From extropians-request@gnu.ai.mit.edu Fri Apr 16 14:38:59 1993 Return-Path: Received: from usc.edu by chaph.usc.edu (4.1/SMI-4.1+ucs-3.0) id AA07655; Fri, 16 Apr 93 14:38:56 PDT Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu Received: from churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu by usc.edu (4.1/SMI-3.0DEV3-USC+3.1) id AA06436; Fri, 16 Apr 93 14:38:52 PDT Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu Received: by churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu (5.65/4.0) id ; Fri, 16 Apr 93 17:23:27 -0400 Message-Id: <9304162123.AA19617@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu> To: ExI-Daily@gnu.ai.mit.edu Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 17:21:55 -0400 X-Original-Message-Id: <9304162121.AA19608@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu> X-Original-To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu From: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu Subject: Extropians Digest V93 #0197 X-Extropian-Date: Remailed on April 16, 373 P.N.O. [21:23:26 UTC] Reply-To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu Errors-To: Extropians-Request@gnu.ai.mit.edu Status: OR Extropians Digest Fri, 16 Apr 93 Volume 93 : Issue 0197 Today's Topics: BOOKS: Wilson's LaNague Chronicles [1 msgs] COMP: Complexity of sorting [1 msgs] Dorothy Denning's friends strike [4 msgs] HUMOR: Anti P(C) Graffito [1 msgs] HUMOR: Libertarian Party doomed [2 msgs] IMPORTANT! [6 msgs] Korzybski's "E-Prime", also NLP [3 msgs] TECH: Genetic algorithms question [6 msgs] White House announcement on encryption--FORWARDED [1 msgs] [tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May): White House announcement on encryption--FORWARDED] [1 msgs] text of White House announcement and Q&As on clipper chip encryption [1 msgs] Administrivia: This is the digested version of the Extropian mailing list. Please remember that this list is private; messages must not be forwarded without their author's permission. 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Approximate Size: 52092 bytes. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 09:12:19 CDT From: twb3@midway.uchicago.edu (Tom Morrow) Subject: HUMOR: Anti P(C) Graffito Reputed graffito, as reported by ESQUIRE magazine: "The political is never correct." T.O. Morrow -- twb3@midway.uchicago.edu Vice President: ExI -- The Extropy Institute Law & Politics Editor: EXTROPY -- Journal of Transhumanist Thought ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 09:59:30 -0400 (EDT) From: cbmvax!snark.thyrsus.com!esr@uunet.UU.NET (Eric S. Raymond) Subject: Korzybski's "E-Prime", also NLP > I do find that since learning of E-Prime and of GS in general, that a > warning flag goes up in my mind whenever I encounter excessively izzy > statements or questions such as "what *is* X, *really*?". Words like > "really", "essentially", "only", etc. have the same effect. They usually > disguise muddled thinking. I even regard the word "the" with suspicion on > occasion. *Excellent*! It sounds like you are beginning to internalize consciousness of abstracting. You have just increased your intelligence. Next step; learn the sme suspicion about claims that rely on excluded middle. -- Eric S. Raymond ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 11:20:25 -0400 From: pavel@PARK.BU.EDU (Paul Cisek) Subject: TECH: Genetic algorithms question Eli writes: > >If you just remove half of the population randomly with respect to >the gene in question, the removed half and the remaining half will >have the same expected allele frequencies, just by symmetry. You >might expect more inbreeding, but really, those related to you are >as likely to be removed as those not. > I was thinking of a population decreasing nonrandomly but rather based upon territory. Thus any particular group within a region may survive and be forced to inbreed through lack of other mates. But your point is well taken. For a large number of scenarios (like disease) this mechanism wouldn't work. It could only work under certain assumptions, perhaps for climate changes and such... -Paul ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 11:40:25 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Subject: HUMOR: Libertarian Party doomed X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu says: > > CBS late nite news showed a clip of a naked woman riding through a city > on horseback wearing only the sign "Libertarians oppose income taxes!" > > I thought such a stunt was humorous, but it is damaging to the image > of libertarians. It is unprofessional and tends to project a > "crackpot" image. For this reason, the L-party will probably never > enter the mainstream (unless it can deal with it's image problem). > > I've met quite a few people who think libertarians are nothing more > than drug using homosexual republicans. "Humor" is the wrong prefix. "Truth" is more like it. (This is not to say that libertarians are all drug using homosexual republicans: it is to say that the Libertarian Party is pretty much going nowhere.) Perry ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 11:50:29 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Subject: Korzybski's "E-Prime", also NLP X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission Eric S. Raymond says: > Next step; learn the sme suspicion about claims that rely on excluded middle. Can you elaborate on that? Perry ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 12:02:55 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Subject: