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From: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 14:38:57 -0400
Message-ID: <CAJowKgJE6+1nKFYngTRhS_X2z_tmLoxY__J_Aph6UHmAnR8tcQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="089e0822908c4feb18055203fbec"
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network
 Upgrade Activated by Miners
Precedence: list

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> How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But
what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork=
?

I had proposed earlier and maintain that "UTXO bits" can be used to allow
coordinated user participation activation thresholds akin to other
hashpower thresholds.

https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.htm=
l

While I'm not certain that my implementation was correct (or was just too
complicated and concerned with compression at the expense of readability),
I am fairly certain that this mechanism - or a similar one - would be a
reasonable way for users to coordinate changes independently of miners and
with very high consensus levels.


On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 1:04 AM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Jun 14, 2017, at 9:55 PM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin <heater@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Jameson:
>>
>> =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C01:20=EF=BC=8CJames=
on Lopp <jameson.lopp@gmail.com> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev <
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8814=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C02:11=EF=BC=8CGr=
egory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A
>>> >
>>> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
>>> > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> > The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
>>> > miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
>>> > paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence).  This is
>>> > critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
>>> > degree of centralization in pools.  Without it, Bitcoin's security
>>> > would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
>>> >
>>>
>>> =E6=98=AF=E7=9A=84=EF=BC=8C=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=B0=B8=E8=BF=9C=E9=83=
=BD=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E5=B9=B6=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E6=8A=9B=
=E5=BC=83=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=8A=82=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BI=
P =E5=B9=B6=E6=B2=A1=E6=9C=89=E5=8F=8D=E5=AF=B9=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E7=94=A8=
=E6=88=B7=E8=BF=99=E4=B9=88=E5=81=9A=E3=80=82=E5=8F=AA=E6=9C=89=E9=82=A3=E4=
=BA=9B=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=EF=BC=
=8C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E9=9C=80=E8=A6=81=E7=9F=A5
>>> =E9=81=93=E5=BF=85=E9=A1=BB=E5=81=9A=E5=87=BA=E4=B8=80=E4=B8=AA=E9=80=
=89=E6=8B=A9=E3=80=82=EF=BC=88=E8=80=8C=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=
=E7=9A=84=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E9=BB=98=E8=AE=A4=E7=9A=84=E7=AD=96=E7=95=A5=EF=
=BC=89
>>> Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP
>>> does=E2=80=99t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets)=
 that=E2=80=99s
>>> passive, they need to know there=E2=80=99s a choice and pick one.
>>>
>>> =E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E8=A2=AB=E5=BA=94=E7=94=A8=E4=
=BA=8E=E5=87=A0=E4=B9=8E=E4=BB=BB=E4=BD=95=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E4=B8=
=8A=EF=BC=8C=E5=8C=85=E6=8B=AC=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=
=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E7=9A=84=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=
=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=EF=BC=8C=E6=B6=8C=E7=8E=B0=E5=85=B1=E8=AF=
=86=EF=BC=8C=E5=85=AB=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=E7=AD=89=E3=80=82=E4=BD=86=
=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E9=87=8D=E7=
=82=B9=E3=80=82
>>> This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit,
>>> Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m=E2=80=A6 but the upgrade is not the key point.
>>>
>>> =E5=88=B0=E5=BA=95=E6=88=91=E4=BB=AC=E7=9A=84=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=98=
=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9C=9F=E7=9A=84=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=9F
>>> Did the users have any real choice?
>>>
>>> =E6=88=91=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E8=83=BD=E7=90=86=E8=A7=A3=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=
=AC=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5=A4=A7=E9=83=A8=E5=88=86=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=88=
=E5=B0=B1=E5=83=8F=E5=BD=93=E5=89=8D=E4=B8=80=E6=A0=B7=EF=BC=89=EF=BC=8C=E4=
=BD=86=E6=8B=92=E7=BB=9D=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=
=A5=E5=AF=B9=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E7=9A=84=E6=8A=95=E7=A5=A8=
=E7=BB=93=E6=9E=9C=E3=80=82
>>> I don=E2=80=99t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they d=
o today)
>>> but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
>>>
>>
>> To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the
>> term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once=
 a
>> feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that
>> they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too
>> "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, use=
rs
>> may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do =
not
>> show readiness for enforcing the new rules.
