From extropians-request@extropy.org Tue Aug 16 15:02:45 1994 Return-Path: extropians-request@extropy.org Received: from usc.edu (usc.edu [128.125.253.136]) by chaph.usc.edu (8.6.8.1/8.6.4) with SMTP id PAA12060 for ; Tue, 16 Aug 1994 15:02:39 -0700 Received: from news.panix.com by usc.edu (4.1/SMI-3.0DEV3-USC+3.1) id AA27541; Tue, 16 Aug 94 15:02:16 PDT Received: by news.panix.com id AA05800 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for more@usc.edu); Tue, 16 Aug 1994 18:02:06 -0400 Date: Tue, 16 Aug 1994 18:02:06 -0400 Message-Id: <199408162202.AA05800@news.panix.com> To: Extropians@extropy.org From: Extropians@extropy.org Subject: Extropians Digest #94-8-177 - #94-8-184 X-Extropian-Date: August 16, 374 P.N.O. [18:00:58 UTC] Reply-To: extropians@extropy.org X-Mailer: MailWeir 1.0 Status: RO Extropians Digest Tue, 16 Aug 94 Volume 94 : Issue 227 Today's Topics: EPIST: ah yes, once more [2 msgs] EPIST: certainty again [1 msgs] EPIST: certainty again [1 msgs] EXTRO-1: WIRED 2.09 Sept. 94 [1 msgs] FWD: NIST Newsletter [1 msgs] Nietzsche: Eternal Recurrence [1 msgs] Silicon Brain [1 msgs] Administrivia: Note: I have increased the frequency of the digests to four times a day. The digests used to be processed at 5am and 5pm, but this was too infrequent for the current bandwidth. Now digests are sent every six hours: Midnight, 6am, 12pm, and 6pm. If you experience delays in getting digests, try setting your digest size smaller such as 20k. You can do this by addressing a message to extropians@extropy.org with the body of the message as ::digest size 20 -Ray Approximate Size: 26956 bytes. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: smo@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Shawn O'Connor) Date: Tue, 16 Aug 94 2:24:58 WET DST Subject: [#94-8-177] Nietzsche: Eternal Recurrence Reilly writes: Unamuno thought Nietzsche was a weakling for accepting death in the form of the "eternal recurrence" nonsense. I agree with him. No more namby- pamby self-decapitating cosmologies. The individual self is all there is, and it needs other individual selves to interact with to provide meaning to life. I read the eternal recurrence as a tool, a reminder, to live life without regrets. Whatever you do will be remembered. Your actions, no matter how fleeting you may have thought they were, are replayed in memories for eternity. Keep it in mind next time you contemplate doing something you'll regret. But why stop here? If you aren't satisfied with the "weak" eternal recurrence as above, you can opt for the "strong" form: human history will be replayed countless times as posthumans remember with atomic precision. Does anyone have a copy of Moravec's essay on the eternal recurrence that he posted here once, or maybe it was Keith Henson. Who was 'outbid' when they mentioned that 'this might not be the first time this happened' and the reply was 'the probability approaches zero for this being the first time we're having this conversation'? These are all paraphrases of posts I vaguely remember, perhaps someone will recognize their own words and repost the originals. Shawn smo@gnu.ai.mit.edu ------------------------------ From: EdRegis@aol.com Date: Tue, 16 Aug 94 07:48:27 EDT Subject: [#94-8-178] EXTRO-1: WIRED 2.09 Sept. 94 Reilly Jones writes (Tue, Aug 16, 1994 2:17 AM EST): >Where is the Extro-1 article? It'll be in the October issue. Be cool. Don't worry. Ed edregis@aol.com ------------------------------ From: "Harry S. Hawk" Date: Tue, 16 Aug 1994 08:35:01 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [#94-8-179] Silicon Brain a conscious being, tjk@MIT.EDU wrote: > the current version of "CAM-Brain" is still in its infancy. while the > results are very interesting, i think it will be 6 months to a year > before the performance will be practical (exciting!). > if anybody is interested in details, feel free to send me email. I hope you keep us posted! /hawk -- Harry S. Hawk habs@panix.com Product Marketing Manager PowerMail, Inc. Producers of MailWeir(tm) & PowerServ(tm) ------------------------------ From: EdRegis@aol.com Date: Tue, 16 Aug 94 11:11:17 EDT Subject: [#94-8-180] EPIST: certainty again Eric Watt Forste (Sun, Aug 14, 1994 9:41 PM EST) writes re his previous post (Fri, Aug 12, 1994 9:19 AM EST): >Perhaps you did not notice that the argument behind >my metaphor (and it was merely a metaphor) relied >on holding the number of significant figures constant. You're right. I misunderstood the argument, and I completely glossed over the meaning of your point re "3 significant digits." My apologies. I do get your argument now (I hope), but I still don't buy it as you apparently intend to apply it in epistemology. You say (among other things): >Mathematicians have little use for numbers of less than >perfect precision, and scientists have no access to >numbers of more than imperfect precision. I'm slightly uncomfortable with this implied opposition between "mathematicians" and "scientists." There is such a thing as applied mathematics, after all, and even theoretical mathematicians are scientists in a perfectly legitimate sense; they're just not empirical or experimental scientists. Regarding your claim that "scientists have no access to numbers of more than imperfect precision," this is false as far as I can see: much of science, perhaps most of it, deals with quantities that are perfectly and precisely measurable by the integers