Nick Bostrom wrote:
>As long as the decision-maker and the pain-experiencer are "the same", there
>does not seem to be a moral problem ... maybe we assume that there is no moral
>problem in this case only because we have evolved to care about our future
>segments so the problem doesn't arise much in the real world. So for
>practical purposes, the present time segment can be the coercing guardian of
>your future time segments. But I wonder how this might change if we
>construct "perverse" beings who don't have this degree of care for their
>future selves. ... Do we want to give coercive rights to the earlier segment
>over the later segment simply because it happens to be at an earlier temporal
>position?
Actually, people seem to *not* care about their future selves in the same
way that those future selves will care about themselves. Maybe the difference
isn't as large as it might become in the future, but it is large enough to
be a major current argument for various forms of regulation and limitations
on choice.
For example, the following paper uses it to argue for higher smoking taxes:
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7507
It has also been used as an argument against allowing/supporting suicide.
Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
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