also useful
http://classes.tmcc.edu/classes/rgault/study10.html
http://www.immunet.org/immunet/atn.nsf/page/a-010-01
Query:
since BHT has (apparently) killed every enveloped virus in vitro, would it
have some effect with pox
In test tube experiments, BHT has successfully inactivated all lipid viruses
so far tested including herpes virus (Snipes 1975), cytomegalovirus (Kim
1978), PM2 virus (Cupp 1975), Semliki Forest virus (Kim 1978), Newcastle
disease virus (Brugh 1977, Winston 1980), Phi-6 virus (Wanda 1976, Bamford
1981) and pseudorabies virus (Pirtle, 1986), at concentrations of BHT that
have not altered the growth of the host cell culture.
BHT is reputed to work by interfering with the association of envelope
proteins and envelope lipids. In this view, BHT gets in between the lipids
and the hydrophobic regions of the proteins that are normally immersed in
lipid. By altering the dynamics between these hydrophobic surfaces, the
structure is destabilized and either disintegrates (as in phi-6 virus) or
selective proteins become detached (as in herpes).
----- Original Message -----
From: <hal@finney.org>
To: <extropians@extropy.org>
Sent: Wednesday, September 26, 2001 11:29 AM
Subject: Re: Is there still a chance for us? (question ?)
> James Rogers wrote:
> > It is possible that you already have immunity. The smallpox vaccine is
> > based on the cowpox virus (hence the word "vaccine"), and if you worked
on a
> > farm as a child you may have already been exposed to it.
>
> Actually the smallpox virus is based on the vaccinia virus, which is
> where the word "vaccine" comes from. The medical name for the smallpox
> virus is variola.
>
> Vaccinia and variola are part of a family of viruses known as Orthopox
> viruses. These also include monkeypox and cowpox. There is a related
> family called Avipox viruses which affect birds. Researchers who work
> with these types of viruses have been the only ones able to get smallpox
> vaccinations in recent years.
>
> http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5010a1.htm provides a good
> description of the symptoms of smallpox and its progression:
>
> Symptoms of smallpox begin 12--14 days (range: 7--17) after exposure,
> starting with a 2--3 day prodrome of high fever, malaise, and
> prostration with severe headache and backache. This preeruptive
> stage is followed by the appearance of a maculopapular rash (i.e.,
> eruptive stage) that progresses to papules 1--2 days after the rash
> appears; vesicles appear on the fourth or fifth day; pustules appear
> by the seventh day; and scab lesions appear on the fourteenth day
> (Figures 1,2) (3). The rash appears first on the oral mucosa, face,
> and forearms, then spreads to the trunk and legs (3,4). Lesions
> might erupt on the palms and soles as well. Smallpox skin lesions
> are deeply embedded in the dermis and feel like firm round objects
> embedded in the skin. As the skin lesions heal, the scabs separate and
> pitted scarring gradually develops (Figure 2) (4). Smallpox patients
> are most infectious during the first week of the rash when the oral
> mucosa lesions ulcerate and release substantial amounts of virus into
> the saliva. A patient is no longer infectious after all scabs have
> separated (i.e., 3--4 weeks after the onset of the rash).
>
> I have been told that emergency workers at hospitals have been given
> lists of symptoms of smallpox and other biological warfare agents so
> that an attack can be recognized as early as possible. Here is a
description
> from the article above of procedures in response to a smallpox attack:
>
> If an intentional release of smallpox (variola) virus does occur,
> vaccinia vaccine will be recommended for certain groups. Groups for
> whom vaccination would be indicated include
>
> persons who were exposed to the initial release of the virus;
>
> persons who had face-to-face, household, or close-proximity
> contact (<6.5 feet or 2 meters) (84) with a confirmed or suspected
> smallpox patient at any time from the onset of the patient's
> fever until all scabs have separated;
>
> personnel involved in the direct medical or public health
> evaluation, care, or transportation of confirmed or suspected
> smallpox patients;
>
> laboratory personnel involved in the collection or processing
> of clinical specimens from confirmed or suspected smallpox
> patients; and
>
> other persons who have an increased likelihood of contact with
> infectious materials from a smallpox patient (e.g., personnel
> responsible for medical waste disposal, linen disposal or
> disinfection, and room disinfection in a facility where smallpox
> patients are present).
>
> Using recently vaccinated personnel (i.e., <3 years) for patient care
> activities would be the best practice. However, because recommendations
> for routine smallpox vaccination in the United States were rescinded
> in 1971 and smallpox vaccination is currently recommended only
> for specific groups (see Routine Nonemergency Vaccine Use), having
> recently vaccinated personnel available in the early stages of a
> smallpox emergency would be unlikely. Smallpox vaccine can prevent
> or decrease the severity of clinical disease, even when administered
> 3--4 days after exposure to the smallpox virus (2,4,85). Preferably,
> healthy persons with no contraindications to vaccination, who can
> be vaccinated immediately before patient contact or very soon after
> patient contact (i.e., <3 days), should be selected for patient care
> activities or activities involving potentially infectious materials.
> Persons who have received a previous vaccination (i.e., childhood
> vaccination or vaccination >3 years before) against smallpox might
> demonstrate a more accelerated immune response after revaccination
> than those receiving a primary vaccination (3). If possible, these
> persons should be revaccinated and assigned to patient care activities
> in the early stages of a smallpox outbreak until additional personnel
> can be successfully vaccinated.
>
> So the good news is that emergency administration of the vaccine
> immediately after exposure can reduce symptoms, and that people over 35
> or so who have been previously vaccinated will respond especially well
> to revaccination.
>
> Bad news aplenty is available from the New Scientist's series on
bioterrorism
> at http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/bioterrorism/bioterrorism.jsp. A
> supposedly reassuring article,
>
http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/bioterrorism/bioterrorism.jsp?id=22492
300,
> begins,
>
> THE US already has enough smallpox vaccine to defeat most bioterrorist
> attacks with this virus, according to public health officials. Between
> six and seven million people could be treated by the amount of vaccine
> that is currently in the country's stockpiles.
>
> but then continues,
>
> Meltzer constructed various models based on the number of people
> infected in the attack, and how many other people each of these
> can infect. His model predicts that between three and nine million
> vaccinations would be enough to contain an initial outbreak affecting
> a hundred people, but only if at least a third of those infected were
> put in quarantine as soon as they developed the symptoms.
>
> So we have plenty of doses - as long as only a hundred people were
> initially exposed! And even then we need millions of vaccinations to
> handle the outbreak! This is devastating news because one would suppose
> that the kinds of terrorists we are dealing with today would be able to
> infect far more people than this.
>
> The latest bit of sunshine on the New Scientists site comes from
>
http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/bioterrorism/bioterrorism.jsp?id=ns999
91337:
>
> The prospect of an anthrax attack was investigated in the 1990s
> by the US Office of Technological Assessment. They concluded that
> 100 kilograms of virulent anthrax effectively dispersed at night
> over Washington DC could cause between one and three million
> deaths. Crop-dusters can carry up to twice that capacity.
>
> It's very bad news.
>
> Hal
>
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