Return-Path: Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org (smtp4.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::137]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D741C002D for ; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 14:01:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4E3F442413 for ; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 14:01:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp4.osuosl.org 4E3F442413 Authentication-Results: smtp4.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20210112 header.b=ivQsvev3 X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.838 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.838 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_KAM_HTML_FONT_INVALID=0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp4.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jn0cyJPy7ZTf for ; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 14:01:16 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp4.osuosl.org B522B42412 Received: from mail-ed1-x531.google.com (mail-ed1-x531.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::531]) by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B522B42412 for ; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 14:01:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ed1-x531.google.com with SMTP id u21so6193431edi.9 for ; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 07:01:15 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=QWY3mB149505HhxmZo0wHQzSiNnrUXABUYbHjAAKN74=; b=ivQsvev3407EQmepmDcmSeRapuYDLsvJcWbwuxfRxuEA3sZ2t+uf1M0ZiWLN2pPshQ pyUovp2I0HEFFgSwmK67JbpVogluwVjfsaI5/4qKTkoPHfh0V4Q7GuD8sAamtYP99Q9u 9vbF+7ym3hC0CF/TZbGCJErX+XmhdZxGgXwDckGAavOvRwYDwG40ipzUCjlKYZzguwF3 98n4WthglPr1qsW3GVA50wb3ovfb3+uGUm6CJUzWnOr4K+CNwcvjmmYWQLBunOLYQuto ZUFTFxhvFYB6GgfYlBzDS0l7BlgfZNaanXkcT9ToA+QtrTU73jFjtYZGIwZCgP3Tm51L woFA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=QWY3mB149505HhxmZo0wHQzSiNnrUXABUYbHjAAKN74=; b=piDFMlHZDVCRq6zgFNz23QZHRp9T4YooenKRhaJEbJYp2GjqQT3ka0DFYJG7Y3pIZR wWNw3faYaxmZ1nWlFVV8OWP1oz9YoTDPo+U69q2LOkHpU6IVaOnZuVHeaUmHEhSSfGdu Wo+4uwxGxZ1A3jne1q1W/gLpM9caT0uB3MXPIBpTK2YNn4U7XVSdalwg4H4Nn8fy3rE2 oHwJHQ0LXoLKJsRTjUVQtJv/f/nuXh1pD0vJM/Lpwzn2wcNpTm28IJAFUeUN+HMxB+UN ahQINs21cn/EOxfjVTMQLtngl2BcvHMMiVuIPTUFYuIML/3aVUdyoctbP1dZrjuKmA6Y B7hQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ACrzQf23o5iyQeg6U7vwZ1gde/mUxrzq78mZJJ3FOlLdukUberb3SQk6 9W2Oqj+rC3GQ96IoUI/AOJU6PAwwLZvBsb2xecI= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AMsMyM4ldL69fTmi5RyGZdcPXhPk74TaglEWyZOYqilQ7dE5Zvh/0R9GaDcXqfpHaKM0gAYJ/lYDy+EoOO8HnOGtG4M= X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:2e19:b0:78e:11cc:3bc5 with SMTP id ig25-20020a1709072e1900b0078e11cc3bc5mr15702218ejc.543.1666360873420; Fri, 21 Oct 2022 07:01:13 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Greg Sanders Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2022 10:01:01 -0400 Message-ID: To: Sergej Kotliar Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000ed8b0f05eb8bdfa3" Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion , Anthony Towns Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Opt-in full-RBF] Zero-conf apps in immediate danger X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2022 14:01:18 -0000 --000000000000ed8b0f05eb8bdfa3 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Full-rbf is an odd duck, because while it is not a consensus issue, it does affect a large % of transactions made by wallets already, contrary to most policy changes. We have a status quo that is understandable, but unfortunately long-term incentive incompatible. It's also a UX issue, not a safety issue for retail wallet users(except Muun, who have given a clear timeline). Clearly considerations would be very different otherwise, but retail wallets by and large do not consider 0-conf as a valid deposit, or at least put up some warning symbols to that effect. Can only speak for myself, but I am looking for a concrete timeframe from 0-conf stakeholders. I have no preference for any particular time frame, as long as it can be agreed upon in the near-ish future. This keeps the transition technically speaking very simple, and removes uncertainty from decision making going forward. To make a follow-on consensus analogy, I am in the BIP8 lock-on-timeout=true camp for full rbf. If metrics arise that shows we're ready early, great. If not, I still want to avoid having this discussion again