Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2022 03:03:52 +0000
To: Greg Sanders <gsanders87@gmail.com>,
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] More uses for CTV
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Good morning Greg,


> Hi James,
> Could you elaborate on a L2 contract where speedy
> settlement of the "first part" can be done, while having the rest
> take their time? I'm more thinking about time-out based protocols.
>=20
> Naturally my mind drifts to LN, where getting the proper commitment
> transaction confirmed in a timely fashion is required to get the proper
> balances back. The one hitch is that for HTLCs you still need speedy
> resolution otherwise theft can occur. And given today's "layered
> commitment" style transaction where HTLCs are decoupled from
> the balance output timeouts, I'm not sure this can save much.

As I understand it, layered commitments can be modified to use `OP_CTV`, wh=
ich would be slightly smaller (need only to reveal a 32-byte `OP_CTV` hash =
on the witness instead of a 64-byte Taproot signature, or 73-byte classical=
 pre-Taproot ECDSA signature), and is in fact precisely an example of the s=
peedy settlement style.

> CTV style commitments have popped up in a couple places in my
> work on eltoo(emulated via APO sig-in-script), but mostly in the
> context of reducing interactivity in protocols, not in byte savings per s=
e.

In many offchain cases, all channel participants would agree to some pre-de=
termined set of UTXOs, which would be implemented as a transaction spending=
 some single UTXO and outputting the pre-determined set of UTXOs.

The single UTXO can be an n-of-n of all participants, so that all agree by =
contributing their signatures:

* Assuming Taproot, the output address itself is 33 bytes (x4 weight).
* The n-of-n multisignature is 64 witness bytes (x1 weight).=20

Alternatly the single UTXO can be a P2WSH that reveals an `OP_CTV`:

* The P2WSH is 33 bytes (x4 weight) --- no savings here.
* The revelation of the `<hash> OP_CTV` is 33 witness bytes (x1 weight).

Thus, as I understand it, `OP_CTV` can (almost?) always translate to a smal=
l weight reduction for such "everyone agrees to this set of UTXOs" for all =
offchain protocols that would require it.


Regards,
ZmnSCPxj