Dorothy Denning's friends strike X-Reposting-Policy: unlimited redistribution permitted. To: cypherpunks@toad.com, libernet@dartmouth.edu, extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu [Libernet readers -- please do not follow up on libernet, as it is only for announcements. All readers -- please do not CC lists you are not on with replies.] According to a front page article in today's New York Times, the Clinton Administration is going to be releasing a standard encryption technology that commercial users will be encouraged to adopt that involves having the government keep copies of "back door" keys associated with every device deployed. The article is entitled, with unintentional irony, "Communications Plan to Balance Government Access with Privacy". The article indicates that the move is "inteded to resolve a long standing dilema[...] how to preserve the legitimate right for businesses and citizens to use codes [...] without letting criminals and terrorists conspire beyond the reach of the law". The implications are obvious. Perry Metzger ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 09:50:24 -0400 (EDT) From: cbmvax!snark.thyrsus.com!esr@uunet.UU.NET (Eric S. Raymond) Subject: TECH: Genetic algorithms question > Now waitaminit. The pigment is in the iris, not the cornea -- if it > were in the cornea, everything you see would be tinted (well, maybe > not, given adaptation. But it would screw corneal transplants to > hell.) I have hazel eyes and have just been assured that I do not > have tinted corneas. Possibly I have my anatomical terminology slightly wrong. There was a sort of feel about the memory as though it had lost some detail; haven't accessed it in some time. By `cornea' I meant the transparent (or almost transparent) tissue over the iris. > As to the blue color of blue eyes being produced by scattering, that > sounds reasonable. It supports the implicit assumption I made in > explaining eye-color dominance, that the "default" color is blue. Yup. Except that, worldwide, the statistical norm is brown. I'm not sure, but I believe that blue/green/gray eyes are effectively confined to European populations. This may bear on your next point. > If I were designing an eye, I'd make the iris black, as opaque as > possible. Who'd make a camera with a translucent diaphragm? I > guess there are other considerations than light scattered through > the iris, because nobody's got black eyes... But most people, worldwide, have dark brown eyes. It may be that brown is the human norm, with blue an old local adaptation to mist and fog conditions, and all the other colors being essentially off-blues. -- Eric S. Raymond ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 09:52:01 -0400 (EDT) From: cbmvax!snark.thyrsus.com!esr@uunet.UU.NET (Eric S. Raymond) Subject: BOOKS: Wilson's LaNague Chronicles > Has anyone out there read any of F. Paul Wilson's science > fiction? The new issue of Liberty describes Wilson's > The_LaNague_Chronicles as "explicitly libertarian science fiction". > The book is an omnibus edition incorporating three novels "Healer", > "Wheels Within Wheels", and "An Enemy of the State" (you gotta love > that last title). > > Anyone care to cough up a review? No time to write one now, but I can tell you that Liberty is correct and the books are pretty good (especially AEotS). -- Eric S. Raymond ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 10:27:32 -0800 From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty) Subject: HUMOR: Libertarian Party doomed Perry says >(This is not to say that libertarians are all drug using homosexual >republicans: it is to say that the Libertarian Party is pretty much >going nowhere.) I can't imagine this coming as any sort of a surprise to anyone. The Libertarians have yet to demonstrate that they could campaign their way out of a pay toilet. -- Lefty (lefty@apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 10:24:51 PDT From: Eli Brandt Subject: TECH: Genetic algorithms question > From: jrk@information-systems.east-anglia.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway) > > [introns just sit there] > Is this actually known to be the case, or speculation based only on current > ignorance of any known function for the apparently functionless material? Well, it's always partially speculation. Some unexpressed material actually serves a structural rather than genetic purpose. But the bulk of it is just normal genome, sitting there and never getting expressed. It has no *means* to function, except by its untranslated presence. The appendix at least is hanging around your abdomen, capable of doing something. There has been speculation that this material is actually a carrier for species memory, or that it's a message from our alien creators, and so forth. I don't find this very plausible (though I like the second one), because if you look at the stuff, you see ordinary genetic material. Some pieces are recognizably similar to known genes. > Richard Kennaway Eli ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 10:28:20 PDT From: Eli Brandt Subject: TECH: Genetic algorithms question > From: pavel@PARK.BU.EDU (Paul Cisek) > I was thinking of a population decreasing nonrandomly but rather based upon > territory. Thus any particular group within a region may survive and be forced > to inbreed through lack of other mates. Ah, this would work. I don't have a feel for how often this sort of population reduction will happen, but it will to some extent. Probably quite a bit, actually. > -Paul