From extropians-request@gnu.ai.mit.edu Fri Apr 16 19:53:16 1993 Return-Path: Received: from usc.edu by chaph.usc.edu (4.1/SMI-4.1+ucs-3.0) id AA18851; Fri, 16 Apr 93 19:53:14 PDT Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu Received: from churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu by usc.edu (4.1/SMI-3.0DEV3-USC+3.1) id AA18534; Fri, 16 Apr 93 19:53:11 PDT Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu Received: by churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu (5.65/4.0) id ; Fri, 16 Apr 93 22:46:32 -0400 Message-Id: <9304170246.AA22458@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu> To: ExI-Daily@gnu.ai.mit.edu Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 22:45:21 -0400 X-Original-Message-Id: <9304170245.AA22447@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu> X-Original-To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu From: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu Subject: Extropians Digest V93 #0199 X-Extropian-Date: Remailed on April 17, 373 P.N.O. [02:46:31 UTC] Reply-To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu Status: OR Extropians Digest Sat, 17 Apr 93 Volume 93 : Issue 0199 Today's Topics: "Big Brother" Proposal [3 msgs] (fwd) White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet [2 msgs] A vote of confidence? [1 msgs] Big Brother Proposal (was: apology...) [1 msgs] CRYPTO: Useful irony [1 msgs] CRYPTO: Ways around PGP ban [1 msgs] IMPORTANT! [6 msgs] Key Registration and Big Brother--Time to Fight! [2 msgs] Korzybski's "E-Prime", also NLP [3 msgs] META: Rules on Quoting Private Messages? [1 msgs] PRIVACY: A Further Note [3 msgs] PRIVACY: New Finger Print I.D. System [1 msgs] SOCIAL: David Friedman Visits Bay Area Saturday [1 msgs] Voluntaryist Address [1 msgs] White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet [1 msgs] apology... [1 msgs] Administrivia: This is the digested version of the Extropian mailing list. Please remember that this list is private; messages must not be forwarded without their author's permission. To send mail to the list/digest, address your posts to: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu To send add/drop requests for this digest, address your post to: exi-daily-request@gnu.ai.mit.edu To make a formal complaint or an administrative request, address your posts to: extropians-request@gnu.ai.mit.edu If your mail reader is operating correctly, replies to this message will be automatically addressed to the entire list [extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu] - please avoid long quotes! The Extropian mailing list is brought to you by the Extropy Institute, through hardware, generously provided, by the Free Software Foundation - neither is responsible for its content. Forward, Onward, Outward - Harry Shapiro (habs) List Administrator. Approximate Size: 50135 bytes. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 17:32:49 -0500 From: "Phil G. Fraering" Subject: IMPORTANT! >No it doesn't. For example: you must do it to get gov contracts. >You must do it to send encrypted data over NREN or any other >government-owned data transmission medium... But NREN is a de-facto nationalization of data transmission media (or at least the Clinton Administration initiatives towards "bringing the US into the 21st Century, or at least to 1984"). Phil ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 18:41:39 -0400 (EDT) From: Carol Moore Subject: PRIVACY: New Finger Print I.D. System At the recent FOSE computer convention in DC a new computerized finger print I.D. system was showcase. I would allow police to scan an individual's finger print without ink, using a screen and within 1 minute return to the officer information about outstanding warrants, etc. It should be fully operational, I believe, within 2 years. Scary....especially for tax resisters like me who refuse to pay up and are always jumping from job to job so the IRS doesn't grab my income. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 17:53:30 CDT From: twb3@midway.uchicago.edu (Tom Morrow) Subject: CRYPTO: Ways around PGP ban A question from one who makes no claims to crypto-expertise: If PGP and other similar encryption programs were banned, would statists be able to detect their use via tapping messages? Everything I've read on the topic suggests that encrypted messages can be imbedded in other, apparently meaningful, texts. I suppose that you could even send PGP encrypted messages over lines using the Clipper Chip. Ditto for messages encrypted with a one-time key. From what little I know, the feds would be unable to detect messages encryted by these means from random noise. It may thus be wise to begin developing now a custom of including a string of (apparently) random characters with every message. Then statists won't know whether you are sending encrypted messages or just thumbing your nose at the NSC. I seems to me that the only way to stop PGP and related encryption programs is to ban the software and the use of public keys. But the software genie is already out of the bottle, and keys can always be spread by non-virtual routes (albeit less efficiently). Let me just add this before I sign off: 049ofonqfo@654&68 99*&^(&^hiHi7h9hoggfuf(*& ((y9hhoh89fkj3ei04986*&^iojuy^5jfUcktHefEds ;-) T.O. Morrow -- twb3@midway.uchicago.edu Vice President: ExI -- The Extropy Institute Law & Politics Editor: EXTROPY -- Journal of Transhumanist Thought ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 17:41:23 -0500 From: "Phil