Chris Russo boldly asked:
>What makes you you?
>Besides the physical characteristics that I think that we can all
>agree upon are copied down to the smallest detail, the mental
>characteristics define who we are.
You're assuming Cartesian duality, I take it, in that you assume the brain
and mind to be two separate entities. This is only true if you regard the
mind to not be comprised of "physical characteristics."
>Basically, my "mental characteristics" are comprised of memories
> I have and the neural algorithms that drive my thoughts, as well as
>any capacity to support those algorithms.
True, true, but are these not physical characteristics? Are you familiar
with the idea of "synaptic plasticity" in memory cells and the assignment
of weights in neural networks?
>Copy the mental and physical "me" exactly, and there's no real
>distinction between the two.
This is where you run into some serious trouble (more serious than
philosophical trouble). First of all, by nature of the definition of a
"copy," there is a definite distinction between the two, in that there is
a usually quantifiable spatial sepation between the two entities which
prevents them from being one in the same thing.
Take for example a correlative analogy between the dynamics of an exact
replica of you and, for the sake of application to computer science, an
exact copy of your Windows 98 platform transferred to another computer.
Say your biological replica, which is NOT you (because it moves to the
Congo in an attempt to avoid the concept of dualism while you remain in
Western Civilization) and your Windows 98 copy both are infected with
viruses - your replica gets ebola while your Windows gets a virused copy
of this email.
Up until this point, assume both copies might have the same dynamics,
unaffected by environment (which is untrue from the first millisecond
after the copy is made). Therefore, arguably (with a really compelling
argument) there would be no "real" distinction between the two. After your
replica comes down with ebola, however, you can bet there will be
observable-measurable-quantifiable changes in you and your replica,
distinguishing the two on many levels. Same goes with the Windows 98
example. After a week or so, the difference will be great enough that one
will be functional and the other will not.
You also said something earlier to the effect of sentimentality hindering
the acceptance of the idea that me and my replica have different
consciousnesses, and that I would still be trapped in me while my replica
goes off to the Congo. I ask, if there is an equal chance of mortality for
me and my copy (since although our environmental factors may change our
genetic predispositions, these effects are unpredictable due to the
chaotic nature of genetic physiology in human DNA and the randomness of
environmental events) - then what is the point of making a replica in the
first place??? With all sincerity,
Cyrus
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Mon May 28 2001 - 09:50:34 MDT