Bernard Hughes <bjhughes@istar.ca> wrote:
>
>Scott Badger wrote:
>
>> (A1) if, as I believe he suggests, a part of my brain is constructing a
>> best-fit storyline to account for the actions of other neural
sub-
>> systems, and
>> (A2) if this story is a mixture of interpretation and confabulation,
and
>> (A3) if I perceive that *I* am the story being told by the
story-teller,
>> then
>>
>> (B) Isn't the notion of self an illusion? (and isn't this an
>> increasingly
>> popular theory among consciousness researchers?)
>>
>
>I don't think B follows from A. The description in A fits my current model
of
>how brains work quite well. But the "story-teller" is just one neural
>subsystems. For me, concepts like "free will" apply at the level of
interactions
>between the subsystems. Observing that the subsystems are too simple to
support
>the behavior of the total system is normal for complex systems.
Hmmm, I think you snipped the part of my post that addresses your
comments at least in part, but nevermind. I still think B follows from A.
I assumed that my concept of my "self" *is* the story being told by the
story-teller module. I also assumed that the story is the *product* of
the story-teller. As a product, the story does not have the capacity to
act as an agent. The story-teller is the agent, as are all the other
sub-systems and their interactions. But the story itself has no inherent
causative capacity. It may be reacted to once it is produced, but is not
a *direct* agent of change. Thus the self cannot exert "free will". (keep
in mind this is the argument as I understand it, not my personal philosophy
- I just enjoy advocating for the devil.)
So, I agree that the story-teller is one of many sub-systems and that it is
the complex interactions between subsystems which are required to
support the total organism. Now . . . you postulate that "free will"
applies
at the level of sub-system interactions. My question then
> Its a pet peeve of mine that when I say that the human behavior is based
on the
>firing of neurons, some people jump to, "you think we are just a bundle of
>neurons". The "just" takes out most of the interesting stuff about how the
brain
>works, and rather misrepresents my view.
I agree completely.
>I like the "Society of Mind" model
>which I think Scott is referring to. But I don't think it implies the brain
is
>"just" a collection of neural sub-systems. The "story-teller" may be an
>important part of the perception of self, but without the other parts, it
would
>have no stories to tell.
>
>Bernard
Right, I never meant to diminish the importance of the other parts. In
fact,
if anything, I may have been implying the opposite.