G. Fraering" Subject: IMPORTANT! From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn) X-Original-To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 15:10:02 CDT X-Extropian-Date: Remailed on April 16, 373 P.N.O. [20:10:21 UTC] Reply-To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu ... I did. Four times so far. Here's part of it: Q: If the Administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed, would the Administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices? A: This is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review. The key escrow mechanism will provide Americans with an encryption product that is more secure, more convenient, and less expensive than others readily available today, but it is just one piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to encryption technology, which the Administration is developing. The Administration is not saying, "since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement, we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have effectively done); nor is the U.S. saying that "every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product." There is a false "tension" created in the assessment that this issue is an "either-or" proposition. Rather, both concerns can be, and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned, balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper Chip" and similar encryption techniques. Where does it say anywhere that this proposal would make unbreakable private encryption illegal? That document is not "all about" such regulations -- it doesn't even mention them! "...nor is the US saying that ''every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product.``" _THAT_'S where it says that it would make unbreakable private encryptioin illegal. Understand, you moron? All I'm saying is that I'd like to see one further question answered by somebody in the administration: Q: Is it part of your proposal to make private encryption of data (by any means) illegal? You have to ask? They'll say "No. We just think we should be able to make it illegal, not that it should be illegal." They'd say the same thing in abolishing the first amendment. Take out a loan and rent a clue for a couple days. derek Phil Fraering |"...drag them, kicking and screaming, pgf@srl02.cacs.usl.edu|into the Century of the Fruitbat." - Terry Pratchett, _Reaper Man_ ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 18:54:57 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Subject: IMPORTANT! X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission "Phil G. Fraering" says: > Where does it say anywhere that this proposal would make unbreakable > private encryption illegal? That document is not "all about" > such regulations -- it doesn't even mention them! > > "...nor is the US saying that ''every American, as a matter > of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption > product.``" > > _THAT_'S where it says that it would make unbreakable private > encryptioin illegal. Understand, you moron? Phil; You are right, but its not nice to call Derek a moron. We all need each other more than ever now. Derek is just as smart as the rest of us -- he just has a different opinion. Lets not stoop to insult -- we are all on the same side, and there is a battle ahead. Perry ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 16:56:38 MDT From: Ed_Lane@Novell.COM (Ed Lane) Subject: Korzybski's "E-Prime", also NLP Perry asked: > > Eric S. Raymond says: > > Next step; learn the sme suspicion about claims that rely on excluded middle. > > Can you elaborate on that? > > Perry > One of the best (at least most recent) "debunking" of the "Law of the Excluded Middle" appears in book I have mentioned before, *Fuzzy Logic*. The law of E-M is basically: "A" must be either "B" or not-"B". Mostly the authors [of *Fuzzy Logic*] dealt with "White" and "non-White" sheep. These are my own (observed in the "real-world") examples of E-M reasoning: "You're either for me or against me" another degenerative expression comes from this type of reasoning: "The enemy of my enemy, is my friend" This 2nd example actually relies also on another Aristotlian notion -- Law of Contradiction. Or simply put: "A" cannot be both "B" and not-"B". I usually like a few well-chosen examples to appreciate some new tool. Do you see how this [Aristotolian] meme could be potentially destructive to the human race if it ever got loose in the world and was misapplied? I hope this helps. -Ed Lane ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 16:17:42 PDT From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Subject: A vote of confidence? Forwarded message: >From cmoore@gwu.edu Fri Apr 16 15:40:11 1993 Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 18:38:37 -0400 (EDT) From: Carol Moore Subject: Re: Key Registration and Big Brother--Time to Fight! To: "Timothy C. May" In-Reply-To: <9304162118.AA19587@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu> Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Well, how refreshing to see Tim, the oppressor of the Irish, defending the Cyberpunks and other privacy freaks. How absurd. He even comes out of self-imposed exile to do so. But you aren't thin-skinned about satire, are you Tim? Or have you, hopefully, transcended that era of your youth? Just wondering.... ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 18:28:05 -0500 From: "Phil G. Fraering" Subject: IMPORTANT! Yes, Perry, you are right; I was rude. However, it's time to realize: there _is_ a battle ahead, and whatever the enemy generals say to _US_ CAN'T be taken by us at face value. Phil ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 19:57:56 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Subject: "Big Brother" Proposal X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission It has been suggested that we start refering to the latest Encryption Initiative by the feds as the "Big Brother" proposal. I think this is an excellent idea. If we can get the media to adopt the term, it means that every time someone refers to the proposal they have already given our propaganda slant to it. Perry ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 16:51:05 -0700 From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Subject: (fwd) White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet Message from Tim: The following forwarded message (below, after these introductory comments) explains in more detail the NIST/NSA proposal and adds a few disturbing wrinkles: 1. Quote: "INSTALLATION OF GOVERNMENT-DEVELOPED MICROCIRCUITS The Attorney General of the United States, or her representative, shall request manufacturers of communications hardware which incorporates encryption to install the U.S. government-developed key-escrow microcircuits in their products." This suggests more than just voice communications will be affected by the policy. "Communications hardware" suggests a broad scope. Modem makers may be told to (somehow) incorporate this system into their products...not clear what this means for old equipment, incompatible equipment, etc. 2. The "shall request manufacturers..." bit does not sound voluntary. (The whole line about "Clipper" being so attractive that manufacturers will gladly design it in....total B.S.) 3. At the end of this document is mention of using the civil forfeiture laws to enforce the new system. Not state, but implicit (I believe) is that the threat of civil forfeiture will be used to scare users into compliance. Very disturbing. Read it and weep! Then start planning. -Tim May, who hopes the Cypherpunks will adopt my suggestion that we use the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists-style "clock"...I call it 10 minutes before midnight ***Begin forwarded message from sci.crypt and other groups*** From: clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement) Subject: White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet Organization: National Institute of Standards & Technology Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 20:44:58 GMT Note: The following was released by the White House today in conjunction with the announcement of the Clipper Chip encryption technology. FACT SHEET PUBLIC ENCRYPTION MANAGEMENT The President has approved a directive on "Public Encryption Management." The directive provides for the following: Advanced telecommunications and commercially available encryption are part of a wave of new computer and communications technology. Encryption products scramble information to protect the privacy of communications and data by preventing unauthorized access. Advanced telecommunications systems use digital technology to rapidly and precisely handle a high volume of communications. These advanced telecommunications systems are integral to the infrastructure needed to ensure economic competitiveness in the information age. Despite its benefits, new communications technology can also frustrate lawful government electronic surveillance. Sophisticated encryption can have this effect in the United States. When exported abroad, it can be used to thwart foreign intelligence activities critical to our national interests. In the past, it has been possible to preserve a government capability to conduct electronic surveillance in furtherance of legitimate law enforcement and national security interests, while at the same time protecting the privacy and civil liberties of all citizens. As encryption technology improves, doing so will require new, innovative approaches. In the area of communications encryption, the U. S. Government has developed a microcircuit that not only provides privacy through encryption that is substantially more robust than the current government standard, but also permits escrowing of the keys needed to unlock the encryption. The system for the escrowing of keys will allow the government to gain access to encrypted information only with appropriate legal authorization. To assist law enforcement and other government agencies to collect and decrypt, under legal authority, electronically transmitted information, I hereby direct the following action to be taken: INSTALLATION OF GOVERNMENT-DEVELOPED MICROCIRCUITS The Attorney General of the United States, or her representative, shall request manufacturers of communications hardware which incorporates encryption to install the U.S. government-developed key-escrow microcircuits in their products. The fact of law enforcement access to the escrowed keys will not be concealed from the American public. All appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that any existing or future versions of the key-escrow microcircuit are made widely available to U.S. communications hardware manufacturers, consistent with the need to ensure the security of the key-escrow system. In making this decision, I do not intend to prevent the private sector from developing, or the government from approving, other microcircuits or algorithms that are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key- escrow