Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Z4QZu-0000Yb-MK for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 15 Jun 2015 09:21:14 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from mail-qk0-f178.google.com ([209.85.220.178]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Z4QZs-0003Cn-3i for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 15 Jun 2015 09:21:14 +0000 Received: by qkdm188 with SMTP id m188so29380401qkd.1 for ; Mon, 15 Jun 2015 02:21:06 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=//yCnDWS4yHf5IGjbc95HbxbxrdXd4mbffmp2q2gGEQ=; b=ddvW1c+QRzPtrHcZeu2F64zpPWhsbjSysWIO/GkGfvYF9N+o7v9XZaDPW1FQzDtH0D 3b2lxWzjiUKkM0C9c5LggmML2gRt0vSgXb0e5mFNSp7HaOq5WNCMLxN42RAlK4NbU4+E IoyHSCDm1T2wqtd8IHU/wJshkuVM/gEc7L7Oce92zlWeCqdFgaRadOb3POnTRS8ILyxa NZ5hOw/Q/DTkjBZkuHGqL85kGdgnPR6Qj34xoBXIK5dcV97jyT2WPIAjIMKTkjOrtRdL d+yTEiRcQ+fyGS2dekrz6uf2lW/efTkFis0VWVOslbJOw5J24P1/geVZvSxwzybHZZbS kTpw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQlN1zSnOMwiVPEtGr+yxQQjPRLI2uPQdz7TOS/JPUlsSx5HSLHYZlK0Re2SG/unostSr14T MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.55.16.74 with SMTP id a71mr56678155qkh.15.1434360066605; Mon, 15 Jun 2015 02:21:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.96.145.9 with HTTP; Mon, 15 Jun 2015 02:21:06 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 11:21:06 +0200 Message-ID: From: Kalle Rosenbaum To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11374472401ab905188afa6b X-Spam-Score: 1.0 (+) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.0 T_FILL_THIS_FORM_SHORT Fill in a short form with personal information X-Headers-End: 1Z4QZs-0003Cn-3i Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP for Proof of Payment X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 09:21:14 -0000 --001a11374472401ab905188afa6b Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi all! I have made the discussed changes and updated my implementation ( https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc) accordingly. These are the changes: * There is now only one output, the "pop output", of value 0. * The sequence number of all inputs of the PoP must be set to 0. I chose to set it to 0 for all inputs for simplicity. * The lock_time of the PoP must be set to 499999999 (max block height lock time). The comments so far has been mainly positive or neutral. Are there any major objections against any of the two proposals? If not, I will ask Gregory Maxwell to assign them BIP numbers. The two BIP proposals can be found at https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki/Proof-of-Payment-BIP and https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki/btcpop-scheme-BIP. The source for the Proof of Payment BIP proposal is also in-lined below. A number of alternative names have been proposed: * Proof of Potential * Proof of Control * Proof of Signature * Signatory Proof * Popo: Proof of payment origin * Pots: Proof of transaction signer * proof of transaction intent * Declaration of intent * Asset-access-and-action-affirmation, AAaAA, or A5 * VeriBit * CertiBTC * VBit * PayID Given this list, I still think "Proof of Payment" is the most descriptive to non-technical people. Regards, Kalle #################################################
  BIP: 
  Title: Proof of Payment
  Author: Kalle Rosenbaum 
  Status: Draft
  Type: Standards Track
  Created: 