Eli ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 10:39:18 PDT From: Eli Brandt Subject: TECH: Genetic algorithms question > From: cbmvax!snark.thyrsus.com!esr@uunet.UU.NET (Eric S. Raymond) > By `cornea' I meant the transparent (or almost transparent) tissue over > the iris. Yeah, the cornea is the clear `window' in the anterior surface. But I've never heard of a tinted one (though this might be an EC self-alteration: rose-tinted corneae?). Are you sure you're not seeing light that's come off the iris and been internally reflected? > But most people, worldwide, have dark brown eyes. It may be that brown > is the human norm, with blue an old local adaptation to mist and fog > conditions, and all the other colors being essentially off-blues. Sounds reasonable; I was just thinking that you could probably do better than brown. This is probably a result of my tendency to misjudge optical densities. Really, brown is probably almost exactly as good as black. I wonder how blue eyes help in fog? (But you know, I'm not sure this is on topic, strictly speaking) > Eric S. Raymond Eli ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 10:47:35 -0700 From: cappello%cs@hub.ucsb.edu (Peter Cappello) Subject: COMP: Complexity of sorting > The reason that radix sort is able to work in linear time is >that it depends on the number of digits in the number being sorted. True. >So while >it is not (n*lg n), it is (d * lg n), where d is the logarithm of n >or larger. That is too fast. If b is the number of bits/number and there are n numbers, then its complexity is O(bn): linear in the size of the input, with respect to the random-access machine model. -Pete cappello@cs.ucsb.edu ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 13:38:30 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Subject: [tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May): White House announcement on encryption--FORWARDED] Forwarded message from Tim May: From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Message-Id: <9304161638.AA19495@netcom3.netcom.com> Subject: White House announcement on encryption--FORWARDED To: cypherpunks@toad.com Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 9:38:01 PDT X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11] Cypherpunks, Here's a message from sci.crypt that's of relevance to us in several ways. I assume from its length, seriousness, and wording that it's not a spoof...I can't check the White House's signature! Some messages: 1. It tells us what Denning and Rivest were probably actually working on when they floated their "trial balloons" last summer and fall. 2. A goverment-sanctioned phone encryption technique has implications for the phone encryption topics we've discussed at the Cypherpunks meetings (notably with Paul Rubin and Whit Diffie). 3. As always, end-to-end encryption, bypassing such schemes as this, is looking better and better. 4. It is not clear if the government scheme will legally preclude other encryption schemes. 5. I expect a lively debate will soon take place in sci.crypt. Newsgroups: sci.crypt Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!uunet!dove!csrc.ncsl.nist.gov!clipper From: clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement) Subject: text of White House announcement and Q&As on clipper chip encryption Message-ID: Sender: news@dove.nist.gov Organization: National Institute of Standards & Technology Distribution: na Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 15:19:06 GMT Lines: 282 Note: This file will also be available via anonymous file transfer from csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in directory /pub/nistnews and via the NIST Computer Security BBS at 301-948-5717. --------------------------------------------------- THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary _________________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release April 16, 1993 STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY The President today announced a new initiative that will bring the Federal Government together with industry in a voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement. The initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links. For too long there has been little or no dialogue between our private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of protecting Americans. Rather than use technology to accommodate the sometimes competing interests of economic growth, privacy and law enforcement, previous policies have pitted government against industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement. Sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer. It is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files. While encryption technology can help Americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information, it also can be used by terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals. A state-of-the-art microcircuit called the "Clipper Chip" has been developed by government engineers. The chip represents a new approach to encryption technology. It can be used in new, relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to an ordinary telephone. It scrambles telephone communications using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in commercial use today. This new technology will help companies protect proprietary information, protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically. At the same time this technology preserves the ability of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals. A "key-escrow" system will be established to ensure that the "Clipper Chip" is used to protect the privacy of law-abiding Americans. Each device containing the chip will have two unique 2 "keys," numbers that will be needed by authorized government agencies to decode messages encoded by the device. When the device is manufactured, the two keys will be deposited separately in two "key-escrow" data bases that will be established by the Attorney General. Access to these keys will be limited to government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap. The "Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of Americans. