Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Ysi0J-0000Hq-KF for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 14 May 2015 01:32:03 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.216.171 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.216.171; envelope-from=voisine@gmail.com; helo=mail-qc0-f171.google.com; Received: from mail-qc0-f171.google.com ([209.85.216.171]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Ysi0I-0002al-Gz for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 14 May 2015 01:32:03 +0000 Received: by qcvo8 with SMTP id o8so32535115qcv.0 for ; Wed, 13 May 2015 18:31:57 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.55.17.21 with SMTP id b21mr3585860qkh.71.1431567117070; Wed, 13 May 2015 18:31:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.140.91.37 with HTTP; Wed, 13 May 2015 18:31:56 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <5550D8BE.6070207@electrum.org> Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 18:31:56 -0700 Message-ID: From: Aaron Voisine To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113fe0fe7c36ed051600b1ea X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (voisine[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Ysi0I-0002al-Gz Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 14 May 2015 01:32:03 -0000 --001a113fe0fe7c36ed051600b1ea Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > by people and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement. I completely agree. Increasing fees will cause people voluntary economize on blockspace by finding alternatives, i.e. not bitcoin. A fee however is a known, upfront cost... unpredictable transaction failure in most cases will be a far higher, unacceptable cost to the user than the actual fee. The higher the costs of using the system, the lower the adoption as a store-of-value. The lower the adoption as store-of-value, the lower the price, and the lower the value of bitcoin to the world. > That only measures miner adoption, which is the least relevant. I concede the point. Perhaps a flag date based on previous observation of network upgrade rates with a conservative additional margin in addition to supermajority of mining power. Aaron Voisine co-founder and CEO breadwallet.com On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:19 PM, Pieter Wuille wrote: > On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Aaron Voisine wrote: > >> Conservative is a relative term. Dropping transactions in a way that is >> unpredictable to the sender sounds incredibly drastic to me. I'm suggesting >> increasing the blocksize, drastic as it is, is the more conservative choice. >> > > Transactions are already being dropped, in a more indirect way: by people > and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement. That is very sad, > but it's completely inevitable that there is space for some use cases and > not for others (at whatever block size). It's only a "things don't fit > anymore" when you see on-chain transactions as the only means for doing > payments, and that is already not the case. Increasing the block size > allows for more utility on-chain, but it does not fundamentally add more > use cases - only more growth space for people already invested in being > able to do things on-chain while externalizing the costs to others. > > >> I would recommend that the fork take effect when some specific large >> supermajority of the pervious 1000 blocks indicate they have upgraded, as a >> safer alternative to a simple flag date, but I'm sure I wouldn't have to >> point out that option to people here. >> > > That only measures miner adoption, which is the least relevant. The > question is whether people using full nodes will upgrade. If they do, then > miners are forced to upgrade too, or become irrelevant. If they don't, the > upgrade is risky with or without miner adoption. > > -- > Pieter > > --001a113fe0fe7c36ed051600b1ea Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>=C2=A0by people and bus= inesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement.

I completely agree. Increasing fees w= ill cause people voluntary economize on blockspace by finding alternatives,= i.e. not bitcoin. A fee however is a known, upfront cost... unpredictable = transaction failure in most cases will be a far higher, unacceptable cost t= o the user than the actual fee. The higher the costs of using the system, t= he lower=C2=A0the adoption as a store-of-value. The lower the adoption as s= tore-of-value, the lower the price, and the lower the value of bitcoin to t= he world.

>=C2=A0That only measures miner adoption, which is the least relevant.

I concede the = point. Perhaps a flag date based on previous observation of network upgrade= rates with a conservative additional margin in addition to supermajority o= f mining power.


Aaron Voisine
co-founder and CEO
breadwallet.com

On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:19 PM, Pieter Wuil= le <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at = 6:13 PM, Aaron Voisine <voisine@gmail.com> wrote:
=
Conservative is a relative term= . Dropping transactions in a way that is unpredictable to the sender sounds= incredibly drastic to me. I'm suggesting increasing the blocksize, dra= stic as it is, is the more conservative choice.

=
Transactions are already being dropped, in a more indirec= t way: by people and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement. Th= at is very sad, but it's completely inevitable that there is space for = some use cases and not for others (at whatever block size). It's only a= "things don't fit anymore" when you see on-chain transaction= s as the only means for doing payments, and that is already not the case. I= ncreasing the block size allows for more utility on-chain, but it does not = fundamentally add more use cases - only more growth space for people alread= y invested in being able to do things on-chain while externalizing the cost= s to others.
=C2=A0
I would recommend that the fork take effect= when some specific large supermajority of the pervious 1000 blocks indicat= e they have upgraded, as a safer alternative to a simple flag date, but I&#= 39;m sure I wouldn't have to point out that option to people here.

That only measures miner adoption,= which is the least relevant. The question is whether people using full nod= es will upgrade. If they do, then miners are forced to upgrade too, or beco= me irrelevant. If they don't, the upgrade is risky with or without mine= r adoption.

--
Piete= r


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