Cycles of history: epistemologically suspect? (was Cultural

Carl Feynman (carlf@atg.com)
Mon, 16 Jun 1997 12:52:15 -0400


At 06:25 AM 6/14/97 -0400, Reilly Jones wrote:
>
>This whole historical cycle nonsense ... Once
>again, the fallacy of analysis like this, is that you can start arbitrarily
>anywhere in history, in any given year, and make historical facts fit
>whatever cycle you choose

Only if the cycles are defined with sufficent imprecision. Here's a
cyclical theory that is suffciently precise to be disproved: the rate of
growth of the French population has oscillated from psotive to negative with
a 47-year period since the twelfth century. I just made this theory up, and
it's probably false.
But it's hardly vacuous.

>But history is continuous, one year after
>another, no one year any different than any other year, every year of equal
>length. No year is to be given a privileged position when starting a
>cyclical analysis. There is no "generation" identifiable anywhere except
>in relation to yourself and yourself alone. To arbitrarily assert
>otherwise is to commit a category error in analysis.

Begin analogy:

But geography is continuous, one kilometer after another, no one kilometer
any different than any other kilometer, every kilometer of equal length. No
kilometer is to be given a privileged position when starting a cyclical
analysis. There is no "basin/range alternation" identifiable anywhere
except in relation to yourself and yourself alone. To arbitrarily assert
otherwise is to commit a category error in analysis.

End analogy.

A generation is a theoretical concept used by people who try to explain
history. I don't see why it's a category error to construct such a
concept, and then argue that it provides a correct theory. What two
categories are you claiming to have been confused in this case?

--CarlF