=3D=3D Abstract =3D=3D This BIP describes how a wallet can prove to a server that it has the ability to sign a certain transaction. =3D=3D Motivation =3D=3D There are several scenarios in which it would be useful to prove that you have paid for something. For example: * A pre-paid hotel room where your PoP functions as a key to the door. * An online video rental service where you pay for a video and watch it on any device. * An ad-sign where you pay in advance for e.g. 2 weeks exclusivity. During this period you can upload new content to the sign whenever you like using PoP. * Log in to a pay site using a PoP. * A parking lot you pay for monthly and the car authenticates itself using PoP. * A lottery where all participants pay to the same address, and the winner is selected among the transactions to that address. You exchange the prize for a PoP for the winning transaction. With Proof of Payment, these use cases can be achieved without any personal information (user name, password, e-mail address, etc) being involved. =3D=3D Rationale =3D=3D Desirable properties: # A PoP should be generated on demand. # It should only be usable once to avoid issues due to theft. # It should be able to create a PoP for any payment, regardless of script type (P2SH, P2PKH, etc.). # It should prove that you have enough credentials to unlock all the inputs of the proven transaction. # It should be easy to implement by wallets and servers to ease adoption. Current methods of proving a payment: * In BIP0070, the PaymentRequest together with the transactions fulfilling the request makes some sort of proof. However, it does not meet 1, 2 or 4 and it obviously only meets 3 if the payment is made through BIP0070. Also, there's no standard way to request/provide the proof. If standardized it would probably meet 5. * Signing messages, chosen by the server, with the private keys used to sign the transaction. This could meet 1 and 2 but probably not 3. This is not standardized either. 4 Could be met if designed so. If an input script type is P2SH, any satisfying script should do, just as if it was a payment. For M-of-N multisig scripts, that would mean that any set of M keys should be sufficient, not neccesarily the same set of M keys that signed the transaction. This is important because strictly demanding the same set of M keys would defeat the purpose of a multisig address. =3D=3D Specification =3D=3D =3D=3D=3D Data structure =3D=3D=3D A proof of payment for a transaction T, here called PoP(T), is used to prove that one has ownership of the credentials needed to unlock all the inputs of T. It has the exact same structure as a bitcoin transaction with the same inputs as T and in the same order as in T, but with each sequence number set to 0. There is exactly one output, here called the pop output, with value 0. The pop output must have the following format: OP_RETURN {| ! Field !! Size [B] !! Description |- | <version> || 2 || Version, little endian, currently 0x01 0x00 |- | <txid> || 32 || The transaction to prove |- | <nonce> || 6 || Random data |} The lock_time of the PoP must be set to 499999999 to prevent the PoP from being included in a block, should it appear on the bitcoin p2p network. This is also the reason for setting the sequence numbers to 0, since sequence number of ffffffff would make lock_time ineffective. This specification demands that all input sequence numbers are 0, not just one of them, which would be sufficient to make lock_time effective. This is for simplicity reasons. An illustration of the PoP data structure and its original payment is shown below.
  T
 +------------------------------------------------+
 |inputs                | outputs                 |
 |       Value,Sequence | Value,Script            |
 +------------------------------------------------+
 |input0 1,ffffffff     | 0,pay to A              |
 |input1 3,ffffffff     | 2,OP_RETURN  |
 |input2 4,ffffffff     | 1,pay to B              |
 |                      | 4,pay to C              |
 +------------------------------------------------+

