----- Original Message -----
From: "Harvey Newstrom" <mail@HarveyNewstrom.com>
To: "John Clark" <jonkc@worldnet.att.net>; <extropians@extropy.org>
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2000 6:16 AM
Subject: Re: Immortality
> To further expound on this copy-question, try this thought experiment
> resulting in six different copies. I am not trying to prove a point
> here, and don't know what the "right" answer is. I just want to see
> which copy people think is the best continuation of themselves.
>
> Your original, one-and-only body and brain are kidnapped by a mad
> scientist. (Knowing this list, it's a possibility!) The scientist
> makes an exact copy of your body. The scientist then transfers your
> complete memory into the copy. While doing this, your memories are
> completely erased in your original body. The computer also keeps a
> buffered-memory copy of the operation and runs a comparison against
> it to verify that the copy is accurate. After the mad scientist
> finishes, the brilliant idea occurs that he can make the copy better
> than the original. A second duplicate is made, but this one is
> incredibly sexier, younger, smarter, and healthier than your original
> body, while it has the same memories and mannerisms.
>
> We now have these four entities:
>
> Number 1, dubbed "the original", is a total amnesiac with no memory
> whatsoever, but fingerprints indicate it is you.
>
That's me, the original. Unfortunately I'm amnesiac, which really sucks,
although maybe it feels ok. But without memories,
even though it's me, it's not me too.
> Number 2, dubbed "the copy", is apparently you, looks exactly like
> you, and has your exact memories and behavior mannerisms.
If I were the copy, then I would be me, no doubt about it. Fabulous. No
problems. I remember my whole life, I have subjective experience of
being the old me, right up until the point where I close my eyes and woke up
on the other side of the room, in apparently the same body,
although I've been told that the drooling amnesiac in the corner is actually
the original.
Unfortunately, being the original that I am, I would not be the copy.
Instead, I'm the drooling amnesiac, and only a shadow of my former self. I
hope the copies avenge me; this was a pretty mean stunt.
>
> Number 3, dubbed "the youth", is physically better off than you were,
> but otherwise has your exact memories and behavior mannerisms.
>
Now I've been teleported into a cooler body! Awesome! But, I do know, in a
logical sense, that "me" that was before is now stuffed; that's not very
nice!
> Number 4, dubbed "the simulation", is a computer-generated simulation
> of you. It is a projected picture on a computer screen that claims
> to be you, and seems to have all your exact memories and mannerisms.
>
I'm in a computer! Awesome! That's so awesome! No more RSI from keyboards
for me.
But that scientist has got a wupping coming for stuffing the original
around, the bastard. If I can just find an entry into his network, his files
are toast...
> To carry this even further, imagine that the scientist loads your
> memories back into your meat brain, and then replaces each neuron of
> the original's brain with a machine neuron. This is done one neuron
> at a time, and your brain keeps functioning while this is done.
> Eventually, the original brain is completely replaced with mechanical
> neurons. Strangely, the mad scientist's assistant has reassembled
> the neurons into a completely functioning meat brain, and has
> transplanted it into a monkey. We now have:
>
> Number 5, dubbed "the android", with a completely mechanical brain,
> with all your exact memories and mannerisms.
When the meat brain was reinstated, it might be me, or it might not. It'll
be someone, but I'd bet the amnesia was enough to disrupt the sense of self
from the original to this new copy. Perhaps if the memory wiping and
reinstating were done while the original was conscious, it might be the same
person in some trivial sense.
Whoever is in this copy when the memory is reinstated, remains the same
consciousness during the incremental neuron replacement. The transition is
gradual and transparent enough that it wouldn't affect the fuzzy object that
is consciousness.
>
> Number 6, dubbed "the chimp", which looks like a chimp with a large
> brain pan, which seems to have all your exact memories and mannerisms.
>
This is a new copy, different from the android (which has the strongest,
although still weak, claim to be "me"). I'm pretty pissed off at being
turned into a chimp! I'm gonna find a pointy banana, and shove it where the
sun don't shine, you bastard scientist freak!
> Which entity is "you"? Any of them? All of them? Some of them?
>
> Note that I destroyed the original. The amnesiac original is the
> most obvious choice for body continuation, but it had no memory or
> personality. The chimp now contains the original meat brain with all
> its data, but the android alone maintained continuous functioning
> between the original meat-brain and a replacement. The copy is the
> closest to what the original was like before, whereas the youth seems
> to be the best restoration of the original to good health. The
> simulation exists in cyberspace and probably has the most
> possibilities of all the bodies.
>
> How would we rate these entities in probability of being "you"?
All of them are "you", in their own subjective experience. The android may
even be correct in that feeling, even if only trivially.
In a significant way, the original me was destroyed, by the amnesiac
experience.
Now if the android had been created without the initial amnesia inflicted on
the original, then the Android would really be me, I think. That's my most
favoured upload plan.
Emlyn
(Thanks for this stimulating example, Harvey)
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