Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1SZOce-0000R2-Te for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 29 May 2012 15:46:12 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of coinlab.com designates 209.85.210.47 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.210.47; envelope-from=peter@coinlab.com; helo=mail-pz0-f47.google.com; Received: from mail-pz0-f47.google.com ([209.85.210.47]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-MD5:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1SZOcZ-0008BU-2W for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 29 May 2012 15:46:12 +0000 Received: by dalh21 with SMTP id h21so5499075dal.34 for ; Tue, 29 May 2012 08:46:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type:x-gm-message-state; bh=27BqUJWp0CfKf0LX+EoRZxudd5vCoMIoNZQwfofNTLY=; b=b/nprA/teJCzyB9xsvBPA+YpgMF93JU+b2SnItBSUW+MterF3uaT8F2UABGGsgwi8O SJLWfTAf4vseMXtkbPIWO2zk1ItGubYeuvUk7h7GpvZk1vYJSmtMQVoP/TJrNxCypuu3 psJXDle+dsRl/jYFY31O0rhT37GLFTU8HTjZQQX6F27yTxK8GYNMYHJovwNcZ21edwUl sW+7t3BQmMjm/wW8PnA3HMPLsAwxUqr2U49M/zYh5Q3pNsfMqZLx+LToB3/8ejCCGAPl yqv261sXDKSkIEbzih8AAs4HQWzaleUMz6+7kmAbic3xZsd2qngSQ0yysg4uD/B9xVXc feGw== Received: by 10.68.194.201 with SMTP id hy9mr17184419pbc.69.1338306361072; Tue, 29 May 2012 08:46:01 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.143.13.1 with HTTP; Tue, 29 May 2012 08:45:39 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <201205291539.57824.luke@dashjr.org> References: <201205291534.40364.luke@dashjr.org> <201205291539.57824.luke@dashjr.org> From: Peter Vessenes Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 11:45:39 -0400 Message-ID: To: Luke-Jr Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b10cb0f409c7904c12ebb4d X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQled7eXx+gDfCWkp9AQC4OUuWHth1vabZVR6cBdWqXLm5vjp8qb03+qut+t5we2ElsjsZjx X-Spam-Score: -0.0 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 0.7 HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_28 BODY: HTML: images with 2400-2800 bytes of words 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.0 T_REMOTE_IMAGE Message contains an external image -0.3 AWL AWL: From: address is in the auto white-list X-Headers-End: 1SZOcZ-0008BU-2W Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Punishing empty blocks? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 15:46:13 -0000 --047d7b10cb0f409c7904c12ebb4d Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 I see. That is undeniably more secure and "bitcoin-y" than my suggestion. It's also really a lot more work, especially in that it requires extra linkages between codebases that in my mind are largely separate. I'm just one voice, but I persist in believing that the 'lighter' solution, especially for something that may not be a particularly big problem in the bitcoin world is good -- it carries much less technical implementation debt going forward, and has a lower risk of sort of seizing up development with additional necessary code to worry about for those implementing to-spec clients. If that lighter solution turns out to be gameable, or has problems that require the full force of the bitcoin network and concepts, that would be the time to implement the improved version. That's just my approach, however. I worry that building in any additional requirements to the protocol or codebase adds significant cost to the network as a whole over the next 10 years. Peter On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 11:39 AM, Luke-Jr wrote: > On Tuesday, May 29, 2012 3:36:34 PM Peter Vessenes wrote: > > I suppose I mean that I don't understand how to reverse that into a URL > > when one is presented only with a block, or perhaps a coinbase in a > > transaction. > > A new message can be added to the p2p relay network, similar to tx and > alert > broadcasts, that allow miners to publish/update their policy URI signed by > the > key in question. Counter-DDoS rules could decline to relay or store URIs > for > keys that haven't been published in - or achieved statistical significance > in > - the last N blocks. > -- Peter J. Vessenes CEO, CoinLab M: 206.595.9839 Skype: vessenes Google+ --047d7b10cb0f409c7904c12ebb4d Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I see. That is undeniably more secure and "bitcoin-y" than my sug= gestion.

It's also really a lot more work, especiall= y in that it requires extra linkages between codebases that in my mind are = largely separate.=A0

I'm just one voice, but I persist in believing that= the 'lighter' solution, especially for something that may not be a= particularly big problem in the bitcoin world is good -- it carries much l= ess technical implementation debt going forward, and has a lower risk of so= rt of seizing up development with additional necessary code to worry about = for those implementing to-spec clients.

If that lighter solution turns out to be gameable, or h= as problems that require the full force of the bitcoin network and concepts= , that would be the time to implement the improved version. That's just= my approach, however. I worry that building in any additional requirements= to the protocol or codebase adds significant cost to the network as a whol= e over the next 10 years.

Peter

On = Tue, May 29, 2012 at 11:39 AM, Luke-Jr <luke@dashjr.org> wrote= :
On Tuesday, May 29, 2012 3= :36:34 PM Peter Vessenes wrote:
> I suppose I mean that I don't understand how to reverse that into = a URL
> when one is presented only with a block, or perhaps a coinbase in a > transaction.

A new message can be added to the p2p relay network, similar to tx an= d alert
broadcasts, that allow miners to publish/update their policy URI signed by = the
key in question. Counter-DDoS rules could decline to relay or store URIs fo= r
keys that haven't been published in - or achieved statistical significa= nce in
- the last N blocks.



--
Peter J. Vessenes
CEO, CoinLab
M: 206.595.9839
Skype: vessenes
= Google+

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