  PoP(T)
 +-------------------------------------------------------------+
 | inputs               | outputs                              |
 |       Value,Sequence | Value,Script                         |
 +-------------------------------------------------------------+
 |input0 1,00000000     | 0,OP_RETURN    |
 |input1 3,00000000     |                                      |
 |input2 4,00000000     |                                      |
 +-------------------------------------------------------------+
 | lock_time=3D499999999                                         |
 +-------------------------------------------------------------+
The PoP is signed using the same signing process that is used for bitcoin transactions. The purpose of the nonce is to make it harder to use a stolen PoP; Once the PoP has reached the server, that PoP is useless since the server will generate a new nonce for every PoP request. =3D=3D=3D Process =3D=3D=3D # A proof of payment request is sent from the server to the wallet. The PoP request contains: ## a random nonce ## a destination where to send the PoP, for example a https URL ## data hinting the wallet which transaction to create a proof for. For example: ##* txid, if known by the server ##* PaymentRequest.PaymentDetails.merchant_data (in case of a BIP0070 payment) ##* amount, label, message or other information from a BIP0021 URI # The wallet identifies a transaction T, if possible. Otherwise it asks the user to select among the ones that match the hints in 1.iii. # The wallet creates an unsigned PoP (UPoP) for T, and asks the user to sign it. # The user confirms # The UPoP(T) is signed by the wallet, creating PoP(T). # The PoP is sent to the destination in 1.ii. # The server receiving the PoP validates it and responds with =E2=80=9Cvali= d=E2=80=9D or =E2=80=9Cinvalid=E2=80=9D. # The wallet displays the response in some way to the user. '''Remarks:''' * The method of transferring the PoP request at step 1 is not specified here. Instead that is specified in separate specifications. See [btcpop scheme BIP](btcpop scheme BIP). * The nonce must be randomly generated by the server for every new PoP request. =3D=3D=3D Validating a PoP =3D=3D=3D The server needs to validate the PoP and reply with "valid" or "invalid". That process is outlined below. If any step fails, the validation is aborted and "invalid" is returned: # Check the format of the PoP. It must pass normal transaction checks, except that the inputs may already be spent. # Check that lock_time is 499999999. # Check that there is exactly one output. This output must have value 0 and conform to the OP_RETURN output format outlined above. # Check that the nonce is the same as the one requested. # Check that the inputs of the PoP are exactly the same as in transaction T, except that the sequence numbers must all be 0. The ordering of the inputs must also be the same as in T. # Run the scripts of all the inputs. All scipts must return true. # Check that the txid in the PoP output is the transaction you actually want proof for. If you don=E2=80=99t know exactly what transaction you want= proof for, check that the transaction actually pays for the product/service you deliver. # Return "valid". =3D=3D Security considerations =3D=3D * Someone can intercept the PoP-request and change any parameter in it. These can be mitigated by using secure connections. For example: ** Pop destination - Stealing your PoP. ** label - Trick you to sign an unintended pop or set a label that your wallet doesn't have any record for, resulting in a broken service. Always check the PoP before signing. ** nonce - Your pop will not validate on server. * Someone can steal a PoP, for example by tampering with the PoP request, and try to use the service hoping to get a matching nonce. Probability per try: 1/(2^48). The server should have a mechanism for detecting a brute force attack of this kind, or at least slow down the process by delaying the PoP request by some 100 ms or so. * Even if a wallet has no funds it might still be valuable as a generator for PoPs. This makes it important to keep the security of the wallet after it has been emptied. * Transaction malleability may cause the server to have another transaction id for a payment than the client's wallet. In that case the wallet will not be able to prove the transaction to the server. Wallets should not rely on the transaction id of the outgoing transaction. Instead it should listen for the transaction on the network and put that in its list of transactions= . =3D=3D Reference implementation =3D=3D [https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc poppoc on GitHub] [https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/wallet Mycelium fork on GitHub] =3D=3D References =3D=3D [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0021.mediawiki BIP0021]: URI Scheme [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0070.mediawiki BIP0070]: Payment Protocol [[btcpop scheme BIP]] ######################################################### 2015-06-06 23:25 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rosenbaum : > Thank you all for the feedback. > > I will change the data structure as follows: > > * There will be only one output, the "pop output", and no outputs from > T will be copied to the PoP. > * The pop output will have value 0. > * The sequence number of all inputs of the PoP will be set to 0. I > chose to set it to 0 for all inputs for simplicity. > * The lock_time of the PoP is always set to 499999999. > > Any comments on this? > > /Kalle > > 2015-06-06 19:00 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rosenbaum : >> 2015-06-06 18:10 GMT+02:00 Tom Harding : >>> On Jun 6, 2015 8:05 AM, "Kalle Rosenbaum" wrote: >>> >>>> I'm open to changes here. >>> >>> I suggest: >>> >>> - Don't include any real outputs. They are redundant because the txid is >>> already referenced. >> >> with the nLocktime solution, the copied outputs are not needed. >> >>> >>> - Start the proof script, which should be invalid, with a magic constant and >>> include space for future expansion. This makes PoP's easy to identify and >>> extend. >> >> I did remore the constant (a "PoP" literal ascii encoded string) >> because it didn't add much. The recipient will expect a pop, so it >> will simply treat it as one. I did add a 2 byte version field to make >> it extendable. >> >>> >>> - "Proof of Potential" >> >> Noted :-) >> >> Thank you >> /Kalle --001a11374472401ab905188afa6b Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi all!