>>
>>
>> How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But
>> what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the f=
ork?
>>
>> I agree with you that the =E2=80=9Cvote=E2=80=9D is not accurate. Could =
you kindly
>> suggest an other word for that?
>>
>> I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you
>> agree with this or not?
>>
>> Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number
> of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users =
to
> signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing
> that to date has been arguably flawed.
>
>
> There is exactly one way to express one's opinion on consensus at the
> protocol level - participation. The method is neither flawed nor
> inequitable in the context of Bitcoin.
>
> The only "problem" with it is that people are not satisfied with having a
> voice limited to their participation. People are used to political system=
s
> in which they vote using their existence as power, not their participatio=
n,
> and they expect some subset of existing human bodies to control all other=
s.
> This is the concept of some ruling over others, which gives the rulers a
> more powerful voice than either their proportional existence or individua=
l
> participation would allow.
>
> Bitcoin exists in defiance of political models. It is a market, not a
> state. The only choice you have is to participate or leave. If you are
> satisfied with others participating in your stead, you have left the
> consensus - you have no say.
>
> Most people who think they are participating in Bitcoin have either never
> participated or long ago left the consensus. Having surrendered it, these
> people now grope for a way to have their say. You can always reclaim your
> say on consensus, but you cannot take it away from others.
>
> To have your say regarding hard forks, you must validate Bitcoin received
> in exchange for something else of economic value. To have your say
> regarding soft forks you must mine. Everyone has these options. Hard fork=
s
> cannot control miners' selection of transactions and miners cannot contro=
l
> the economy's determination of what is valid. If one wants a say in eithe=
r
> one must participate in the respective operation.
>
> e
>
> Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely
> impossible, especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin
> users do not voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules.
>
> Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best describe=
d
> as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no
> actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating
> node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what
> rules other entities are enforcing.
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> =E5=AF=B9=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E7=9A=84=E9=80=89=E6=8B=
=A9=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=
=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=
=BB=AC=E4=B8=8D=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=EF=BC=8C=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E9=80=9A=E8=BF=
=87=E5=88=86=E5=8F=89=E6=9D=A5=E6=B6=88=E9=99=A4=E6=8E=89=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=
=E3=80=82
>>> This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51%
>>> majority miners. If they don=E2=80=99t, they can have their fork that g=
et rid of
>>> miners.
>>>
>>> =E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4=BB=8D=E6=97=A7=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=
=A1=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E9=82=A3=E4=B9=88=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E7=95=99=
=E4=B8=8B=E6=9D=A5=E5=B9=B6=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=B0=86=E6=
=9D=A5=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E3=80=82
>>> If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for
>>> upcoming protocol upgrade.
>>>
>>> =E6=89=80=E4=BB=A5=E9=97=AE=E9=A2=98=E5=9C=A8=E4=BA=8E=EF=BC=9A=E6=AF=
=94=E7=89=B9=E5=B8=81=E7=9A=84=E5=BC=80=E5=8F=91=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=A8=
=E6=88=B7=E3=80=81=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E6=9C=8D=E5=8A=A1=E6=
=8F=90=E4=BE=9B=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=9A=E8=87=B3=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=
=8C=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=EF=BC=88=E4=BB=8D=E7=84=B6=EF=BC=89=E5=A6=82=E7=99=BD=
=E7=9A=AE=E4=B9=A6=E4=B8=AD=E6=8F=8F=E8=BF=B0=E7=9A=84=E5=AF=B9=E5=A4=A7=E5=
=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=BB=E3=80=
=82
>>> So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service
>>> provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as
>>> designed in the white paper?
>>>
>>>
>> There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white
>> paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to
>> determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid=
/
>> chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the
>> correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid
>> chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in min=
ers
>> (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they
>> wish to enforce.
>>
>>
>> Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1
>> temporarily. That=E2=80=99s a =E2=80=9Csoft fork=E2=80=9D right? If they=
 dislike the idea, they can
>> leave as always.
>>
>> From my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop
> confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be=
 a
> soft fork, yes.