or whole numbers, numbers that are accurate to an infinite number of significant digits. For example, if a scientist claims that the experiment started with 10 rats, and 2 of them died by the end, these are numbers of perfect precision that the scientist seems to have has free access to. There doesn't seem to be any room for "noise" here. Ditto for scientific claims to the effect that a given organism has 12 chromosomes, or that in covalent substances the chemical valence of carbon is 4, or that a molecule of water consists of 2 atoms of hydrogen and 1 of oxygen, etc., etc., etc. What you say about precision of measurement may be valid for contexts where perfectly precise measuremnts cannot be made, but why should we restrict ourselves to such a context? Moreover, why should we take such a context as providing us with the best, or even a useful, metaphor, model, or paradigm for epistemology? The fact is that we can and do measure lots of things with whole numbers, we do this successfully, and much of scientific knowledge is expressed in the medium of whole numbers. >As far as our ability to perceive the real world, >the world of our senses, is concerned, numbers >of perfect precision are of but theoretical interest. I think you can see from the above why I don't agree with that. As for "Mathematicians have little use for numbers of less than perfect precision," well, I'm not sure about this. There are entire branches of mathematics devoted to the irrational numbers, numbers that are not expressible as ratios of two integers; they're expressible in the form of a nonrepeating decimal expansion. The square root of two, for example, is such a number. Some mathematicians devote entire careers to studying the transcendentals, numbers like pi and e, the base of natural logs. I don't know whether in your view these numbers are of "less than perfect precision," but there's lots of uses of them in mathematics. Anyway, applying all this to epistemology, my view is that we can have objective knowledge regarding empirical matters, irrespective of whether or not the relevant measurements are expressible in whole numbers. (Or at least you haven't shown anything to the contrary.) And we can also have objective knowledge in theoretical mathematics, whether we're dealing with the integers, the irrationals, or whatever else. (Ditto.) Postscript re: >In this case, the analytical distinction you are seeking to >preserve didn't exist in the first place. To convince me >otherwise, show me a (continuous, not countable) >phenomenon which has been measured to an infinite degree >of precision. The analytical distinction that I sought to preserve (and still do) is between a given quantity, x, and another quantity, y, that approaches x asymptotically. I mistakenely thought that in your previous post you were trying to collapse that distinction. In fact, you were not. But now you *do* seem to be trying to collapse it!!! I don't know what you mean by "a (continuous, not countable) phenomenon which has been measured to an infinite degree of precision," but to preserve my distinction no empirical measurements are necessary. It's an *analytical* distinction, meaning that it's made on grounds of logic, not observation. (Neither pi nor e "has been measured to an infinite degree of precision," but both pi and e are nevertheless distinct from all other numbers.) Ed edregis@aol.com ------------------------------ From: EdRegis@aol.com Date: Tue, 16 Aug 94 11:48:44 EDT Subject: [#94-8-181] EPIST: ah yes, once more Robin Hanson writes (Sun, Aug 14, 1994 3:31 PM EST): >It seems to me that current discussions hinge crucially >on what is meant by "objective", "know", and "prove". Sometimes, it's true, you've got to get a clear definition on the table so that everyone knows exactly what the issue is. But in my experience, that's not usually the problem. In my experience, the single biggest problem in philosophical discussions is the failure to be clear about what *exactly* follows from what. In other words, what does a given claim or assumption *really* and *in fact* prove, as opposed to what it on the surface *appears* to prove. The move from premise A to conclusion Z is one that people make all too glibly, imagining that all the intermediate steps are obvious, or at least very easy to fill in, whereas just the opposite is actually the case. Typical example: Premise: The world exists. Conclusion: Therefore God created it. To some people this is just "obvious." The problem is not so much one of giving definitions of the words "world," "God," "exists," or "created." The task is to get those people to see the number and magnitude of all the missing subsidiary premises that must be supplied, and that must be established as true, in order for that conclusion to be drawn soundly. Ed edregis@aol.com ------------------------------ From: fcp@nuance.com (Craig Presson) Date: Tue, 16 Aug 94 12:00 CDT Subject: [#94-8-182] FWD: NIST Newsletter This seems apposite to the counting & measurement thread: ------- Start of forwarded message ------- From: "Michael Baum (NIST Public Affairs)" To: NIST_UPDATE@NIST.GOV Subject: NIST UPDATE for 15 August 1994 Date: Tue, 16 Aug 1994 11:46:14 -0400 (EDT) FILE: NIST UPDATE DATE: August 15, 1994 CONTENTS: NIST Researchers Achieve Coldest Temperature Ever Proposals Sought for Precision Measurement Grants [...] --------------------------------------------------------------------- This