> There are still ways to attack the content. One could flood the
> namespace with bogus submissions, thus making bona fide documents hard
> to find. By publishing a lot of big random blobs, and creating a fake
> demand for them (M$ has a lot of machines, and there are things like
> Troj_trinoo and Stacheldraht), which would be DoS against the
> participants' donated resources.
We've already discussed ways to prevent namespace pollution and
usurpation, but implementing those will have to wait for version 2.
Specifically, if you store data keyed on content hash, and store
"names" as cryptographically signed references to content-hash-keyed
data, you can have any number of namespaces, each secure and reliable,
which users can choose among.
-- Lee Daniel Crocker <lee@piclab.com> <http://www.piclab.com/lcrocker.html> "All inventions or works of authorship original to me, herein and past, are placed irrevocably in the public domain, and may be used or modified for any purpose, without permission, attribution, or notification."--LDC
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Jul 27 2000 - 14:04:29 MDT