>
>>
>> Regards
>>
>> LIN Zheming
>>
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>&gt; How does the users show their opinion? They can =
fork away and=20
leave. But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united=20
users or the fork?<br><br></div><div>I had proposed earlier and maintain th=
at &quot;UTXO bits&quot; can be used to allow coordinated user participatio=
n activation thresholds akin to other hashpower thresholds.=C2=A0=C2=A0 <br=
><br><a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/201=
7-May/014251.html">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/=
2017-May/014251.html</a><br><br>While I&#39;m not certain that my implement=
ation was correct (or was just too complicated and concerned with compressi=
on at the expense of readability), I am fairly certain that this mechanism =
- or a similar one - would be a reasonable way for users to coordinate chan=
ges independently of miners and with very high consensus levels.<br><br></d=
iv></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, =
Jun 15, 2017 at 1:04 AM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank"=
>bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto"><div><div class=3D"h5"><div></div><di=
v><br></div><div><br>On Jun 14, 2017, at 9:55 PM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-=
dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"=
_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.<wbr>linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></=
div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zh=
eming Lin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:heater@gmail.com" target=
=3D"_blank">heater@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space">=
<div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space">Hi Jameson=
:<br><div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span><div>=E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=
=E6=9C=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C01:20=EF=BC=8CJameson Lopp &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:jameson.lopp@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">jameson.lopp@gmail.com</a>&gt;=
 =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A</div><br class=3D"m_1442751185230761362m_49372=
64445905329853Apple-interchange-newline"></span><div><br class=3D"m_1442751=
185230761362m_4937264445905329853Apple-interchange-newline"><br style=3D"fo=
nt-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:norm=
al;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0p=
x;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;=
font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-alig=
n:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing=
:0px"><span>On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev<sp=
an class=3D"m_1442751185230761362m_4937264445905329853Apple-converted-space=
">=C2=A0</span><span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.li=
nuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists<wbr>.linuxfoundation=
.org</a>&gt;</span><span class=3D"m_1442751185230761362m_493726444590532985=
3Apple-converted-space">=C2=A0</span>wrote:<br></span><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border=
-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><spa=
n><span><br><br>&gt; =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8814=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C0=
2:11=EF=BC=8CGregory Maxwell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:greg@xiph.org" target=3D=
"_blank">greg@xiph.org</a>&gt; =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A<br>&gt;<br>&gt; =
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev<br>&gt; &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bi=
tcoin-dev@lists.linuxfounda<wbr>tion.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></span></span><s=
pan><span><br>&gt; The enforcement of the system&#39;s rules by users broad=
ly, and not just<br>&gt; miners, is specifically described in the white pap=
er (section 8,<br>&gt; paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentenc=
e).=C2=A0 This is<br>&gt; critical for the security of Bitcoin especially w=
ith the current<br>&gt; degree of centralization in pools.=C2=A0 Without it=
, Bitcoin&#39;s security<br>&gt; would look a lot more like the Ripple syst=
em.<br>&gt;<br><br></span>=E6=98=AF=E7=9A=84=EF=BC=8C=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=
=B0=B8=E8=BF=9C=E9=83=BD=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E5=B9=B6=E5=8F=
=AF=E4=BB=A5=E6=8A=9B=E5=BC=83=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=8A=82=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82=
=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=B9=B6=E6=B2=A1=E6=9C=89=E5=8F=8D=E5=AF=B9=E8=BF=
=99=E4=BA=9B=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E8=BF=99=E4=B9=88=E5=81=9A=E3=80=82=E5=8F=AA=
=E6=9C=89=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=
=94=A8=E6=88=B7=EF=BC=8C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E9=9C=80=E8=A6=81=E7=9F=A5<wbr>=
=E9=81=93=E5=BF=85=E9=A1=BB=E5=81=9A=E5=87=BA=E4=B8=80=E4=B8=AA=E9=80=89=E6=
=8B=A9=E3=80=82=EF=BC=88=E8=80=8C=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=
=84=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E9=BB=98=E8=AE=A4=E7=9A=84=E7=AD=96=E7=95=A5=EF=BC=89=
<br>Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP=
 does=E2=80=99t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) th=
at=E2=80=99s passive, they need to know there=E2=80=99s a choice and pick o=
