Jason Joel Thompson <jasonjthompson@home.com> Wrote:
> if I delete my mp3 of my favorite Metallica song, I'm fairly certain your
> collection will remain unscathed.
And if I make a copy and send it to you then your collection will be unscathed too
because you'll get the exact same mp3 file back, it is digital after all.
>>If you have a better definition of death than having a last thought I'd love to hear it.
>Death = Permanent termination of the experience of reality.
That's exactly equivalent to my definition, except that in my humble opinion my wording is
much better, it doesn't need a murky concept like "reality".
>Perhaps you can envision modalities into which we might evolve
> where the concept of "having a thought" is irrelevant to our existence.
Like being brain dead. I am using "thought" in the broad sense that includes feeling.
>>Me:
>>what's "the original"?
>The one with which we started.
Ok, so "The Original" is a one celled zygote.
>How long is that instant?
Depends of how long "now" is, probably second or two for most people.
>Is there an actual effective reality in which they are all "me?"
Depends of which "me" your talking about, the "me" of a year ago, the "me"
at the instant the copy was made, or the "me" of after the copy.
> In what -scientific- fashion is one of the brains simultaneously doing what
> you describe above, and what possible substance does it have?
Huh?
> By what science does my subjective experience mysteriously jump across to
> the clone?
Something can't "jump" unless it occupies space (Where is the number eleven?)
and it's debatable if consciousness even has a position in space, when you're thinking about
something abstract I don't suppose it has anything to do with space, but if it ever does it's the
place you're thinking about.
> Why is it important that the copy was made within a single nanosecond?
Because I can have a thought in 60 seconds. If the copy was made a 60 seconds
ago and then I'm hit by a bus then I've had a last thought and so the "me" after the
copy was made is dead, and I wouldn't like that at all. The "me" of before the copy
is doing just fine but that's another matter.
> Let me get this straight: is it your contention that my discrete experience
> of reality will, at the instant of impact, jump across to the (just
> activated) copy?
A loaded question. If your experience is and always will be "discreet" then obviously
I can't make another, but I've yet to find a scrap of evidence indicating that is true.
> there's got to be *something* making that mystical jump across into
> the new substrate,
Indeed there is but it's not mystical, it's information.
>As far as I'm concerned, -you're- the one who believes in a human soul
You're the one claming this huge difference between "The Original" and "The Copy".
Something must cause the difference, what is it, what does one have that the other does not?
It can't be matter, science can tell no difference between one hydrogen atom and another, and
if you're right and it's not information either then it can only be something beyond the scientific
method, the soul.
To tell the truth I do believe in a soul, sort of, because information is about as close as you can
get to the traditional concept of the soul and still and still be rational. Consider the similarities:
1)The soul is non material and so is information.
2)It's difficult to pin down a unique physical location for the soul, and the same is true for
information.
3)The soul is the essential, must have, part of consciousness, exactly the same situation
is true for information.
4)The soul is immortal and so, potentially, is information.
However there are also important differences between the soul and information:
1)A soul is unique but information can be duplicated.
2)The soul is and will always remain unfathomable, but information is understandable,
in fact, information is the ONLY thing that is understandable.
3) Information unambiguously exists, I don't think anyone would deny that, but if the
soul exists it will never be proven scientifically.
John K Clark jonkc@att.net
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Mon May 28 2001 - 09:50:34 MDT