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology, the Attorney General will soon purchase several thousand of the new devices. In addition, respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings. The chip is an important step in addressing the problem of encryption's dual-edge sword: encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can shield criminals and terrorists. We need the "Clipper Chip" and other approaches that can both provide law-abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities. In order to assess technology trends and explore new approaches (like the key-escrow system), the President has directed government agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on encryption that accommodates: -- the privacy of our citizens, including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes; -- the ability of authorized officials to access telephone calls and data, under proper court or other legal order, when necessary to protect our citizens; -- the effective and timely use of the most modern technology to build the National Information Infrastructure needed to promote economic growth and the competitiveness of American industry in the global marketplace; and -- the need of U.S. companies to manufacture and export high technology products. The President has directed early and frequent consultations with affected industries, the Congress and groups that advocate the privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed. 3 The Administration is committed to working with the private sector to spur the development of a National Information Infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer technologies to give Americans unprecedented access to information. This infrastructure of high-speed networks ("information superhighways") will transmit video, images, HDTV programming, and huge data files as easily as today's telephone system transmits voice. Since encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in that infrastructure, the Federal Government must act quickly to develop consistent, comprehensive policies regarding its use. The Administration is committed to policies that protect all Americans' right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law. Further information is provided in an accompanying fact sheet. The provisions of the President's directive to acquire the new encryption technology are also available. For additional details, call Mat Heyman, National Institute of Standards and Technology, (301) 975-2758. - --------------------------------- QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVE Q: Does this approach expand the authority of government agencies to listen in on phone conversations? A: No. "Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of Americans. Q: Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device. What would they have to do to decipher the message? A: They would have to obtain legal authorization, normally a court order, to do the wiretap in the first place. They would then present documentation of this authorization to the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug smugglers. The key is split into two parts, which are stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key escrow system. Q: Who will run the key-escrow data banks? A: The two key-escrow data banks will be run by two independent entities. At this point, the Department of Justice and the Administration have yet to determine which agencies will oversee the key-escrow data banks. Q: How strong is the security in the device? How can I be sure how strong the security is? A: This system is more secure than many other voice encryption systems readily available today. While the algorithm will remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow system, we are willing to invite an independent panel of cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all potential users that there are no unrecognized vulnerabilities. Q: Whose decision was it to propose this product? A: The National Security Council, the Justice Department, the Commerce Department, and other key agencies were involved in this decision. This approach has been endorsed by the President, the Vice President, and appropriate Cabinet officials. Q: Who was consulted? The Congress? Industry? A: We have on-going discussions with Congress and industry on encryption issues, and expect those discussions to intensify as we carry out our review of encryption policy. We have briefed members of Congress and industry leaders on the decisions related to this initiative. Q: Will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers? A: The government designed and developed the key access encryption microcircuits, but it is not providing the microcircuits to product manufacturers. Product manufacturers can acquire the microcircuits from the chip manufacturer that produces them. Q: