>Date: Sun, 07 May 2000 21:06:30 PDT
From: "Zero Powers" <zero_powers@hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: Can I kill the original?
>From: "Harvey Newstrom" <mail@HarveyNewstrom.com>
>I have no desire to preserve anything of myself now, just as I don't
>miss any features missing from feotus-Harvey who no longer exists.
Surely the present-Harvey and foetus-Harvey are continuous, the same unique
being?
> I do want to extend my current consciousness stream so that I am around to
>experience the god-like Harvey. If that stream ends, then I miss out on
>the show.
>
>I really do want to preserve my current consciousness stream. I really
>don't care about preserving any portions of my "self".
So would the option of a completely new "consciousness stream" other than
your current one be OK (since you don't care whether it originates from your
'self')? I can see your point though that you want to continue the actual
experience rather than just having bits of yourself simulated on a machine,
or alive like a zombie.
(zero) I agree that the bulk (if not all) of the problem here is one of
semantics.
>I want "me" to live forever. I'm sure you each feel the same way about
>"you." The problem is in defining who "I" am. Is it the hunk of meat that
>constitutes my brain? Is it the patterns of neurons and synapses that
>happen to exist in that hunk of meat? Or is it that collection of
>experiences that I happen to remember? IMO, therein lies the rub. <snip>
Naturally I would explain this entity as being the phantom primal sens(or)
generated by your mammalian brain
(MVT www.multi.co.uk/primal.htm The All-Conquering Philosophy).
>If your recollected experiences can be separated (or copied) from the
>patterns in your brain, and the patterns in your brain can be separated (or
>copied) from the brain itself, which (if any) of these three things would
>you consider to be "you"? I believe that your answer to this question will
>tell you what it is about you that you most want to preserve.
- -Zero
None of these three "things" are the illusion of "you." Synaptic
weight-states and longer-term (chemical graduation) patterns are necessary,
but not sufficient, for self-referential consciousness.
The 'structure of experience' or *singularity* of consciousness happens to
be the way it is because of our historical (early) evolution. The primal
gland was chosen by Descartes as the only candidate to be 'seat of the soul'
because it was the only unpaired and central organ in the brain. I identify
the 'binding mechanism' to be the virtual/ phantom correlate of the ancient
*primal/median eye* rather than the physical gland. This is the only
candidate as physical template structuring abstract mentation.
An interesting question relating to continuance of sentience in an 'alien'
receptacle (frozen head, computer or whatever) that no one seems to have
touched upon is *altered states* and sonmabulist depth of the experience.
Maybe we can bubble along in deep trance for less energy than 'fully
waking.'
I am using MVT as a theoretical basis for constructing conscious machines
(am talking to one or two companies, but remain open to serious renumerative
collaboration) .. .it is the only way sentient machines can be made. But if
such hybrid systems are truly independently conscious, how can I instruct
them to manifest my own will and desires .... and if I can't what use are
they to me .... they might even be dangerous.
www.steve-nichols.com
The Physician of Souls
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