in N+ years. Cheers, Greg On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 8:02 AM Sergej Kotliar wrote: > On Thu, 20 Oct 2022 at 23:07, Greg Sanders wrote: > >> A large number of coins/users sit on custodial rails and this would >> essentially encumber protocol developers to those KYC/AML institutions. If >> Binance decides to never support Lightning in favor of BNC-wrapped BTC, >> should this be an issue at all for reasoning about a path forward? >> > > This is a big question here, with the caveat that it's not just binance > but in fact the majority of wallets and services that people use with > bitcoin today. > But the question remains as you phrased: At which point do we break > backwards compatibility? Another analogy would be to have sunset the old > P2PKH addresses during rollout of Segwit - it would certainly have led to > Segwit getting rolled out faster. The rbf change actually breaks more > things than that, takes more effort to address than just implementing a new > address format. Previously in the Bitcoin Core process we've chosen to keep > backwards compatibility and only roll out opt-in changes with broad > consensus over them, with the default behavior being to not roll out > changes that are controversial. At which point it's time to back away from > that - I honestly don't know. There is probably such a point, and we should > maybe have some kind of discussion around that topic on a higher level, > just as you phrased it, and I'll paraphrase: > If a majority of bitcoin wallets and services continue using legacy > patterns and features, preventing progress, at which point do we want to > break compatibility with them? > > Best, > Sergej > > > On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 3:59 PM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev < >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 02:37:53PM +0200, Sergej Kotliar via bitcoin-dev >>> wrote: >>> > > If someone's going to systematically exploit your store via this >>> > > mechanism, it seems like they'd just find a single wallet with a good >>> > > UX for opt-in RBF and lowballing fees, and go to town -- not >>> something >>> > > where opt-in rbf vs fullrbf policies make any difference at all? >>> > Sort of. But yes once this starts being abused systemically we will >>> have to >>> > do something else w RBF payments, such as crediting the amount in BTC >>> to a >>> > custodial account. But this option isn't available to your normal >>> payment >>> > processor type business. >>> >>> So, what I'm hearing is: >>> >>> * lightning works great, but is still pretty small >>> * zeroconf works great for txs that opt-out of RBF >>> * opt-in RBF is a pain for two reasons: >>> - people don't like that it's not treated as zeroconf >>> - the risk of fiat/BTC exchange rate changes between >>> now and when the tx actually confirms is worrying >>> even if it hasn't caused real problems yet >>> >>> (Please correct me if that's too far wrong) >>> >>> Maybe it would be productive to explore this opt-in RBF part a bit >>> more? ie, see if "we" can come up with better answers to some question >>> along the lines of: >>> >>> "how can we make on-chain payments for goods priced in fiat work well >>> for payees that opt-in to RBF?" >>> >>> That seems like the sort of thing that's better solved by a collaboration >>> between wallet devs and merchant devs (and protocol devs?), rather than >>> just one or the other? >>> >>> Is that something that we could talk about here? Or maybe it's better >>> done via an optech workgroup or something? >>> >>> If "we'll credit your account in BTC, then work out the USD coversion >>> and deduct that for your purchase, then you can do whatever you like >>> with any remaining BTC from your on-chain payment" is the idea, maybe we >>> should just roll with that design, but make it more decentralised: have >>> the initial payment setup a lightning channel between the customer and >>> the merchant with the BTC (so it's not custodial), but do some magic to >>> allow USD amounts to be transferred over it (Taro? something oracle based >>> so that both parties are confident a fair exchange rate will be used?). >>> >>> Maybe that particular idea is naive, but having an actual problem to >>> solve seems more constructive than just saying "we want rbf" "but we >>> want zeroconf" all the time? >>> >>> (Ideally the lightning channels above would be dual funded so they could >>> be used for routing more generally; but then dual funded channels are >>> one of the things that get broken by lack of full rbf) >>> >>> > > I thought the "normal" avenue for fooling non-RBF zeroconf was to >>> create >>> > > two conflicting txs in advance, one paying the merchant, one paying >>> > > yourself, connect to many peers, relay the one paying the merchant to >>> > > the merchant, and the other to everyone else. >>> > > I'm just basing this off Peter Todd's stuff from years ago: >>> > > >>> https://np.