Who provides the "Clipper Chip"? A: Mykotronx programs it at their facility in Torrance, California, and will sell the chip to encryption device manufacturers. The programming function could be licensed to other vendors in the future. Q: How do I buy one of these encryption devices? A: We expect several manufacturers to consider incorporating the "Clipper Chip" into their devices. Q: If the Administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed, would the Administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices? A: This is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review. The key escrow mechanism will provide Americans with an encryption product that is more secure, more convenient, and less expensive than others readily available today, but it is just one piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to encryption technology, which the Administration is developing. The Administration is not saying, "since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement, we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have effectively done); nor is the U.S. saying that "every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product." There is a false "tension" created in the assessment that this issue is an "either-or" proposition. Rather, both concerns can be, and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned, balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper Chip" and similar encryption techniques. Q: What does this decision indicate about how the Clinton Administration's policy toward encryption will differ from that of the Bush Administration? A: It indicates that we understand the importance of encryption technology in telecommunications and computing and are committed to working with industry and public-interest groups to find innovative ways to protect Americans' privacy, help businesses to compete, and ensure that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime and terrorism. Q: Will the devices be exportable? Will other devices that use the government hardware? A: Voice encryption devices are subject to export control requirements. Case-by-case review for each export is required to ensure appropriate use of these devices. The same is true for other encryption devices. One of the attractions of this technology is the protection it can give to U.S. companies operating at home and abroad. With this in mind, we expect export licenses will be granted on a case-by-case basis for U.S. companies seeking to use these devices to secure their own communications abroad. We plan to review the possibility of permitting wider exportability of these products. - -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. - -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. ------- End of Forwarded Message ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 13:19:33 CDT From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn) Subject: TECH: Genetic algorithms question Eli Brandt: > > > [introns just sit there] > > Is this actually known to be the case, or speculation based only on current > > ignorance of any known function for the apparently functionless material? > > Some unexpressed material > actually serves a structural rather than genetic purpose. But the > bulk of it is just normal genome, sitting there and never getting > expressed. ... if you look at the stuff, you see ordinary > genetic material. Well, ordinary in that there's not silly string or polywater in there, but the statistical distribution of the codons (and better yet codon pairs or triples) in noncoding regions is very different from those in coding regions. This is the major reason that it's pretty easy to train a neural net to do a very good job telling the difference between noncoding and coding regions. Note also that 'intron' is not a generic term for noncoding regions of DNA. An intron is a chunk that is between pieces of a gene. This means that it gets translated into RNA, whereas other noncoding regions (generally) do not. Some of this RNA then performs catalytic functions similar to proteins. derek ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 14:25:21 EDT From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger) Subject: IMPORTANT! X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission The White House cryptography initiative I've posted about today is in my opinion the most important threat to freedom of the last twenty years, possibly the biggest since the end of world war II. I urge everyone who has not done so to read the press release I forwarded by way of Tim May. Perry ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 11:55:34 PDT From: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney) Subject: Dorothy Denning's friends strike X-Reposting-Policy: Redistribute freely A press release from Clinton's ofice describing this shocking proposal (or fait accompli?) has been posted to several newsgroups, including: sci.crypt alt.security comp.org.eff.talk comp.security.misc comp.org.acm comp.org.ieee It is also available, according to the document, via anonymous ftp to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in directory /pub/nistnews, and via the NIST Computer Security BBS at 301-948-5717. I encourage people to read it for themselves. Frankly, I find myself stunned by the implications of this proposal. It seems clear to me that for the government to achieve its goals in producing this chip it must forbid people to use strong encryption of their own. Otherwise the terrorists and criminals