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Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 16:42:41 +0100
Message-ID: <CANEZrP2Bg=yzoc0br7u=uNnZK4TMoaBbff+0t4uP3DcRaAnW7w@mail.gmail.com>
From: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net>
To: Natanael <natanael.l@gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7bacc0f2654a20050ee5f8e0
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] replace-by-fee v0.10.0rc4
Precedence: list

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>
> I see no fundamental difference in outcome from miner collusion in
> scorched-fee (which isn't guaranteed to pay the "right" pool!) and miner
> collusion in knowingly mining a doublespend transaction.
>
Well, they're the same thing. Replace-by-fee *is* miner collusion in
knowingly mining a double spend, just triggered in a certain way.

Remember that you aren't paying the bad pool, the bad pool is paying you.
Whichever pool benefits from the scorched earth protocol can simply pick an
address out of the transaction it perceived as starting the protocol, and
pay that.

> Zero-conf needs something else for security. A guarantee it can not be
> doublespent in the relevant time frame.
>
I think this is the core point which many of these debates revolve around.

No payment system provides *guarantees*, though some are stronger than
others. All they do is manage risk.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex"><p dir=3D"ltr">I see no fundamental difference i=
n outcome from miner collusion in scorched-fee (which isn&#39;t guaranteed =
to pay the &quot;right&quot; pool!) and miner collusion in knowingly mining=
 a doublespend transaction.</p></blockquote><div>Well, they&#39;re the same=
 thing. Replace-by-fee <i>is</i>=C2=A0miner collusion in knowingly mining a=
 double spend, just triggered in a certain way.</div><div><br></div><div>Re=
member that you aren&#39;t paying the bad pool, the bad pool is paying you.=
 Whichever pool benefits from the scorched earth protocol can simply pick a=
n address out of the transaction it perceived as starting the protocol, and=
 pay that.</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8e=
x;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<p dir=3D"ltr">Zero-conf needs something else for security. A guarantee it =
can not be doublespent in the relevant time frame.<br></p>
</blockquote></div>I think this is the core point which many of these debat=
es revolve around.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra">No payment system provides <i>guarantees</i>, though some are =
stronger than others. All they do is manage risk.</div></div>

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