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/40ejy8/peter_todd_with_my_doublespendpy_tool_with/cytlhh0/ >>> > > >>> https://github.com/petertodd/replace-by-fee-tools/blob/master/doublespend.py >>> > Yeah, I know the list still rehashes a single incident from 10 years >>> ago to >>> > declare the entire practice as unsafe, and ignores real-world data >>> that of >>> > the last million transactions we had zero cases of this successfully >>> > abusing us. >>> >>> I mean, the avenue above isn't easy to exploit -- you have to identify >>> the merchant's node so that they get the bad tx, and you have to connect >>> to many peers so that your preferred tx propogates to miners first -- >>> and probably more importantly, it's relatively easy to detect -- if the >>> merchant has a few passive nodes that the attacker doesn't know about >>> it, and uses those to watch for attempted doublespends while it tries >>> to ensure the real tx has propogated widely. So it doesn't surprise me >>> at all that it's not often attempted, and even less often successful. >>> >>> > > > Currently Lightning is somewhere around 15% of our total bitcoin >>> > > > payments. >>> > > So, based on last year's numbers, presumably that makes your bitcoin >>> > > payments break down as something like: >>> > > 5% txs are on-chain and seem shady and are excluded from zeroconf >>> > > 15% txs are lightning >>> > > 20% txs are on-chain but signal rbf and are excluded from zeroconf >>> > > 60% txs are on-chain and seem fine for zeroconf >>> > Numbers are right. Shady is too strong a word, >>> >>> Heh, fair enough. >>> >>> So the above suggests 25% of payments already get a sub-par experience, >>> compared to what you'd like them to have (which sucks, but if you're >>> trying to reinvent both money and payments, maybe isn't surprising). And >>> going full rbf would bump that from 25% to 85%, which would be pretty >>> terrible. >>> >>> > RBF is a strictly worse UX as proven by anyone >>> > accepting bitcoin payments at scale. >>> >>> So let's make it better? Building bitcoin businesses on the lie that >>> unconfirmed txs are safe and won't be replaced is going to bite us >>> eventually; focussing on trying to push that back indefinitely is just >>> going to make everyone less prepared when it eventually happens. >>> >>> > > > For me >>> > > > personally it would be an easier discussion to have when Lightning >>> is at >>> > > > 80%+ of all bitcoin transactions. >>> > > Can you extrapolate from the numbers you've seen to estimate when >>> that >>> > > might be, given current trends? >>> > Not sure, it might be exponential growth, and the next 60% of Lightning >>> > growth happen faster than the first 15%. Hard to tell. But we're likely >>> > talking years here.. >>> >>> Okay? Two years is very different from 50 years, and at the moment >>> there's >>> not really any data, so people are just going to go with their gut... >>> >>> If it were growing in line with lightning capacity in BTC, per >>> bitcoinvisuals.com/ln-capacity; then 15% now would have grown from >>> perhaps 4% in May 2021, so perhaps 8% per year. With linear growth, >>> getting from 15% to 80% would then be about 8 years. >>> >>> Presumably that's a laughably terrible model, of course. But if we had >>> some actual numbers where we can watch the progress, it might be a lot >>> easier to be patient about waiting for lightning adoption to hit 80% >>> or whatever, and focus on productive things in the meantime? >>> >>> Cheers, >>> aj >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >> > > -- > > Sergej Kotliar > > CEO > > > Twitter: @ziggamon > > > www.bitrefill.com > > Twitter | Blog > | Angellist > --000000000000ed8b0f05eb8bdfa3 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Full-rbf is an odd duck, because while it is not a consens= us issue, it does affect a large % of transactions made by wallets already,= contrary to most policy changes. We have a status quo that is understandab= le, but unfortunately long-term incentive incompatible.=C2=A0