is the e-mail edition of NIST UPDATE. NIST UPDATE is a bi-weekly synopsis for journalists of current activites, research results, and program announcements from the National Institute of Standards and Technology. If you would like to subscribe to this e-mail edition, send an e-mail note to: MAILSERV@nist.gov In the body of the message, put the command: SUBSCRIBE NIST_UPDATE (don't forget the underbar between T and U). That's all there is to it. Send reports of problems to: baum@micf.nist.gov NIST UPDATE also may be found on the NIST gopher service: gopher-server.nist.gov --------------------------------------------------------------------- PHYSICS NIST Researchers Achieve Coldest Temperature Ever If it's too hot outside, then a visit to NIST might provide some relief. Physicists here recently cooled atoms to 700 nanokelvins, the coldest temperature ever recorded for matter. NIST scientists chilled a cloud of cesium atoms very close to absolute zero using lasers to catch the atoms in an optical lattice. The atoms reached 700 nanokelvins, or 700 billionths of a kelvin. Zero kelvin (minus 273 degrees Celsius), or absolute zero, is the temperature at which atomic thermal motion would cease. Since the late 1970s, physicists have sought to use lasers to cool atoms to as close to absolute zero as possible, primarily for improving atomic timekeeping. Since laser cooling was first demonstrated in the NIST laboratories in Boulder, Colo., in 1978, scientists around the world have been steadily pushing to lower temperatures. The new record low temperature at NIST was achieved with a technique borrowed from the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris: an arrangement of four laser beams interfering to produce a regular array, or "optical lattice" of microscopic hills and valleys for the atoms. Media Contact: Linda Joy, (301) 975-4403 joy@micf.nist.gov Proposals Sought for Precision Measurement Grants NIST is requesting project proposals for two research grants for fiscal year 1996 in the field of precision measurement and fundamental constants. Each one-year Precision Measurement Grant of $50,000 may be renewed by NIST for up to two additional years and a total of $150,000. Prospective candidates must submit summaries of their proposed projects and biographical information to NIST by Feb. 1, 1995. NIST Precision Measurement Grants are awarded each year to scientists in academic institutions for work in determining values for fundamental constants, investigating related physical phenomena, or developing new, fundamental measurement methods. By the Feb. 1 deadline, applicants should deliver a pre-proposal summary of not more than five double-spaced pages outlining the objective, motivation and tech-nical approach of the research, and the amount and source of current funding for the research, together with a concise biographical sketch of the applicant and a list of the applicant's most important publications. Submit three copies to Barry N. Taylor, NIST Precision Measurement Grants Committee, C229 Radiation Physics Bldg., NIST, Gaithersburg, Md. 20899-0001. For further information, contact Taylor at the above address or call (301) 975-4220. Media Contact: Linda Joy, (301) 975-4403 joy@micf.nist.gov [...] "... the student crooked his finger back at Cratylus, who promptly drew a dagger and cut it off. The student ran howling from the room, and Cratylus suddenly called his name. When the boy turned to look, Cratylus crooked his finger, and the boy was enlightened." -- From "Koans of Ancient Greece", in manuscript :-) ------------------------------ From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) Date: Tue, 16 Aug 94 13:02:33 -0400 Subject: [#94-8-183] EPIST: ah yes, once more Ed Regis says >Robin Hanson writes (Sun, Aug 14, 1994 3:31 PM EST): > >>It seems to me that current discussions hinge crucially >>on what is meant by "objective", "know", and "prove". > >Sometimes, it's true, you've got to get a clear definition on the table so >that everyone knows exactly what the issue is. But in my experience, that's >not usually the problem. In my experience, the single biggest problem in >philosophical discussions is the failure to be clear about what *exactly* >follows from what. In other words, what does a given claim or assumption >*really* and *in fact* prove, as opposed to what it on the surface *appears* >to prove. The move from premise A to conclusion Z is one that people make >all too glibly, imagining that all the intermediate steps are obvious, or at >least very easy to fill in, whereas just the opposite is actually the case. > >Typical example: >Premise: The world exists. >Conclusion: Therefore God created it. > >To some people this is just "obvious." The problem is not so much one of >giving definitions of the words "world," "God," "exists," or "created." The >task is to get those people to see the number and magnitude of all the >missing subsidiary premises that must be supplied, and that must be >established as true, in order for that conclusion to be drawn soundly. > >Ed >edregis@aol.com Generally, I agree with Ed more than with another other philosopher. In this case, I'm particularly interested in the subsidiary premise that 'existence' has *any* significant implications. The following step-by-step argument shows many weaknesses in that area. ============= So far as I can tell, we don't, and can't, know