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[49.127.13.214]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a2sm26091835pfg.90.2019.12.08.16.45.30 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 08 Dec 2019 16:45:31 -0800 (PST) From: Runchao Han <runchao.han@monash.edu> Message-Id: <29C07E1A-DC6B-49F0-893B-A59E7BD8DB1C@monash.edu> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_83A96B04-E5BD-42EE-8DF6-3D3076A186B7" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 13.0 \(3601.0.4\)) Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2019 11:45:27 +1100 In-Reply-To: <mailman.3482.1575825776.25512.bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> To: Cheng Wang <cheng@alephium.org> References: <mailman.3482.1575825776.25512.bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3601.0.4) X-Mailman-Approved-At: Mon, 09 Dec 2019 05:36:26 +0000 Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Reducing energy consumption and increasing security at the same time X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2019 02:30:15 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_83A96B04-E5BD-42EE-8DF6-3D3076A186B7 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Cheng, This is an interesting proposal! While the incentive analysis is sound, I have two concerns: ## What if a guy keeps mining easy blocks to launch 51% attacks? With PoLW, a miner can sacrifice the coinbase reward as much as possible = to mine blocks faster. If the blockchain follows the longest chain rule, PoLW may make 51% = attacks much easier. An easy way of fixing this is to choose the chain with most work rather = than most blocks. ## What if the coinbase tx is no longer the majority of mining reward, = but the fx fee? This might happen in the future. A possible solution is to limit the number of txs for easy blocks. For example, if a miner chooses to mine blocks N times easier, he can = only include txs of which the total size is <=3D (block_size - = metadata_size) / N. Best regards, Runchao > Date: Sun, 8 Dec 2019 11:43:49 +0100 > From: Cheng Wang <cheng@alephium.org> > To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Reducing energy consumption and increasing > security at the same time > Message-ID: > = <CAJgZxF4G_BjJ=3DOhuzhjfZtkePnEc2hz8DMZzFzWKBNh17XhBeQ@mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3D"utf-8" >=20 > Hi Everyone, >=20 > I would like to share my serious work on reducing the energy = consumption of > PoW without sacrificing security. My new type of algorithm is called = PoLW. > For a practical system where mining is profitable, PoLW could actually > improve the security of the system. >=20 > The idea is to shift part of the external cost of mining in the = physical > world (mainly energy consumption) to the internal cost of the network. = In > PoLW, the miners are able to give up part of the coinbase reward so as = to > get weight (> 1) for the block hash they produce. The total cost of > generating a new block would still be equal to maximal coinbase reward = in > equilibrium. >=20 > I analyzed two algorithms in the paper: linear PoLW and exponential = PoLW. > Linear PoLW could reduce energy consumption by a factor close to 1/2 = in > equilibrium, while exponential PoLW could reduce energy consumption by = an > arbitrary factor in equilibrium. >=20 > In a practical system, mining is usually (if not always) profitable. = If we > transition from PoW to PoLW, the external costs of mining would = decrease > and the internal costs will increase. However, the decrease in = external > costs would be less than the increase in internal costs since mining = is > profitable. The total cost of block generation would get higher, = therefore, > the security will increase. >=20 > Of course, we could not decrease the external costs of any existing = system > by a factor close to zero immediately. There is a section in my paper > discussing this particularly. The principle of applying PoLW is that > keeping the absolute external cost increasing all the time, but the > percentage of external cost in the total cost gets lower eventually. >=20 > This work is based on solid math calculation, and I am looking forward = to > feedback and discussions. My paper is available at: > https://github.com/alephium/research/raw/master/polw.pdf >=20 > It's inspired by the recent great paper of Itay, Alexander, and Ittay: > https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.04124 >=20 > Best, > Cheng Wang --Apple-Mail=_83A96B04-E5BD-42EE-8DF6-3D3076A186B7 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii <html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; = charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; = -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div = class=3D"">Hi Cheng,</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div>This is = an interesting proposal!<div class=3D"">While the incentive analysis is = sound, I have two concerns:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div= class=3D"">## <span style=3D"font-family: "Helvetica = Neue"; font-size: 13px;" class=3D"">What if a guy keeps mining easy = blocks to launch 51% attacks?