ne.<br><br>=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E8=A2=AB=E5=BA=94=E7=
=94=A8=E4=BA=8E=E5=87=A0=E4=B9=8E=E4=BB=BB=E4=BD=95=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=
=A7=E4=B8=8A=EF=BC=8C=E5=8C=85=E6=8B=AC=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=
=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E7=9A=84=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=
=BC=8C<wbr>=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=EF=BC=8C=E6=B6=8C=E7=8E=B0=
=E5=85=B1=E8=AF=86=EF=BC=8C=E5=85=AB=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=E7=AD=89=E3=
=80=82=E4=BD=86=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=
=AF=E9=87=8D=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82<br>This BIP can be applied to almost any upg=
rade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m=E2=80=A6 but the upgrade is no=
t the key point.<br><br>=E5=88=B0=E5=BA=95=E6=88=91=E4=BB=AC=E7=9A=84=E7=94=
=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9C=9F=E7=9A=84=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=
=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=9F<br>Did the users have any real choice?<br><br>=E6=88=91=
=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E8=83=BD=E7=90=86=E8=A7=A3=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E7=9B=B8=E4=
=BF=A1=E5=A4=A7=E9=83=A8=E5=88=86=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=88=E5=B0=B1=E5=83=
=8F=E5=BD=93=E5=89=8D=E4=B8=80=E6=A0=B7=EF=BC=89=EF=BC=8C=E4=BD=86=E6=8B=92=
=E7=BB=9D=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=A4=9A<wbr>=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=AF=
=B9=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E7=9A=84=E6=8A=95=E7=A5=A8=E7=BB=93=
=E6=9E=9C=E3=80=82<br>I don=E2=80=99t see the reason they trust the majorit=
y miners(as they do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrad=
e.<br></span></blockquote><span><div><br></div><div>To be clear, Bitcoin is=
 not a democracy - if you find yourself using the term &quot;voting&quot; t=
hen you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a feature has bee=
n vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that they are ready to=
 enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too &quot;passive or lazy=
&quot; or wish to &quot;veto&quot; the activation of the new rules, users m=
ay choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not =
show readiness for enforcing the new rules.</div></span></div></div></block=
quote><div><br></div><div>How does the users show their opinion? They can f=
ork away and leave. But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the =
united users or the fork?</div><div><br></div><div>I agree with you that th=
e =E2=80=9Cvote=E2=80=9D is not accurate. Could you kindly suggest an other=
 word for that?</div><div><br></div><div>I think users should have choice t=
o follow the miners or not. Do you agree with this or not?</div><span><br><=
/span></div></div></div></blockquote><div>Regarding consensus changes, user=
s can voice their opinion on any number of communication platforms. Though =
if you&#39;re looking for a way for users to signal their intentions at the=
 protocol level, every proposal for doing that to date has been arguably fl=
awed.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div>=
<div>There is exactly one way to express one&#39;s opinion on consensus at =
the protocol level - participation. The method is neither flawed nor inequi=
table in the context of Bitcoin.</div><div><br></div><div>The only &quot;pr=
oblem&quot; with it is that people are not satisfied with having a voice li=
mited to their participation. People are used to political systems in which=
 they vote using their existence as power, not their participation, and the=
y expect some subset of existing human bodies to control all others. This i=
s the concept of some ruling over others, which gives the rulers a more pow=
erful voice than either their proportional existence or individual particip=
ation would allow.</div><div><br></div><div>Bitcoin exists in defiance of p=
olitical models. It is a market, not a state. The only choice you have is t=
o participate or leave. If you are satisfied with others participating in y=
our stead, you have left the consensus - you have no say.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>Most people who think they are participating in Bitcoin have either=
 never participated or long ago left the consensus. Having surrendered it, =
these people now grope for a way to have their say. You can always reclaim =
your say on consensus, but you cannot take it away from others.</div><div><=
br></div><div>To have your say regarding hard forks, you must validate Bitc=
oin received in exchange for something else of economic value. To have your=
 say regarding soft forks you must mine. Everyone has these options. Hard f=
orks cannot control miners&#39; selection of transactions and miners cannot=
 control the economy&#39;s determination of what is valid. If one wants a s=
ay in either one must participate in the respective operation.</div><div><b=
r></div><div>e</div><span class=3D""><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><di=
v dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>Me=
asuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely impossible, =
especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not vo=
ice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules.</div><div><br></div><div=
>Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best described=
 as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no actu=