system. KEY-ESCROW The Attorney General shall make all arrangements with appropriate entities to hold the keys for the key-escrow microcircuits installed in communications equipment. In each case, the key holder must agree to strict security procedures to prevent unauthorized release of the keys. The keys shall be released only to government agencies that have established their authority to acquire the content of those communications that have been encrypted by devices containing the microcircuits. The Attorney General shall review for legal sufficiency the procedures by which an agency establishes its authority to acquire the content of such communications. PROCUREMENT AND USE OF ENCRYPTION DEVICES The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with other appropriate U.S. agencies, shall initiate a process to write standards to facilitate the procurement and use of encryption devices fitted with key-escrow microcircuits in federal communications systems that process sensitive but unclassified information. I expect this process to proceed on a schedule that will permit promulgation of a final standard within six months of this directive. The Attorney General will procure and utilize encryption devices to the extent needed to preserve the government's ability to conduct lawful electronic surveillance and to fulfill the need for secure law enforcement communications. Further, the Attorney General shall utilize funds from the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Super Surplus Fund to effect this purchase. -- ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 19:03:10 CDT From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn) Subject: IMPORTANT! Phil Fraering responds to me: > "...nor is the US saying that ''every American, as a matter > of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption > product.``" > > _THAT_'S where it says that it would make unbreakable private > encryptioin illegal. Understand, you moron? Ooh, now I'm a "moron"! Such name calling on this list, and I even agree with the viewpoints of the posters libeling me! "...nor is the US saying that ''every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to chemotherapy.``". Now, would you interpret this as a proposal to make chemotherapy illegal? > You have to ask? They'll say "No. We just think we should be able > to make it illegal, not that it should be illegal." When and if the question is asked, I will see if this is in fact the answer. I presume I can use the result as a measurement of your understanding? > Take out a loan and rent a clue for a couple days. I digest your hateful statements and return only good will! In another letter, a poster chides me for not joining the effort to stamp out this menace. Hey, come on, this battle's only a few hours old. In that time, I sent a letter to cypherpunks suggesting a specific rhetorical argument to use against legislation, stated more than once that I was opposed to this move, asked a question about the first-amendment status of encryption (but people would rather call me names than contribute something useful like an answer to that question), AND ask whether there is only one way to read between the lines of this announcement (that is, look at it rationally). So I get flamed. Heaven protect Hal for also suggesting that the announcement may mean something different. derek wondering whether everybody WANTS the situation to be grim and clear-cut so they can have fun fighting it ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 18:47:27 -0500 From: "Phil G. Fraering" Subject: apology... Derek, I'm sorry for my inappropriate behavior. And I have a question: why are all these encryption standards built into chips? Does that strike anyone as being inappropriate? Would you use encryption hardware/software where you _couldn't_ see the internals? pgf ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 19:11:44 -0400 (EDT) From: Carol Moore Subject: PRIVACY: A Further Note Since I don't want to give any snide young fellows an opportunity to set up the straw man that I believe police will be stopping individuals on the street to see if they're tax resisters (and calling it "satire"), let me clarify. Once this fingerprint ID system is in operation, it will be quite a temptation for government to insist that fingerprint ID's be used for credit card and other electronic transactions, for proving access to the new health care system, for proving one is a citizen, and even for getting a job-- which sure would screw tax resisters like me should the IRS computers ever get as au-current as this (private sector created, evidently) new fingerprint system. Time will tell. . . ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 00:25:59 BST From: Richard Kennaway Subject: Korzybski's "E-Prime", also NLP Craig Presson writes: > In <9304160848.AA05666@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>, Richard Kennaway writes: > |> The Korzybski and Bourland books are available from the International > |> Society for General Semantics, P.O. Box 2469, San Francisco, CA 94126, tel. > |> (415) 543-1747. The ISGS also publishes a quarterly journal on GS called > |> "Etc", and have published various other books on GS. > > *** THIS TELEPHONE NUMBER IS OLD. It has been reassigned to a travel > agency. Neither the 415 nor 800 information operators could find the > ISGS for me. I suppose, if they haven't closed up shop totally, that > one could send 1st class mail to the address above and have it be > forwarded. *** Sorry, here's another address and phone number from the Winter 92-93 issue of Etc.: ISGS, P.O. Box 728, Concord, CA 94522; (510) 798 0311. I hope this one works. -- ____ Richard Kennaway \ _/__ School of Information Systems Internet: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk \X / University of East Anglia uucp: ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk \/ Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 19:43:44 CDT From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn) Subject: Big Brother Proposal (was: apology...) > Derek, I'm sorry for my inappropriate behavior. Well, you may be quite right about what the govt has in mind (if so I will be a bit sheepish, which is sort of moron-like :-). Still, maybe not -- and maybe even worse, it won't QUITE be a total ban but rather a massive regulatory nightmare that can't be as effectively attacked on simple "privacy" grounds... > why are all these encryption standards built into chips? > Does that strike anyone as being inappropriate? I can think of two reasons: 1) Because they're faster than equivalent software 2) Because it gives ex-defense contractors something to manufacture. derek ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 21:01:31 -0500 (EDT) From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu Subject: Korzybski's "E-Prime", also NLP Ed Lane writes: > > > Perry asked: > > > > > Eric S. Raymond says: > > > Next step; learn the sme suspicion about claims that rely on excluded middle. > > > > Can you elaborate on that? > > > > Perry > > > > One of the best (at least most recent) "debunking" of the "Law of the > Excluded Middle" appears in book I have mentioned before, *Fuzzy > Logic*. The law of E-M is basically: "A" must be either "B" or > not-"B". Mostly the authors [of *Fuzzy Logic*] dealt with "White" and > "non-White" sheep. > > These are my own (observed in the "real-world") examples of E-M reasoning: > > "You're either for me or against me" > > another degenerative expression comes from this type of reasoning: > > "The enemy of my enemy, is my friend" > > This 2nd example actually relies also on another Aristotlian notion -- > Law of Contradiction. Or simply put: "A" cannot be both "B" and not-"B". > > I usually like a few well-chosen examples to appreciate some new tool. > Do you see how this [Aristotolian] meme could be potentially > destructive to the human race if it ever got loose in the world and was > misapplied? > > I hope this helps. It doesn't. Both examples are very poor and aren't applicable. Consider your first example "You're either for me or against me." This statement is totally ambiguous and provides no context. While it is true that there is a continuous spectrum between "for" and "against" (in general), it is possible to decompose each predicate into subpredicates until one reaches only two-valued statements. Example: "You are either for libertarianism or against it" It is possible for someone to not be totally for libertarianism or against it, but let's decompose libertarianism into two more statements "You are either for social freedoms or against them" "You are either for economic freedoms or against them" Again, people can pick and choose things they support in the large set of social and economic freedoms. But, by repeatedly enumerating all subsets of "libertarianism" statements one can construct a tree of statements which are approximately two-valued. If Aristotlian logic couldn't be applied like this, it would be impossible it analyze anything. Your examples are way too simplistic. In the real world, you don't evaluate statements at face value. (i.e. you don't consider statements like "either full blown nanotechnology will happen or nanotechnology won't happen at all". You are more likely to think, "certain aspects of nanotech will happen, and some won't.") I'm not read up on fuzzy logic (I think it's an academic fad right now like perceptrons, neural nets, GA's, and cybernetics were [and still are]) but I'm willing to bet that Aristotlian logic can be shown to be equivalent to fuzzy logic in the same way that a turing machine can compute anything that any other computer can. One more thing. Part of the problem with applying your examples to "real world" language is that the language itself is "fuzzy." That is, if libertarianism is defined as "if you agree with ALL of the statements in this set, then you are a libertarian" then there is no problem with E-M. You are either a libertarian or you're not. However, in the real world, the meaning of language is not so clear cut. The definitions of many labels are very subjective (e.g. Chomsky thinks he is a libertarian). I hope I have made my explanation clear. > -Ed Lane > > > > -- Ray Cromwell | Engineering is the implementation of science; -- -- EE/Math Student | politics is the implementation of faith. -- -- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu | - Zetetic Commentaries -- ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 21:12:58 -0500 (EDT) From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu Subject: IMPORTANT! Phil G. Fraering writes: > "...nor is the US saying that ''every American, as a matter > of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption > product.