</span></div><div class=3D""><span = style=3D"font-family: "Helvetica Neue"; font-size: 13px;" = class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><font = face=3D"Helvetica Neue" size=3D"2" class=3D"">With PoLW, a miner can = sacrifice the coinbase reward as much as possible to mine blocks = faster.</font></div><div class=3D""><font face=3D"Helvetica Neue" = size=3D"2" class=3D"">If the blockchain follows the longest chain = rule, PoLW may make 51% attacks much easier.</font></div><div = class=3D""><font face=3D"Helvetica Neue" size=3D"2" class=3D"">An easy = way of fixing this is to choose the chain with most work rather than = most blocks.</font></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div = class=3D"">## What if the coinbase tx is no longer the majority of = mining reward, but the fx fee?</div><div class=3D""><br = class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">This might happen in the = future.</div><div class=3D"">A possible solution is to limit the number = of txs for easy blocks.</div><div class=3D"">For example, if a miner = chooses to mine blocks N times easier, he can only include txs of which = the total size is <=3D (block_size - metadata_size) / N.</div><div = class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Best regards,</div><div = class=3D"">Runchao</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div = class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div = class=3D"">Date: Sun, 8 Dec 2019 11:43:49 +0100<br class=3D"">From: = Cheng Wang <<a href=3D"mailto:cheng@alephium.org" = class=3D"">cheng@alephium.org</a>><br class=3D"">To: <a = href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" = class=3D"">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br = class=3D"">Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Reducing energy consumption and = increasing<br class=3D""><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" = style=3D"white-space:pre"> </span>security<span = class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre"> </span>at the = same time<br class=3D"">Message-ID:<br class=3D""><span = class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre"> </span><<a = href=3D"mailto:CAJgZxF4G_BjJ=3DOhuzhjfZtkePnEc2hz8DMZzFzWKBNh17XhBeQ@mail.= gmail.com" = class=3D"">CAJgZxF4G_BjJ=3DOhuzhjfZtkePnEc2hz8DMZzFzWKBNh17XhBeQ@mail.gmai= l.com</a>><br class=3D"">Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3D"utf-8"<br= class=3D""><br class=3D"">Hi Everyone,<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">I = would like to share my serious work on reducing the energy consumption = of<br class=3D"">PoW without sacrificing security. My new type of = algorithm is called PoLW.<br class=3D"">For a practical system where = mining is profitable, PoLW could actually<br class=3D"">improve the = security of the system.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">The idea is to = shift part of the external cost of mining in the physical<br = class=3D"">world (mainly energy consumption) to the internal cost of the = network. In<br class=3D"">PoLW, the miners are able to give up part of = the coinbase reward so as to<br class=3D"">get weight (> 1) for the = block hash they produce. The total cost of<br class=3D"">generating a = new block would still be equal to maximal coinbase reward in<br = class=3D"">equilibrium.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">I analyzed two = algorithms in the paper: linear PoLW and exponential PoLW.<br = class=3D"">Linear PoLW could reduce energy consumption by a factor close = to 1/2 in<br class=3D"">equilibrium, while exponential PoLW could reduce = energy consumption by an<br class=3D"">arbitrary factor in = equilibrium.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">In a practical system, mining = is usually (if not always) profitable. If we<br class=3D"">transition = from PoW to PoLW, the external costs of mining would decrease<br = class=3D"">and the internal costs will increase. However, the decrease = in external<br class=3D"">costs would be less than the increase in = internal costs since mining is<br class=3D"">profitable. The total cost = of block generation would get higher, therefore,<br class=3D"">the = security will increase.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Of course, we could = not decrease the external costs of any existing system<br class=3D"">by = a factor close to zero immediately. There is a section in my paper<br = class=3D"">discussing this particularly. The principle of applying PoLW = is that<br class=3D"">keeping the absolute external cost increasing all = the time, but the<br class=3D"">percentage of external cost in the total = cost gets lower eventually.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">This work is = based on solid math calculation, and I am looking forward to<br = class=3D"">feedback and discussions. My paper is available at:<br = class=3D""><a = href=3D"https://github.com/alephium/research/raw/master/polw.pdf" = class=3D"">https://github.com/alephium/research/raw/master/polw.pdf</a><br= class=3D""><br class=3D"">It's inspired by the recent great paper of = Itay, Alexander, and Ittay:<br = class=3D"">https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.04124<br class=3D""><br = class=3D"">Best,<br class=3D"">Cheng Wang<br = class=3D""></div></div></blockquote></div><br = class=3D""></div></body></html>= --Apple-Mail=_83A96B04-E5BD-42EE-8DF6-3D3076A186B7--