al power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating node i=
s free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what rules o=
ther entities are enforcing.=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div=
 style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div style=3D"=
word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div><span><blockquote t=
ype=3D"cite"><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"font-family:Helvetica=
;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:norm=
al;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:no=
ne;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;bo=
rder-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=
<br>=E5=AF=B9=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E7=9A=84=E9=80=89=E6=8B=
=A9=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=
=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=
=BB=AC=E4=B8=8D=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=EF=BC=8C=E5=8F=AF<wbr>=E4=BB=A5=E9=80=9A=
=E8=BF=87=E5=88=86=E5=8F=89=E6=9D=A5=E6=B6=88=E9=99=A4=E6=8E=89=E7=9F=BF=E5=
=B7=A5=E3=80=82<br>This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to fol=
low the 51% majority miners. If they don=E2=80=99t, they can have their for=
k that get rid of miners.<br><br>=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4=BB=
=8D=E6=97=A7=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E9=82=A3=E4=B9=88=
=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E7=95=99=E4=B8=8B=E6=9D=A5=E5=B9=B6=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E7=
=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=B0=86=E6=9D=A5=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=
=98<wbr>=E3=80=82<br>If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and fo=
llow the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.<br><br>=E6=89=80=E4=BB=A5=E9=
=97=AE=E9=A2=98=E5=9C=A8=E4=BA=8E=EF=BC=9A=E6=AF=94=E7=89=B9=E5=B8=81=E7=9A=
=84=E5=BC=80=E5=8F=91=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E3=80=81=E6=8B=A5=
=E6=9C=89=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E6=9C=8D=E5=8A=A1=E6=8F=90=E4=BE=9B=E8=80=85=E3=
=80=81=E7=94=9A=E8=87=B3<wbr>=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=
=EF=BC=88=E4=BB=8D=E7=84=B6=EF=BC=89=E5=A6=82=E7=99=BD=E7=9A=AE=E4=B9=A6=E4=
=B8=AD=E6=8F=8F=E8=BF=B0=E7=9A=84=E5=AF=B9=E5=A4=A7=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=
=BF=E5=B7=A5=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=BB=E3=80=82<br>So the questio=
ns is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service provides, even mi=
ners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as designed in the white=
 paper?<br><span><br></span></blockquote><div>=C2=A0</div><div>There is a f=
undamental misconception regarding this point - the white paper refers to m=
ajority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to determining the corre=
ct chain within the context of many possible /valid/ chain forks. It is not=
 referring to using hashpower to determine the correct chain amongst an inf=
initely variable number of currently invalid chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem=
 participants should not have faith in miners (or any other entity) when it=
 comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish to enforce.</div><div><br>=
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Arrrgh. I think i=
n the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 temporarily. That=E2=80=99=
s a =E2=80=9Csoft fork=E2=80=9D right? If they dislike the idea, they can l=
eave as always.</div><div><br></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div>Fro=
m my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop confirming tr=
ansactions that have a version less than X then it should be a soft fork, y=
es.=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break=
-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line=
-break:after-white-space"><div><div></div><div><br></div><div>Regards</div>=
<span class=3D"m_1442751185230761362HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><div><b=
r></div><div>LIN Zheming</div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:norma=
l;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-al=
ign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spaci=
ng:0px"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"m_1442751185230761362m_4937264445905=
329853HOEnZb"><div class=3D"m_1442751185230761362m_4937264445905329853h5"><=
/div></div></blockquote></div></div></blockquote></font></span></div><br></=
div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>
</div></blockquote></span><span class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><=
span>______________________________<wbr>_________________</span><br><span>b=
itcoin-dev mailing list</span><br><span><a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists=
.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.<wbr>linuxfoundat=
ion.org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/ma=
ilman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation=
.<wbr>org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-<wbr>dev</a></span><br></div></blockquot=
e></span></div><br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.=
<wbr>linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.<wbr>org=
/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-<wbr>dev</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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