Re: Simulation argument in the NY Times

From: Randall Randall (randall@randallsquared.com)
Date: Sun Aug 19 2007 - 18:41:07 MDT


On Aug 19, 2007, at 8:04 PM, Matt Mahoney wrote:
>
> I mean consciousness as that which distinguishes people from
> philosophical
> zombies.
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

But is there any reason to think that the concept of a
philosophical zombie makes any sense? In order for it
to make sense, you have to have found that consciousness
isn't a physical process. Do you believe you have
evidence for this view?

--
Randall Randall <randall@randallsquared.com>
"This is a fascinating question, right up there with whether rocks
fall because of gravity or being dropped, and whether 3+5=5+3
because addition is commutative or because they both equal 8."
   - Scott Aaronson


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