From: Vladimir Nesov (robotact@gmail.com)
Date: Wed Feb 25 2009 - 15:33:58 MST
On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 12:32 AM, Charles Hixson
<charleshixsn@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> The problem is, basically, that the public record isn't complete enough.
> E.g., it's quite possible that model based on clouds appearance would need
> to model the internal appearance of the clouds to allow accurate
> projections. And it's quite probable that any such model would be a lot
> more computation intensive than one based on a higher level understanding,
> and explicitly including such things as temperature.
>
> The problem with your analogy is: What is the equivalent of looking at the
> model and deciding that one needs to turn up the thermostat this evening?
> I.e., if it's a good weather model, then there is an isomorphism between
> levels.
>
> I suppose the question is, basically, are two things which are canonically
> isomorphic not actually the same thing? If they are, then the upload IS the
> person. Though in that case it becomes a question as to exactly how much
> of a person needs to be captured. E.g., is a structure isomorphic to the
> retina required, or merely something that will appropriately stimulate a
> simulation of the optic nerves? But how much can you peel off in the name of
> efficiency and still have the same valid person?
>
> I tend to believe that canonically isomorphic entities are merely different
> views of the same underlying entity. But canonically isomorphic is a very
> high barrier, and one that's probably unreachable in practice. So the
> question becomes "How great a deviation is allowable without considering the
> entity to be a new person?"
>
In weather modeling, you only care about precision of predictions,
while in person modeling you don't care about precision per se. A
model can be a person, and "the same" person, without being a very
accurate down-to-the-tiny-details copy. If a person is slightly drunk,
haven't slept for 24 hours and got a micro stroke that got him forget
where he put his keys, it's still the same person. If that damaged
person somehow recovers, becoming different from before but as removed
from damaged version as was the undamaged original, it's still
essentially the same person. You care about caring about that person
(maybe it's yourself), not about pointless precision. To the extent of
not forgetting to include this difference in the analogy, the analogy
holds.
-- Vladimir Nesov http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/
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