the government claims to want to crack down on would obviously avoid using chips with back doors in them. It is so shocking to me that the United States would actually ban a technology useful solely for protecting privacy that I hardly know how to respond. Hopefully the next few days will reveal some prospects for positive action that might have an impact. Obviously there was no effect from the sound drubbing this scheme got when Dorothy Denning proposed a variant on sci.crypt last year. Hal hal@alumni.caltech.edu ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 15:01:01 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Subject: Dorothy Denning's friends strike X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission Hal Finney says: > It is so shocking to me that the United States would actually ban a > technology useful solely for protecting privacy that I hardly know how > to respond. Hopefully the next few days will reveal some prospects for > positive action that might have an impact. Obviously there was no effect > from the sound drubbing this scheme got when Dorothy Denning proposed a > variant on sci.crypt last year. Dorothy was obviously put up to it. For them to have released working product they had to have been working on this for a long time. Seriously folks, quit what you are doing and start researching this well enough that you can talk to your congresscritter, newspaper, etc about this. We are going to need to crush this and soon. Its a real personal threat to all of us -- I mean that. No hyperbole: this is as big as McCarthyism. Its important, its real, and its here. Perry ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 14:27:32 -0400 (EDT) From: cbmvax!snark.thyrsus.com!esr@uunet.UU.NET (Eric S. Raymond) Subject: Korzybski's "E-Prime", also NLP >>Next step; learn the same suspicion about claims that rely on excluded middle. > > Can you elaborate on that? Sure. In the real world, Aristotelian logic is in general false. Neither the "Law of the Excluded Middle" (A | ~A), nor noncontradiction ~(A & ~A) holds. It's become a cliche to trot out QM in support of this, but it's true even classically (as proponents of fuzzy logic and the related "fudgy logic" in AI have realized). To see this for yourself, think carefully about the predicates "hot" and "cold". Part of "conscious of abstracting" is the awareness that natural language tends to impose on our thinking a two-valuedness which is unsane. GS teaches this insight not just as an intellectual bagatelle but as an active, constant corrective towards sanity. -- Eric S. Raymond ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 14:41:45 CDT From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn) Subject: IMPORTANT! Perry writes: > The White House cryptography initiative I've posted about today is in > my opinion the most important threat to freedom of the last twenty > years Why? I agree that government should just butt out, but I'm not sure why this particular piece of rubbish is more devastating than other government "initiatives". I thought that the perceived danger was from regulations prohibiting encryption devices. This thing doesn't appear to do that -- isn't this just a government program trying to convince people to use their solution? I can't see why people would, so it'll likely bomb. Hmm. On the other hand, I could see the "broad policy review" coming up with awful legislation banning non-government-decryptable data transmissions, and this idiotic "Clipper chip" thing being used as a justification; but I can scarcely believe that it would have a major impact on the fundamental privacy issue. So, since legislation like that has been a threat for some time already, am I right in thinking that what's new is just this (hypothetical) justification mechanism? Even though it does seem a minor "new" threat, those straws are indeed piling up on this camel's back. I haven't been following the issue very closely; what is the current thought on first amendment protection of private encryption? derek dear mr. president: You do not seem to realize that one of the major reasons we the people want encryption technology is that we do not trust your thugs to behave honorably and within their rules, nor do we recognize the justice or legitimacy of those rules. Must I also write all correspondence in 6th grade english so that the FBI can not only read but understand my private communications? ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 15:48:35 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Subject: IMPORTANT! X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission Derek Zahn says: > Perry writes: > > > The White House cryptography initiative I've posted about today is in > > my opinion the most important threat to freedom of the last twenty > > years > > Why? I agree that government should just butt out, but I'm not > sure why this particular piece of rubbish is more devastating > than other government "initiatives". I thought that the perceived > danger was from regulations prohibiting encryption devices. Thats what it is all about! Read it again! > This > thing doesn't appear to do that -- isn't this just a government > program trying to convince people to use their solution? I can't > see why people would, so it'll likely bomb. The only way that they can assure that their people will be able to read messages going by is to impose the use of this system. If they do not impose the use of the system, the key registration technology they are proposing becomes useless