Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2016 12:52:27 -0400
From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
To: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Message-ID: <20160630165227.GA5816@fedora-21-dvm>
References: <87h9cecad5.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
	<1E86A00F-0609-4DBC-9543-94AE04CC13C9@voskuil.org>
	<577234A4.3030808@jonasschnelli.ch>
	<360EF9B8-A174-41CA-AFDD-2BC2C0B4DECB@voskuil.org>
	<20160629111728.GO13338@dosf1.alfie.wtf>
	<2981A919-4550-4807-8ED9-F8C51B2DC061@voskuil.org>
	<57750EAB.3020105@jonasschnelli.ch>
	<426C2AA3-BFB8-4C41-B4DF-4D6CC11988B2@voskuil.org>
	<577513DB.60101@jonasschnelli.ch>
	<F4BDD091-FD80-4EE9-93EF-735B6BBE253C@voskuil.org>
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In-Reply-To: <F4BDD091-FD80-4EE9-93EF-735B6BBE253C@voskuil.org>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12)
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 151
Precedence: list


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On Thu, Jun 30, 2016 at 05:22:08PM +0200, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev wrot=
e:
>=20
> > On Jun 30, 2016, at 2:43 PM, Jonas Schnelli <dev@jonasschnelli.ch> wrot=
e:
> >=20
> >>>> The core problem posed by BIP151 is a MITM attack. The implied solut=
ion (BIP151 + authentication) requires that a peer trusts that another is n=
ot an attacker.
> >>>=20
> >>> BIP151 would increase the risks for MITM attackers.
> >>> What are the benefits for Mallory of he can't be sure Alice and Bob m=
ay
> >>> know that he is intercepting the channel?
> >>=20
> >> It is not clear to me why you believe an attack on privacy by an anony=
mous peer is detectable.
> >=20
> > If Mallory has substituted the ephemeral keys in both directions, at the
> > point where Alice and Bob will do an authentication, they can be sure
> > Mallory is listening.
>=20
> I understand the mechanics of a tunnel between trusting parties that have=
 a secure side channel. But this assumes that no other peer can connect to =
these two nodes. How then do they maintain the chain?
>=20
> The "middle" in this sense does not have to be the wire directly between =
these two peers. It can be between either of them and any anonymous connect=
ion they (must) allow.
>=20
> Of course this creates pressure to expand their tunnel. Hence the problem=
 of expanding node identity in an effort to preserve privacy. The protectio=
n will remain weak until the entire network is "secure". At that point it w=
ould necessarily be a private network.
>=20
> As Pieter rightly observes, there are and always will be tunnels between =
trusting nodes. Often these are groups of nodes that are in collaboration, =
so logically they are one node from a system security standpoint. But if pe=
ople become generally reliant on good node registration, it will become the=
 registrar who controls access to the network. So my concern rests I this p=
roposal becoming widely adopted.

To be clear, are you against Bitcoin Core's tor support?

Because node-to-node connections over tor are encrypted, and make use of on=
ion
addresses, which are self-authenticated in the exact same way as BIP151
proposes. And we're shipping that in production as of 0.12.0, and by default
Tor onion support is enabled and will be automatically setup if you have a
recent version of Tor installed.

Does that "create pressure to expand node identity"?

--=20
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org

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