I have made the discussed changes= and updated my implementation (https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc) accordingly. These = are the changes:

* There is now only one output, the "pop outpu= t", of value 0.
* The sequence number of all inputs of the PoP must= be set to 0. I
chose to set it to 0 for all inputs for simplicity.
*= The lock_time of the PoP must be set to 499999999 (max block height lock t= ime).

The comments so far has been mainly positive or neutral.= Are there any major objections against any of the two proposals? If not, I= will ask Gregory Maxwell to assign them BIP numbers.

The = two BIP proposals can be found at https://github.com/= kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki/Proof-of-Payment-BIP and https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki= /btcpop-scheme-BIP. The source for the Proof of Payment BIP proposal is= also in-lined below.

A number of alternative names have= been proposed:

* Proof of Potential
* Pro= of of Control
* Proof of Signature
* Signatory Proof
* Popo: Proof of payment origin
* Pots: Proof of transaction signer* proof of transaction intent
* Declaration of = intent
* Asset-access-and-action-affirmation, AAaAA, or A5
* VeriBit
* CertiBTC
* VBit
* PayID

Given = this list, I still think "Proof of Payment" is the most descripti= ve to non-technical people.

Regards,
Kalle


= #################################################
<pre>
=C2=A0 = BIP: <BIP number>
=C2=A0 Title: Proof of Payment
=C2=A0 Author:= Kalle Rosenbaum <kalle@rosenbaum.= se>
=C2=A0 Status: Draft
=C2=A0 Type: Standards Track
=C2= =A0 Created: <date created on, in ISO 8601 (yyyy-mm-dd) format>
&l= t;/pre>

=3D=3D Abstract =3D=3D

This BIP describes how a wa= llet can prove to a server that it has the ability to sign a certain transa= ction.

=3D=3D Motivation =3D=3D

There are several scenarios i= n which it would be useful to prove that you have paid for something. For e= xample:

* A pre-paid hotel room where your PoP functions as a key to= the door.
* An online video rental service where you pay for a video an= d watch it on any device.
* An ad-sign where you pay in advance for e.g.= 2 weeks exclusivity. During this period you can upload new content to the = sign whenever you like using PoP.
* Log in to a pay site using a PoP.* A parking lot you pay for monthly and the car authenticates itself using= PoP.
* A lottery where all participants pay to the same address, and th= e winner is selected among the transactions to that address. You exchange t= he prize for a PoP for the winning transaction.

With Proof of Paymen= t, these use cases can be achieved without any personal information (user n= ame, password, e-mail address, etc) being involved.

=3D=3D Rationale= =3D=3D

Desirable properties:

# A PoP should be generated on = demand.
# It should only be usable once to avoid issues due to theft.# It should be able to create a PoP for any payment, regardless of script = type (P2SH, P2PKH, etc.).
# It should prove that you have enough credent= ials to unlock all the inputs of the proven transaction.
# It should be = easy to implement by wallets and servers to ease adoption.

Current m= ethods of proving a payment:

* In BIP0070, the PaymentRequest togeth= er with the transactions fulfilling the request makes some sort of proof. H= owever, it does not meet 1, 2 or 4 and it obviously only meets 3 if the pay= ment is made through BIP0070. Also, there's no standard way to request/= provide the proof. If standardized it would probably meet 5.
* Signing m= essages, chosen by the server, with the private keys used to sign the trans= action. This could meet 1 and 2 but probably not 3. This is not standardize= d either. 4 Could be met if designed so.

If an input script type is = P2SH, any satisfying script should do, just as if it was a payment. For M-o= f-N multisig scripts, that would mean that any set of M keys should be suff= icient, not neccesarily the same set of M keys that signed the transaction.= This is important because strictly demanding the same set of M keys would = defeat the purpose of a multisig address.