``" > > _THAT_'S where it says that it would make unbreakable private > encryptioin illegal. Understand, you moron? Wow. I knew that emotions were running high because of this announcement, but I never expected the arguments to degenerate into name calling. -- Ray Cromwell | Engineering is the implementation of science; -- -- EE/Math Student | politics is the implementation of faith. -- -- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu | - Zetetic Commentaries -- ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 18:13:11 PDT From: Robin Hanson Subject: SOCIAL: David Friedman Visits Bay Area Saturday David D. Friedman will get together with interested folks from ~3pm to ~6pm Saturday April 17, 1993, in Encina 104 at Stanford, a classroom in the Stanford Economics building. Weather permitting, we might sit outside nearby (and leave directions at the room). DIRECTIONS FROM 101: Take Embarcadero exit west toward Palo Alto, past El Camino (where the street becomes Galvez). Continue till you can't go straight any more, and turn left. The first building on your right is Encina, and it has a dozen or so pay parking spots in front of it. Walk up the steps to the main door, but don't go in. Instead, follow the stone porch to your right and enter the first door you find. Room 104 will be the first room on your left. If you arrive late, step to the left and knock on the window, if we're inside, or read the note saying where we've gone. DIRECTIONS FROM 280: Take Page Mill exit east toward the bay. Turn left onto Junipero Serra, right on Campus Drive, and left on Galvez. Then follow directions above. Dan Garrett, who lives on campus, has kindly arranged for the room; lost folks might try him at 415-497-5149 after noon. I, Robin Hanson, am at 510-651-7483. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 21:31:00 -0400 (EDT) From: Carol Moore Subject: Voluntaryist Address I believe there was some discussion of what voluntaryism is or isn't. One libertarian group's fix on it can be obtained by writing the below: The VOLUNTARYIST PO BOX 1275 Gramling, SC 29348 Newsletter on non-violent, non-governmental action for libertarians. PUblished since around 1981 or 1982. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 18:36:14 PDT From: Eli Brandt Subject: "Big Brother" Proposal > From: "Perry E. Metzger" > It has been suggested that we start refering to the latest Encryption > Initiative by the feds as the "Big Brother" proposal. I think this is > an excellent idea. If we can get the media to adopt the term, Unlikely, I think. It's a bit too slanted to be accepted as a neutral term for a government proposal, though it would certainly be nice to see this spade called a spade. What would be less blatant? "Privacy" is a good word; how about "Privacy Abatement Proposal"? Nice bureaucratic ring to it. "Bride of Lead Balloon". "Impending Ban on Strong Encryption". "NSA Initiative". "Initiative for Enhanced Snooping". "Spook Protection Proposal". Hmm. Maybe "the new Big Brother proposal (from Wild Bill and the Snooping Spooks)" is not so bad. I'll toss it in... > Perry Eli ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 20:42:16 -0500 From: "Phil G. Fraering" Subject: PRIVACY: A Further Note But Carol, those things will be pretty easy to spoof. Want hints? Seen FX, or FX II: the deadly art of illusion? You could get VERY far with a little latex. Also, they don't have a database big enough to handle tax evasion (and I'm not talking about "tax resistors" whose only problem with the federal budget is the 17 % spent on defense). Phil Who really means THIS flame... as opposed to the light level stuff with derek. BTW, guys, meet Carol. She's one of the reasons I stopped reading libernet... ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 20:51:31 CDT From: twb3@midway.uchicago.edu (Tom Morrow) Subject: CRYPTO: Useful irony I've thought of a rather ironic aspect of the recent controversy over federal cryptography policy, an angle that is both amusing and potentially useful. Clinton campaigned on a promise to protect womens' rights to privacy and has said that he will seek a supreme court nominee who supports the view that the Bill of Rights guarantees a right to privacy. The irony should be evident: Clinton now refuses to guarantee that all citizens will have the right to protect their privacy from government interference. The usefulness of this irony deserves a bit more explication. Pointing out Clinton's hypocrisy is only the first step. To wield this rhetorical weapon to its fullest effect, you need to point out that there is a far stronger argument that the Bill or Rights protects our rights to encryption than that it protects the right to an abortion. After all, the founders explictly recognized a right to life in the Declaration of Independence. And the freedom to encrypt is necessary to keep the 4th Amendment's guarantee that we will remain secure in our "persons, houses, papers, and effects" up to date. Please note that I do not intend to impugn the right to an abortion (though I do think that it is best treated as a property, rather than a privacy, right). I intend only to show that if Clinton's professed support of the right to privacy leads him to limit goverment interference with abortions, it should lead him to limit government interference with encryption with even greater force. Permission granted to reproduce this message freely. T.O. Morrow -- twb3@midway.uchicago.edu Vice President: ExI -- The Extropy Institute Law & Politics Editor: EXTROPY -- Journal of Transhumanist Thought ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 22:01:16 -0500 (EDT) From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu Subject: PRIVACY: A Further Note Carol, no flame intended, but I have a curious question. Do you happen to