It's also a UX issue, not a safety issue for retail wallet users(= except Muun, who have given a clear timeline). Clearly considerations would= be very different otherwise, but retail wallets by and large do not consid= er 0-conf as a valid deposit,=C2=A0or at least put up some warning symbols = to that effect.

Can only speak for myself, but I am = looking for a concrete timeframe from 0-conf stakeholders. I have no prefer= ence for any particular time frame, as long as it can be agreed upon in the= near-ish future. This keeps the transition technically speaking very simpl= e, and removes uncertainty from decision making going forward.
<= div>
To make a follow-on consensus analogy, I am in the BIP8 = lock-on-timeout=3Dtrue camp for full rbf. If metrics arise=C2=A0that shows = we're ready early, great. If not, I still want to avoid having this dis= cussion again in N+ years.

Cheers,
Greg<= /div>

On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 8:02 AM Sergej Kotliar <sergej@bitrefill.com> wrote:
= On Thu, 20 Oct 2022 at 23:07, Greg Sanders <gsanders87@gmail.com> wrote:
=
A large number of coins/users sit on custodial rail= s and this would essentially encumber protocol developers to those KYC/AML = institutions. If Binance decides to never support Lightning in favor of BNC= -wrapped BTC, should this be an issue at all for reasoning about a path for= ward?

This is a big question he= re, with the caveat that it's not just binance but in fact the majority= of wallets and services that people use with bitcoin today.
But = the question remains as you phrased: At which point do we break backwards c= ompatibility? Another analogy would be to have sunset the old P2PKH address= es during rollout of Segwit - it would certainly have led to Segwit getting= rolled out faster. The rbf change actually breaks more things than that, t= akes more effort to address than just implementing a new address format. Pr= eviously in the Bitcoin Core process we've chosen to keep backwards com= patibility and only roll out opt-in changes with broad consensus over them,= with the default behavior being to not roll out changes that are controver= sial. At which point it's time to back away from that - I honestly don&= #39;t know. There is probably such a point, and we should maybe have some k= ind of discussion around that topic on a higher level, just as you phrased = it, and I'll paraphrase:=C2=A0
If a majority of bitcoin walle= ts and services continue using legacy patterns and features, preventing pro= gress, at which point do we want to break compatibility with them?

Best,
Sergej


=
On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 3:59 PM Ant= hony Towns via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>= ; wrote:
On Thu,= Oct 20, 2022 at 02:37:53PM +0200, Sergej Kotliar via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > If someone's going to systematically exploit your store via t= his
> > mechanism, it seems like they'd just find a single wallet wit= h a good
> > UX for opt-in RBF and lowballing fees, and go to town -- not some= thing
> > where opt-in rbf vs fullrbf policies make any difference at all?<= br> > Sort of. But yes once this starts being abused systemically we will ha= ve to
> do something else w RBF payments, such as crediting the amount in BTC = to a
> custodial account. But this option isn't available to your normal = payment
> processor type business.

So, what I'm hearing is:

=C2=A0* lightning works great, but is still pretty small
=C2=A0* zeroconf works great for txs that opt-out of RBF
=C2=A0* opt-in RBF is a pain for two reasons:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 - people don't like that it's not treated as zeroconf=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 - the risk of fiat/BTC exchange rate changes between
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 now and when the tx actually confirms is worrying
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 even if it hasn't caused real problems yet

(Please correct me if that's too far wrong)

Maybe it would be productive to explore this opt-in RBF part a bit
more? ie, see if "we" can come up with better answers to some que= stion
along the lines of:

=C2=A0"how can we make on-chain payments for goods priced in fiat work= well
=C2=A0 for payees that opt-in to RBF?"

That seems like the sort of thing that's better solved by a collaborati= on
between wallet devs and merchant devs (and protocol devs?), rather than
just one or the other?

Is that something that we could talk about here? Or maybe it's better done via an optech workgroup or something?