=3D=3D Specification =3D= =3D

=3D=3D=3D Data structure =3D=3D=3D

A proof of payment for= a transaction T, here called PoP(T), is used to prove that one has ownersh= ip of the credentials needed to unlock all the inputs of T. It has the exac= t same structure as a bitcoin transaction with the same inputs as T and in = the same order as in T, but with each sequence number set to 0. There is ex= actly one output, here called the pop output, with value 0. The pop output = must have the following format:

=C2=A0OP_RETURN <version> <= txid> <nonce>

{|=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
! Field=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 !! Size [B] !! Descri= ption
|-
| &lt;version> || 2=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0=C2=A0 || Version, little endian, currently 0x01 0x00
|-
| &lt= ;txid>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 || 32=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 || Th= e transaction to prove
|-
| &lt;nonce>=C2=A0=C2=A0 || 6=C2=A0= =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 || Random data
|}

The lock_t= ime of the PoP must be set to 499999999 to prevent the PoP from being inclu= ded in a block, should it appear on the bitcoin p2p network. This is also t= he reason for setting the sequence numbers to 0, since sequence number of f= fffffff would make lock_time ineffective. This specification demands that a= ll input sequence numbers are 0, not just one of them, which would be suffi= cient to make lock_time effective. This is for simplicity reasons.

A= n illustration of the PoP data structure and its original payment is shown = below.

<pre>
=C2=A0 T
=C2=A0+---------------------------= ---------------------+
=C2=A0|inputs=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 | outputs=C2=A0=C2= =A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0=C2=A0 |
=C2=A0|=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Value,Sequenc= e | Value,Script=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0=C2=A0 |
=C2=A0+------------------------------------------------+
= =C2=A0|input0 1,ffffffff=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 | 0,pay to A=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 |
=C2= =A0|input1 3,ffffffff=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 | 2,OP_RETURN <some data&g= t; |
=C2=A0|input2 4,ffffffff=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 | 1,pay to B=C2=A0= =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 |<= br>=C2=A0|=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 | 4,pay to = C=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0 |
=C2=A0+------------------------------------------------+
=C2= =A0
=C2=A0 PoP(T)
=C2=A0+--------------------------------------------= -----------------+
=C2=A0| inputs=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 | outputs=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0 |
=C2=A0|=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Value,Sequence | Va= lue,Script=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0 |
=C2=A0+--------------------------------------------------------= -----+
=C2=A0|input0 1,00000000=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 | 0,OP_RETURN &l= t;version> <txid> <nonce> |
=C2=A0|input1 3,00000000=C2= =A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 |=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 |
=C2=A0|input2 4,00000000=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= |=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= |
=C2=A0+-------------------------------------------------------------+=
=C2=A0| lock_time=3D499999999=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2= =A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 |
=C2=A0+--------------= -----------------------------------------------+
</pre>

The= PoP is signed using the same signing process that is used for bitcoin tran= sactions.

The purpose of the nonce is to make it harder to use a sto= len PoP; Once the PoP has reached the server, that PoP is useless since the= server will generate a new nonce for every PoP request.

=3D=3D=3D P= rocess =3D=3D=3D

# A proof of payment request is sent from the serve= r to the wallet. The PoP request contains:
## a random nonce
## a des= tination where to send the PoP, for example a https URL
## data hinting = the wallet which transaction to create a proof for. For example:
##* txi= d, if known by the server
##* PaymentRequest.PaymentDetails.merchant_dat= a (in case of a BIP0070 payment)
##* amount, label, message or other inf= ormation from a BIP0021 URI
# The wallet identifies a transaction T, if = possible. Otherwise it asks the user to select among the ones that match th= e hints in 1.iii.
# The wallet creates an unsigned PoP (UPoP) for T, and= asks the user to sign it.
# The user confirms
# The UPoP(T) is signe= d by the wallet, creating PoP(T).
# The PoP is sent to the destination i= n 1.ii.
# The server receiving the PoP validates it and responds with = =E2=80=9Cvalid=E2=80=9D or =E2=80=9Cinvalid=E2=80=9D.
# The wallet displ= ays the response in some way to the user.

'''Remarks:= 9;''

* The method of transferring the PoP request at step 1 = is not specified here. Instead that is specified in separate specifications= . See [btcpop scheme BIP](btcpop scheme BIP).
* The nonce must be random= ly generated by the server for every new PoP request.