that the things we believe are "really" real." And I think there is a modern way to understand the situation, one that was dimly evident to thinkers in earlier times, but they did not have the conceptual stuff for dealing with it. Here's what I have in mind. To say that a certain object exists is like saying that it's in the universe. There isn't anything wrong with that. But then, to say that the @i[universe] exists is saying that the universe is inside itself - which makes no sense at all. And the trouble is that the ordinary way of saying things like "X exists" is a useful shortcut that causes trouble when you try to think more about it, because what we really should say is not a simple predicate E(x) at all, but a relation IN(x, U) -- that is, we should say X is in Universe U. To see why this is serious, imagine the predicament of a person like Tron (or you, or me) that is actually being simulated by a Virtual Reality Program inside some computer C. I'm not joking. Clearly, you couldn't tell whether you were absolutely "real" or 'just' a program inside some computer C. Because there's no way to detect C itself. (Although my friend John McCarthy once pointed out that if the simulation were clumsy, you might find an experiment that would reveal that the precision of the simulation was limited, say, to 40 decimal digits. In physics, this would correspond roughly to the Plank length at which regular physics breaks down.) "Ok," you might object. "But that is a real program running in a real computer. So it does -- sort of -- exist." Yes, but now consider the program just sitting there as some writing on paper. Not running in a computer at all. But simulating the processes that you and I embody. Then those process still have a sort of potential performance, because the instructions specify what happens from each step to the next. A lower grade of existence, perhaps, but we should still ask to what extent such an abstract process can feel or think or have "experience"? And so far as I can see, the internal experience ought to be exactly the same. To the abstract process, each abstract pleasure, satisfaction, or frustration or pain should be the same -- and precisely as real -- to that abstract process, as is a real satisfaction or frustration to a real process. And we can make the same statements about each of these "grades of existence": --P runs inside some actual computer --P runs only in the mind of its human programmer.. --P doesn't run at all, but just sits there on paper. --P isn't even written down, but its operation is only imagined by someone. --P isn't even imagined, but merely a "possible" program, not yet even conceived by anyone. And in each such case, if P describes some simulated universe, there is no way for the creatures inside that universe to know whether or not their universe "actually exists" as a feature inside some larger universe. No answer to such a question could have any actual consequences -- and therefore, the attribute of existence is an inconsequential accessory! There is no possible way to prove that our universe itself is anything more than a "logical possibility". Any 'proof' that we (or our gods) exist must have some flaw. There is quite a lot more to say about this, for example, about how, if the simulated universe were orderly enough for us to recognize some regularities, we could regard them as "laws of physics", or "gods", or whatever. If we found such evidence, then we'de have to decide how important it might be to try to discern the intentions of such entities, etc. Either in hope of reaping some reward or, perhaps, to discover how it works and, perhaps, even to re-direct its interests. So all that religious-philosophical stuff about "who created ..." is based on a simple mistake, of postulating an unnecessary attribute, 'existence' . Naive thinkers assume that because existence is self-evident, it must exist. How silly. Self-evidence is a psychologial phenomenon, not a pipeline to otherwise unknowable truths.. ------------------------------ From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn) Date: Tue, 16 Aug 1994 12:07:50 -0500 (CDT) Subject: [#94-8-184] EPIST: certainty again Ed Regis replies to Eric Watt Forste: > much of science, perhaps most of it, deals with quantities that are > perfectly and precisely measurable by the integers or whole numbers, > numbers that are accurate to an infinite number of significant digits. > > For example, if a scientist claims that the experiment started with 10 rats, > and 2 of them died by the end, these are numbers of perfect precision that > the scientist seems to have has free access to. There doesn't seem to be any > room for "noise" here. The "device" by which the number and health of rats are measured is unreliable. Any number of (unlikely) mechanical or neurological events, including random quantum fluctuation completely reordering sense data or memory, could result in a mismeasurement. In this sense the number of rats is uncertain. Because our most useful formal reasoning methods get lots of mileage out of manipulating representational symbols (like numbers) of perfect precision, we just pretend that 10-rats/2-dead is accurate. To me, the distinction between virtual and absolute certainty seems inconsequential. derek but im not certain about that ------------------------------ End of Extropians Digest V94 #227 *********************************