be using an old 8-bit computer? The reason I ask is because a lot of your messages are in 40-columns, ala Commodore 64/Atari/Spectrum. -- Ray Cromwell | Engineering is the implementation of science; -- -- EE/Math Student | politics is the implementation of faith. -- -- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu | - Zetetic Commentaries -- ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 22:03:02 -0400 (EDT) From: Carol Moore Subject: META: Rules on Quoting Private Messages? I was under the impression that according to extropian list rules as either a) a matter of politeness or b) a matter of not boring other list members c) a matter of private property One was not supposed to quote or forward personal messages to the whole list without the other persons permission. What are the ground rules here for future reference? Clarification welcome. ------------------------------ Date: 16 Apr 1993 22:15:20 -0500 (EST) From: KMOSTA01@ULKYVX.LOUISVILLE.EDU Subject: Key Registration and Big Brother--Time to Fight! May I please ask that someone posts info on how I can learn the basics of encryption keys for my Mac (before it is too late). I welcome private mail, but others may also use reading on the subject. Thank you. Krzys' kmosta01@ulkyvx.louisville.edu ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 21:02:34 -0500 From: "Phil G. Fraering" Subject: "Big Brother" Proposal Something I was thinking of: even amoung the law and order folks (seig heil!) we may be able to find some allies. Remember that this system CANNOT be set up so that Uncle Sam, and ONLY Fuhrer Sam, can read your mail and listen to your phone calls. ANY vulnerability legislated into this system will be used by the "evil cyberpunk hacker anarchists trying to destroy honest society" to their advantage in blackmail and other violent schemes. Comments, gentlemen? Also, this thing would be a de facto standard for gubbimint use; the government's mail would be easily read. Well? This could finally provide us with the incentive for finding the weak spot in public key style codes. It would be easier this way, since this is an intentionally weak public key system. Phil ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 19:11:00 -0700 From: George A. Gleason Subject: (fwd) White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet Re Big Brother proposal. The "asset forfeiture" mention isn't quite so ominous as suggested: what it seems to say is that the Atty General will procure (i.e. buy) encryption devices for use by law enforcement in their own secure communications (i.e. police radio and computer links), and "the funding to effect this purchase" will come from the "superfund" of money derived from existing asset forfeitures. In other words, smoke a joint, lose your house, and Uncle Sam sells the house to get money to buy more crypto gear for cops. I don't see an implication that crypto gear makers will be facing forfeiture for failing to comply with the "request" to incorporate key escrow. It appears that this is directed at first to establish the use of key escrow in government-related communications: "federal communications systems that process sensitive but unclassified information." So for instance, Ollie North's memos would be recoverable, and so on. But the real risk is that it will spread out to encompass any facility receiving government funding or contracts, i.e. the universities; and from there, widen so as to restrict other types of crypto from being used at those sites. So far it doesn't seem to restrict crypto on private microcomputers, though a widely accepted standard could eventually be written into law. The proposal specifically says it will allow other manufacturers to develop other approaches to key escrow systems. I think what the long-term plan might be, is to win acceptance for the idea of key escrow, and then require it. This isn't exactly a backdoor into your hardware; what it would allow would be for instance NSA to get your key and then read your communications as they occur. So your local hardware isn't storing anything in a different way or being remotely accessed or triggered, but your key is available elsewhere, at some approved facility. Now I'm guessing here, but what I think the way the crypto part of this has to work, is with a "device-specific" key and a "session"-type of key; where the first is what is escrowed, and the second is user-variable. Both are required to decrypt messages, and recovery of the second key would be relatively straightforward. Now you buy a modem or whatever, and it has a crypto chip in it, with a device-specific key that is registered along with the serial number of the device. So your purchase record has that serial number on it, and that's used to track the device key, which of course has been escrowed by the manufacturer before shipping the modem out. This would suggest that device keys would be relatively hard to crack, and therefore that some improvement in privacy would be possible by simply swapping the key chip in the device; and this would be easy enough with a black market in key escrow chips. In the mean time, from our end of it, someone oughta start working on steganography FAST. Spread spectrum designs are feasible. Slow is okay; the goal being to do anything that will render key escrow obsolete by making it impossible to tell when ciphertext (or for that matter any kind of data) is being sent. -gg ------------------------------ End of Extropians Digest V93 Issue #0199 ****************************************