=3D=3D=3D Vali= dating a PoP =3D=3D=3D

The server needs to validate the PoP and repl= y with "valid" or "invalid". That process is outlined b= elow. If any step fails, the validation is aborted and "invalid" = is returned:

# Check the format of the PoP. It must pass normal tran= saction checks, except that the inputs may already be spent.
# Check tha= t lock_time is 499999999.
# Check that there is exactly one output. This= output must have value 0 and conform to the OP_RETURN output format outlin= ed above.
# Check that the nonce is the same as the one requested.
# = Check that the inputs of the PoP are exactly the same as in transaction T, = except that the sequence numbers must all be 0. The ordering of the inputs = must also be the same as in T.
# Run the scripts of all the inputs. All = scipts must return true.
# Check that the txid in the PoP output is the = transaction you actually want proof for. If you don=E2=80=99t know exactly = what transaction you want proof for, check that the transaction actually pa= ys for the product/service you deliver.
# Return "valid".
<= br>=3D=3D Security considerations =3D=3D

* Someone can intercept the= PoP-request and change any parameter in it. These can be mitigated by usin= g secure connections. For example:
** Pop destination - Stealing your Po= P.
** label - Trick you to sign an unintended pop or set a label that yo= ur wallet doesn't have any record for, resulting in a broken service. A= lways check the PoP before signing.
** nonce - Your pop will not validat= e on server.
* Someone can steal a PoP, for example by tampering with th= e PoP request, and try to use the service hoping to get a matching nonce. P= robability per try: 1/(2^48). The server should have a mechanism for detect= ing a brute force attack of this kind, or at least slow down the process by= delaying the PoP request by some 100 ms or so.
* Even if a wallet has n= o funds it might still be valuable as a generator for PoPs. This makes it i= mportant to keep the security of the wallet after it has been emptied.
*= Transaction malleability may cause the server to have another transaction = id for a payment than the client's wallet. In that case the wallet will= not be able to prove the transaction to the server. Wallets should not rel= y on the transaction id of the outgoing transaction. Instead it should list= en for the transaction on the network and put that in its list of transacti= ons.

=3D=3D Reference implementation =3D=3D

[https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/popp= oc poppoc on GitHub]

[https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/wallet Mycelium fork on Gi= tHub]

=3D=3D References =3D=3D

[https://github.com/bitcoin/bi= ps/blob/master/bip-0021.mediawiki BIP0021]: URI Scheme

[https:/= /github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0070.mediawiki BIP0070]: Payme= nt Protocol

[[btcpop scheme BIP]]

###########################= ##############################

2015-06-06 23:25 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rose= nbaum <kalle@rosenbaum.se>:=
> Thank you all for the feedback.
>
> I will change the = data structure as follows:
>
> * There will be only one output,= the "pop output", and no outputs from
> T will be copied t= o the PoP.
> * The pop output will have value 0.
> * The sequen= ce number of all inputs of the PoP will be set to 0. I
> chose to set= it to 0 for all inputs for simplicity.
> * The lock_time of the PoP = is always set to 499999999.
>
> Any comments on this?
>> /Kalle
>
> 2015-06-06 19:00 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rosenbaum &l= t;kalle@rosenbaum.se>:
>= > 2015-06-06 18:10 GMT+02:00 Tom Harding <tomh@thinlink.com>:
>>> On Jun 6, 2015 8:05 AM= , "Kalle Rosenbaum" <kal= le@rosenbaum.se> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I'm = open to changes here.
>>>
>>> I suggest:
>>= ;>
>>> - Don't include any real outputs. =C2=A0 They are= redundant because the txid is
>>> already referenced.
>&= gt;
>> with the nLocktime solution, the copied outputs are not nee= ded.
>>
>>>
>>> - Start the proof script, = which should be invalid, with a magic constant and
>>> include = space for future expansion.=C2=A0 This makes PoP's easy to identify and=
>>> extend.
>>
>> I did remore the constant = (a "PoP" literal ascii encoded string)
>> because it did= n't add much. The recipient will expect a pop, so it
>> will s= imply treat it as one. I did add a 2 byte version field to make
>>= it extendable.
>>
>>>
>>> - "Proof o= f Potential"
>>
>> Noted :-)
>>
>>= Thank you
>> /Kalle
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