If "we'll credit your account in BTC, then work out the USD covers= ion
and deduct that for your purchase, then you can do whatever you like
with any remaining BTC from your on-chain payment" is the idea, maybe = we
should just roll with that design, but make it more decentralised: have
the initial payment setup a lightning channel between the customer and
the merchant with the BTC (so it's not custodial), but do some magic to=
allow USD amounts to be transferred over it (Taro? something oracle based so that both parties are confident a fair exchange rate will be used?).

Maybe that particular idea is naive, but having an actual problem to
solve seems more constructive than just saying "we want rbf" &quo= t;but we
want zeroconf" all the time?

(Ideally the lightning channels above would be dual funded so they could be used for routing more generally; but then dual funded channels are
one of the things that get broken by lack of full rbf)

> > I thought the "normal" avenue for fooling non-RBF zeroc= onf was to create
> > two conflicting txs in advance, one paying the merchant, one payi= ng
> > yourself, connect to many peers, relay the one paying the merchan= t to
> > the merchant, and the other to everyone else.
> > I'm just basing this off Peter Todd's stuff from years ag= o:
> > https://np.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/40ejy8/peter_todd_with_my= _doublespendpy_tool_with/cytlhh0/
> > https://github= .com/petertodd/replace-by-fee-tools/blob/master/doublespend.py
> Yeah, I know the list still rehashes a single incident from 10 years a= go to
> declare the entire practice as unsafe, and ignores real-world data tha= t of
> the last million transactions we had zero cases of this successfully > abusing us.

I mean, the avenue above isn't easy to exploit -- you have to identify<= br> the merchant's node so that they get the bad tx, and you have to connec= t
to many peers so that your preferred tx propogates to miners first --
and probably more importantly, it's relatively easy to detect -- if the=
merchant has a few passive nodes that the attacker doesn't know about it, and uses those to watch for attempted doublespends while it tries
to ensure the real tx has propogated widely. So it doesn't surprise me<= br> at all that it's not often attempted, and even less often successful.
> > > Currently Lightning is somewhere around 15% of our total bit= coin
> > > payments.
> > So, based on last year's numbers, presumably that makes your = bitcoin
> > payments break down as something like:
> >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 5% txs are on-chain and seem shady and are excluded = from zeroconf
> >=C2=A0 =C2=A015% txs are lightning
> >=C2=A0 =C2=A020% txs are on-chain but signal rbf and are excluded = from zeroconf
> >=C2=A0 =C2=A060% txs are on-chain and seem fine for zeroconf
> Numbers are right. Shady is too strong a word,

Heh, fair enough.

So the above suggests 25% of payments already get a sub-par experience,
compared to what you'd like them to have (which sucks, but if you'r= e
trying to reinvent both money and payments, maybe isn't surprising). An= d
going full rbf would bump that from 25% to 85%, which would be pretty
terrible.

> RBF is a strictly worse UX as proven by anyone
> accepting bitcoin payments at scale.

So let's make it better? Building bitcoin businesses on the lie that unconfirmed txs are safe and won't be replaced is going to bite us
eventually; focussing on trying to push that back indefinitely is just
going to make everyone less prepared when it eventually happens.

> > > For me
> > > personally it would be an easier discussion to have when Lig= htning is at
> > > 80%+ of all bitcoin transactions.
> > Can you extrapolate from the numbers you've seen to estimate = when that
> > might be, given current trends?
> Not sure, it might be exponential growth, and the next 60% of Lightnin= g
> growth happen faster than the first 15%. Hard to tell. But we're l= ikely
> talking years here..

Okay? Two years is very different from 50 years, and at the moment there= 9;s
not really any data, so people are just going to go with their gut...

If it were growing in line with lightning capacity in BTC, per
bitcoinvisuals.com/ln-capacity; then 15% now would have gro= wn from
perhaps 4% in May 2021, so perhaps 8% per year. With linear growth,
getting from 15% to 80% would then be about 8 years.

Presumably that's a laughably terrible model, of course. But if we had<= br> some actual numbers where we can watch the progress, it might be a lot
easier to be patient about waiting for lightning adoption to hit 80%
or whatever, and focus on productive things in the meantime?

Cheers,
aj
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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