gibberish. It is obvious to many people, including myself, Phil Zimmermann, Phil Karn, folks at EFF, etc, that this is what the direction is. > So, since legislation like that has been a threat for some time already, > am I right in thinking that what's new is just this (hypothetical) > justification mechanism? No. Perry ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 15:15:35 CDT From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn) Subject: IMPORTANT! Oh, another thing: > The only way that they can assure that their people will be able to > read messages going by is to impose the use of this system. If they do > not impose the use of the system, the key registration technology they > are proposing becomes useless gibberish. No it doesn't. For example: you must do it to get government contracts. You must do it to send encrypted data over NREN or any other government- owned data transmission medium. And so on. There are lots of reasons that do not restrict my freedom as a private individual. I'm not defending this typical clownish government lunacy; just trying to clarify what it is actually saying, rather than what others project onto it. derek ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 15:16:18 CDT From: eder@hsvaic.boeing.com (Dani Eder) Subject: Dorothy Denning's friends strike On a technical work-around level, won't it be possible to have voice to encrypted data stream and back using personal computers? My Macintosh at home has a microphone and a modem port, and sounds can already be converted to data files and back. I don't think the Mac is fast enough to do this in real time right now, but I could Imagine holding a conversation slowly by recording onto a data file, encrypting it, sending it via modem, then reversing the process and listening to the speech via a speaker. How much more computer power would it take to do this real time? Of course, at typing speeds, I imagine it is no problem to hold a secure conversation right now through a modem, provided the encryption scheme itself is secure. Dani Eder ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 16:22:23 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" Subject: IMPORTANT! X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission Derek Zahn says: > Oh, another thing: > > > The only way that they can assure that their people will be able to > > read messages going by is to impose the use of this system. If they do > > not impose the use of the system, the key registration technology they > > are proposing becomes useless gibberish. > > No it doesn't. For example: you must do it to get government contracts. > You must do it to send encrypted data over NREN or any other government- > owned data transmission medium. And so on. There are lots of reasons > that do not restrict my freedom as a private individual. I disagree. They are going to try to get it used in all phone equipment so that they can catch terrorists -- they say so, more or less. I cannot believe your naivite -- just because the document doesn't come out and say "we are banning private encryption" doesn't mean thats not very obviously their ultimate intent. Government does NOT come out and say we are going to rape you -- they put out ambigious press releases. Read between the lines. They want to push this and hard. It becomes a mockery if people are using secure encryption systems other than it -- they are going to have to impose the technology eventually. Perry ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 15:10:02 CDT From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn) Subject: IMPORTANT! > > Why? I agree that government should just butt out, but I'm not > > sure why this particular piece of rubbish is more devastating > > than other government "initiatives". I thought that the perceived > > danger was from regulations prohibiting encryption devices. > > Thats what it is all about! Read it again! I did. Four times so far. Here's part of it: Q: If the Administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed, would the Administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices? A: This is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review. The key escrow mechanism will provide Americans with an encryption product that is more secure, more convenient, and less expensive than others readily available today, but it is just one piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to encryption technology, which the Administration is developing. The Administration is not saying, "since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement, we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have effectively done); nor is the U.S. saying that "every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product." There is a false "tension" created in the assessment that this issue is an "either-or" proposition. Rather, both concerns can be, and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned, balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper Chip" and similar encryption techniques. Where does it say anywhere that this proposal would make unbreakable private encryption illegal? That document is not "all about" such regulations -- it doesn't even mention them! All I'm saying is that I'd like to see one further question answered by somebody in the administration: Q: Is it part of your proposal to make private encryption of data (by any means) illegal? derek ------------------------------ End of Extropians Digest V93 Issue #0197 ****************************************