Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 58E33941 for ; Fri, 21 Aug 2015 06:01:09 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wi0-f172.google.com (mail-wi0-f172.google.com [209.85.212.172]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2B801EA for ; Fri, 21 Aug 2015 06:01:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wicja10 with SMTP id ja10so6932276wic.1 for ; Thu, 20 Aug 2015 23:01:06 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=hZ7i2Cu8L/fGU8o4A+DVE1kCEFv3+lSCzfQsIY2RGxw=; b=QqKMfMNC2cv4PCtcSYE2ZZX38AV6LKKw4Wh7XkSxKy0RLZ+qzxTVzFhaHcRsj9KMih BaxhtV6/koOIlNejQxBpEbP0SBQLsN+nq+J7nR2ktEPRa2rKUoyO31QAEC4KEwBKm2gZ wdILvtzBtIWXb/164BQQk/VI5RKCkkL/3EKVyTYnSEu8SmAmk78rW8BnVmhZrUNl4byW zrNof0H0CYKIQ7PJd+8bysGOamyS/remUnPwAO8lKnCkX17OyKjCt86T5xwdCMeK6anL /HCLdRlPGiobv/4o++vxfGsf4mIuaUin4DNPbm5Y5CpV4a8DnBGYLAlwA5Maq26RZ4PB 1irw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.11.194 with SMTP id s2mr2768336wib.33.1440136866774; Thu, 20 Aug 2015 23:01:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.28.52.84 with HTTP; Thu, 20 Aug 2015 23:01:06 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20150821055534.GA27259@muck> References: <55D6AD19.10305@mattcorallo.com> <20150821055534.GA27259@muck> Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2015 02:01:06 -0400 Message-ID: From: Jeff Garzik To: Peter Todd Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c355a25f46d8051dcbfe02 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin development mailing list Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Revisiting NODE_BLOOM: Proposed BIP X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2015 06:01:09 -0000 --001a11c355a25f46d8051dcbfe02 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 I don't see any link to data backing up "Bloom filter usage has declined significantly" Is there actual data showing this feature's use is declining or non-existent? On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 1:55 AM, Peter Todd wrote: > On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 01:48:23AM -0400, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > If this is widely deployed + enabled, what is the impact to current > wallets > > in use? > > See my comment on the recently-opened issue, reproduced below. In short, > not all that much, especially if we adopt my suggestion of having the > Core implementation accept and respond to bloom filter requests from > non-upgraded clients regardless of whether or not NODE_BLOOM was set > until some fixed upgrade deadline in the future. > > > Note that since the last time NODE_BLOOM was proposed, the landcape for > (lite-)SPV clients has changed significantly in a few key ways: > > 1) @mikehearn's [Cartographer](https://github.com/mikehearn/httpseed) > seed protocol has been created and deployed in production to allow > (lite-)SPV clients to find nodes supporting arbitrary service bits, > notable NODE_GETUTXOs. > > 2) Bloom filter usage has declined significantly, as lite-SPV clients > are moving towards using centralized, trusted, servers run by the > wallet > authors. For instance > [Mycelium](https://github.com/mycelium-com/wallet), > [GreenBits](https://github.com/greenaddress/GreenBits), > [AirBitz]( > https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3etohn/whats_wrong_with_breadwallet/ctirou5 > ), > and [Electrum](https://electrum.org/#home) all fall in this category. > > 3) Bloom filters [have been found](http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/763) to > have severe privacy issues, offering essentially no privacy at all. > Under many threat models a small number of trusted servers pose less > privacy security risk than connecting to random, sybil-attackable, > peers > using unencrypted connections and giving those peers very accurate > wallet contents information. > > 4) Finally, Bloom filters still have [unsolved DoS attack > issues]( > https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3hjak7/the_hard_work_of_core_devs_not_xt_makes_bitcoin/cu9xntf?context=3 > ), > that will get significantly worse under upcoming blocksize increase > proposals. > > Re: service bit identifier, I'd just pick 1<<3 > > -https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/6578#issuecomment-133226943 > > -- > 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org > 00000000000000000402fe6fb9ad613c93e12bddfc6ec02a2bd92f002050594d > --001a11c355a25f46d8051dcbfe02 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I don't see any link to data backing up "Bloom filter usage has declined significantly"<= /span>

Is there actual data showing this feature's u= se is declining or non-existent?


On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 1:55 AM, = Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 01:48:23AM -0400, Je= ff Garzik via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> If this is widely deployed + enabled, what is the impact to current wa= llets
> in use?

See my comment on the recently-opened issue, reproduced below. In sh= ort,
not all that much, especially if we adopt my suggestion of having the
Core implementation accept and respond to bloom filter requests from
non-upgraded clients regardless of whether or not NODE_BLOOM was set
until some fixed upgrade deadline in the future.


=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Note that since the last time NODE_BLOOM was proposed, the la= ndcape for
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 (lite-)SPV clients has changed significantly in a few key way= s:

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 1) @mikehearn's [Cartographer](https://github= .com/mikehearn/httpseed)
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 seed protocol has been created and deployed in production to = allow
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 (lite-)SPV clients to find nodes supporting arbitrary service= bits,
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 notable NODE_GETUTXOs.

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 2) Bloom filter usage has declined significantly, as lite-SPV= clients
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 are moving towards using centralized, trusted, servers run by= the wallet
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 authors. For instance
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [Mycelium](https://github.com/mycelium-com/walle= t),
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [GreenBits](https://github.com/greenaddress/G= reenBits),
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [AirBitz](https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3etohn/whats_wrong_with_= breadwallet/ctirou5),
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 and [Electrum](https://electrum.org/#home) all fall in t= his category.

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 3) Bloom filters [have been found](http://eprint.iacr.o= rg/2014/763) to
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 have severe privacy issues, offering essentially no privacy a= t all.
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Under many threat models a small number of trusted servers po= se less
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 privacy security risk than connecting to random, sybil-attack= able, peers
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 using unencrypted connections and giving those peers very acc= urate
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 wallet contents information.

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 4) Finally, Bloom filters still have [unsolved DoS attack
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 issues](https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comm= ents/3hjak7/the_hard_work_of_core_devs_not_xt_makes_bitcoin/cu9xntf?context= =3D3),
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 that will get significantly worse under upcoming blocksize in= crease
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 proposals.

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Re: service bit identifier, I'd just pick 1<<3

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 -https://github.c= om/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/6578#issuecomment-133226943

--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
00000000000000000402fe6fb9ad613c93e12bddfc6ec02a2bd92f002050594d

--001a11c355a25f46d8051dcbfe02--