is little risk to them and a big reward (activating Taproot) so the=
y are incentivized to do a UASF=2E<br><br></div>
<div dir=3D"auto">A UASF w=
ith a miner majority can scare everyone else about them being at risk of bi=
g reorgs to gain traction and followers=2E<br><br></div>
<div dir=3D"auto">=
With the same proposal but the final threshold set to 51% instead of 80% th=
ere can't be risk of a UASF because if 51% is not reached they know they do=
n't have enough miner support to keep the chain together=2E<br><br></div>
<=
div dir=3D"auto">If support is less than 50% a UASF movement needs to hard =
fork anyway to change the PoW (for protection) and change addresses to prev=
ent double spends=2E<br><br></div>
<div dir=3D"auto">I really like the SMA =
proposal with 51% because it removes the incentive to do a UASF=2E<br><br><=
/div>
<div dir=3D"auto">Cheers<br></div>
<div dir=3D"auto">Ariel Lorenzo-Lu=
aces<br></div>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote" >On Mar 7, 2021, at 6:37 AM, Carl=
o Spiller via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists=2Elinuxfo=
undation=2Eorg" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg=
</a>&gt; wrote:<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0pt 0pt 0=
pt 0=2E8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">=

<pre class=3D"blue">Hi everybody<br><br>I'm new to this list, but not new =
to Bitcoin, having skin in the game <br>since 2014=2E I was there for the s=
caling war and the drama around SegWit, <br>as a simple user=2E This time, =
I run my own full node and follow <br>development=2E I hope to bring someth=
ing new to the table=2E<br><br>Having witnessed the miner's unwillingness t=
o activate SegWit truly <br>makes me concerened for a simple LOT=3Dfalse=2E=
 After reading the discussion <br>now for some time and thinking about it m=
yself, I have come to the <br>following proposal=2E<br><br>Initially deploy=
 with LOT=3Dfalse and an activation threshold of 95% of <br>miner signaling=
=2E<br><br>*IFF* after 6 months Taproot is not activated by MASF, BUT at le=
ast 80% <br>of hashpower signaled for the upgrade, LOT gets a lock-in date =
another 6 <br>months later and the threshold for MASF is lowered to 90%=2E<=
br><br>If after the initial 6 months of signaling with LOT=3Dfalse, 80% is =
not <br>reached, the proposal expires=2E<br><br>This way, a small percent o=
f hashpower does not get to stall activation, <br>rather, 80% of hashpower =
can activate LOT=3Dtrue, and later, 90% can <br>activate Taproot=2E If a fl=
aw is found in Taproot in the first six months <br>(unlikely anyway), miner=
s simply don't signal and the proposal expires=2E <br>If miners don't signa=
l at all, only six months are lost, before a new <br>activation logic can b=
e deployed=2E<br><br>Don't mind this if something similar was already propo=
sed somewhere else=2E<br><br>Best<br><br>Carlo<br><br><hr><br>bitcoin-dev m=
ailing list<br>bitcoin-dev@lists=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg<br><a href=3D"http=
s://lists=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev">https://lis=
ts=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br></pre></bloc=
kquote></div></body></html>
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