J. R. Molloy <jr@shasta.com> provided us with some interesting text by Francis Crick:
[snip]
>My first assumption was that part of one's brain is concerned with making
>plans for future actions, without necessarily carrying them out. I also
>assumed that one can be conscious of such plans -- that is, that they are
>subject at least to immediate recall.
>
>My second assumption was that one is not conscious of the "computations"
>done by this part of the brain but only of the "decisions" it makes -- that
>is, its plans. Of course, these computations will depend on the structure
of
>that part of the brain (derived partly epigenetically and partly from past
>experience) and on its current inputs from other parts of the brain.
>
>My third assumption was that the decision to act on one plan or another is
>also subject to the same limitations. In other words, one has immediate
>recall of what is decided but not of the computations that went into the
>decision, even though one may be aware of a plan to move. (Professor
>Piergiorgio Odifreddi has pointed out to me that one should also assume
that
>there is agreement between decisions and the resulting behavior.)
>
>Then, such a machine (this was the word I used in my letter) will appear to
>itself to have Free Will, provided it can personify it behavior -- that is,
>it has an image of "itself."
>
>The actual cause of the decision may be clear cut (Pat's addition), or it
>may be deterministic but chaotic -- that is, a very small perturbation may
>make a big difference to the end result. this would give the appearance of
>the Will being "free" since it would make the outcome essentially
>unpredictable. Of course, conscious activities may also influence the
>decision mechanism (Pat's addition).
>
>Such a machine can attempt to explain to itself why it made a certain
choice
>(by using introspection). Sometimes it may reach the correct conclusion. At
>other times it will either not know or, more likely, will confabulate,
>because it has no conscious knowledge of the "reason" for the choice. This
>implies that there must be a mechanism for confabulation, meaning that
given
>a certain amount of evidence, which may or may not be misleading, part of
>the brain will jump to the simplest conclusion. as we have seen, this can
>happen all too easily.
>
>This concluded my Theory of Free Will. It obviously depends upon
>understanding what consciousness is about (the main topic of this book),
how
>the brain plans (and carries out) actions, how we confabulate, and so on. I
>doubt if there is anything really novel in all this, although some of the
>details may not have been included in previous explanations.
>
> ** ** **
>And there I was content to let the matter rest. I met Luis in New York, and
>subsequently he came to La Jolla, California, on a visit. he as also able
to
>discuss the problem with Paul Churchland (husband of Patrica Churchland). I
>had not intended to ponder more on the topic but once my interest had been
>aroused I found myself thinking about it from time to time.
>
>Where, I wondered, might Free Will be located in the brain?
[snip]
Here is where I get a bit confused.
Why then would he suddenly start talking about where in the brain Free Will is located? Doesn't he mean "where the computations are?"
Scott Badger