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Sun, 26 Jun 2022 20:43:37 -0400 (EDT) Received: by localhost (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 4ABB122B4C; Sun, 26 Jun 2022 20:43:35 -0400 (EDT) Date: Sun, 26 Jun 2022 20:43:35 -0400 From: Peter Todd To: alicexbt , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Message-ID: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="zwp7TnS3OpeDXg8r" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Playing with full-rbf peers for fun and L2s security X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 00:43:41 -0000 --zwp7TnS3OpeDXg8r Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Sun, Jun 26, 2022 at 04:40:24PM +0000, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Hi Antoine, >=20 > Thanks for sharing the DoS attack example with alternatives. >=20 > > - Caroll broadcasts a double-spend of her own input C, the double-spend= is attached with a low-fee (1sat/vb) and it does _not_ signal opt-in RBF > > - Alice broadcasts the multi-party transaction, it is rejected by the n= etwork mempools because Alice double-spend is already present >=20 > I think this affects almost all types of coinjoin transaction including c= oordinator based implementations. I tried a few things and have already rep= orted details for an example DoS attack to one of the team but there is no = response yet. >=20 > It was fun playing with RBF, DoS and Coinjoin. Affected projects should s= hare their opinion about full-rbf as it seems it might improve things. >=20 > Example: >=20 > In Wasabi an attacker can broadcast a transaction spending input used in = coinjoin after sending signature in the round. This would result in a coinj= oin tx which never gets relayed: https://nitter.net/1440000bytes/status/154= 0727534093905920 Note that Wasabi already has a DoS attack vector in that a participant can = stop participating after the first phase of the round, with the result that the coinjoin fails. Wasabi mitigates that by punishing participating in future rounds. Double-spends only create additional types of DoS attack that need = to be detected and punished as well - they don't create a fundamentally new vulerability. --=20 https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org --zwp7TnS3OpeDXg8r Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAEBCgAdFiEEFcyURjhyM68BBPYTJIFAPaXwkfsFAmK4/TEACgkQJIFAPaXw kfv+tggAgg0HaIpO+qVegWegMtPIqgTgcbLFYCd75YHOTMwD3co6loSMgApnHePH Au/2S+XpWA8iZiLpiwOXlUafhw15uNEHBmCVCHwGw4f1tn4jY/iIFQC0/wm41vFZ noG3mcrOcAV0hkiVC7RLrrr7nh5rSEm9y3LTGkwDPOTBae93P5WCtGEkrK/P4hvO rTZHn0gavYiNdDtr4CgC7X9P5/nji1gx0xBaGyh7o6HAz5nLYaq6AvJR8gHfJgU3 RSO47Z74dUE7IS8WGXsD6N953p0tZjc2fVC3RGwWoi7KmDeqoy0p7Q7PFBJRd0Ta eLPz6keWPxYqdIOwJtJY/PRm+M9o3Q== =zG7+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --zwp7TnS3OpeDXg8r--