Re: TO: Joe Dees - Mu-shin

• Messages sorted by: [ date ][ thread ][ subject ][ author ]
• [ Next ][ Previous ] In reply to: Joe E. Dees Next in thread: Joe E. Dees

> > J. The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind asserts that the belief that
> > one possesses a self is a delusion; that the self is, in
> > reality, nothing.
> >
> > B. Let me rephrase this for the sake of illustration: No-Mind
> > asserts that the dreamer is the dream, the dancer is the
> > dance, the hearer is the sound, the perceiver is the

> > I have yet to see a waltz without a waltzer.

Of course I would reply: You have yet to see a waltz without waltzing.

> > The perceiver is NOT the perception!

Petitio Principii.

I would suggest that the burden of proof is upon you: that is, to prove "dualism" is a true theory of reality, and to demonstrate how you know that. My statements are based on empirical considerations; that is, I assert that the truth or falsity of any proposition whose content is based on what cannot be experienced is and must be indeterminate.

This is what Kant's "noumenon" was all about; since he regarded "objective experience" as "phenomenal" (i.e. appearance only) then like you he must also assume there is an "unexperienced somewhat" of which the "object" is an "appearance". You, in effect, keep saying "x is an appearance; ergo, there must exist a y such that y is what appears as x", i.e. is a fallacious argument involving Petitio Principii -- that is, you continually assume that which is to be proved.

> > ...the presence of thought logically entails the existence of
> > a self who thinks (the thinker of the thought).

Petitio Principii.

> > If there is no dreamer, there cannot be a dream. If there is a
> > dream, there must be a dreamer. Likewise, awakening can occur
> > only when someone is awakened.

Petitio Principii.

> > J. On the other hand, if one does not possess a self, then no
> > delusion can occur, either, for delusion requires a self in

Petitio Principii.

> > J. There must be a believer for a belief to occur, and a
> > nonexistent belief cannot be deluded

Petitio Principii.

> > The eye cannot see itself, but its seeing refers necessarily to a
> > seer as surely as it refers to a seen.

Petitio Principii. Dualism is inherent in all Germanic and Romance languages. "My eyes are blue." assumes the eyes belong to a hypothetical somebody, i.e. your "self".

> > The epithet of "dualistic" is a common Zen ploy with which its
> > practitioners attempt to dismiss what they cannot refute.

To a certain extent, I agree; it assumes that "monism" is the case. But the intellectual problem of "the denial of dualism implies the affirmation of monism" is, again, based on the Law of Contradiction and the Law of the Excluded Middle -- another dualistic Petitio Principii.

> There is a way around the conundrum, but you ain't found it yet. I'll
> give you another chance; if you don't find it then, I'll go ahead and
> tell you.

I haven't found it because it only exists as an epiphenomenon of your illusory assumptions. I do not mean this disrespectfully: what is intended is simply the assertion that on empirical grounds neither dualism nor monism are descriptions of experience. Further, the concept of "self" has no experiential referent substantively but can only intend the vocalized or sub-vocalized statement: "My self is thinking of itself" or "I think therefore I exist therefore I think therefore...". By an "illusion" I mean "that which is experienced as an image without any referent except itself but is belived to exist in an assumed "external world", in other words, a mirage. Again, Petitio Principii -- "external to what?" But that which is "internal" of course.

Thus, the "self" is a mirage if taken as more than a cognition; of course if you regard "external" things as "objects" then there MUST be a "subject"

• this is the first assumption of all dualism. If there is no "self" then we are unjustified in saying either that it is "nothing" or "something". In paradoxical form, "The self is nothing only if it is something." The evident inconsistency of this statement underlies all the "ontological arguments" invoked to prove the existence of God (or, in your case, the "Self").

However this may be, if your "way around" assumes dualism, but asserts logically that you cannot use "nothing" as a predicate "nothing" (c.f. the Petitio Principii fallacy upon which all ontological proofs depend); or if, on the contrary, it does not, then I would like to witness it for myself.

Thanks for the intellectual stimulation, whatever you are,

Bob (your hypothetical and undemonstrable correspondent)

• [ Next ][ Previous ] In reply to: Joe E. Dees Next in thread: Joe E. Dees