From: Bradley Thomas (brad36@gmail.com)
Date: Sun Dec 06 2009 - 18:53:14 MST
>If two experiences S1 and S2 are generated by the one computation but share
no content (because the program deletes data from the memory of the subject
and inserts unrelated data in its place) then there is no subjective
connection between them. On the other hand, if the two experiences are
generated by unrelated computations but just happen to share content, so
that S2 remembers being S1, then they are subjectively connected.
This is interesting. What kind of content overlap does it take for two data
sets to be "subjectively connected"? Is there a clear definition?
Brad Thomas
www.bradleythomas.com
Twitter @bradleymthomas, @instansa
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-sl4@sl4.org [mailto:owner-sl4@sl4.org] On Behalf Of Stathis
Papaioannou
Sent: Sunday, December 06, 2009 7:42 PM
To: sl4@sl4.org
Subject: Re: Copying nonsense (was Re: [sl4] Uploading (was : goals of AI))
2009/12/7 John K Clark <johnkclark@fastmail.fm>:
>> Even if some subjective experiences are highly similar to, and
>> causally computed from, other subjective experiences, they are not
>> connected.
>
> So even if there is a connection (computation) between two things they
> are not connected. Huh?
They may be connected due to their subjective content, but not due to the
causal link. If two experiences S1 and S2 are generated by the one
computation but share no content (because the program deletes data from the
memory of the subject and inserts unrelated data in its
place) then there is no subjective connection between them. On the other
hand, if the two experiences are generated by unrelated computations but
just happen to share content, so that S2 remembers being S1, then they are
subjectively connected.
Essentially it is difficulty with this idea that leads people to reject
uploading, teleportation etc. They figure that only if the thinking happens
in the same head can you continue to be the same person. But in fact the
only reason to keep things in the same head is that this is normally the
only way to ensure that subjective experiences keep happening, one after the
other, with the right sort of content. If this could be done in some other
way then you would be just as happy being you, remembering your past and
looking forward to more experiences in the future. It could be the case
right now that every second you experience is being computed on a different
machine, perhaps even causally disconnected machines. You would have no way
of knowing, and no reason to worry provided that future experiences keep
coming.
-- Stathis Papaioannou
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